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Abstract 
In an interview with Jessica Benjamin and Margaret Simons in 1979, Simone de 
Beauvoir identified the problem that had preoccupied her across her lifetime, that is, “her” 
problem, as the problem of the “the consciousness of the other”. In making this claim, she 
echoed words she had written almost fifty years earlier, when in 1927 as an undergraduate 
student, she wrote in her journal that what interested her was “almost always this 
opposition of self and other that I have felt since beginning to live”. In bookending her 
career in this manner, Beauvoir points her readers to consider her work as a sustained 
engagement with Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, for it is in this text that this problem 
takes shape. Hegel traces the journey of spirit from consciousness to Absolute 
Knowledge. In so doing he provides a description of how it is that the self comes to reside 
in the other and the other to reside in the self as the hostility that initially leads to the 
objectification of one by the other gives way to recognition. This study investigates the 
development of Beauvoir’s understanding of the problem of the other’s consciousness. 
Three times across her career Beauvoir would turn to Hegel’s text. Using these readings 
as guideposts, it traces her account of the relationship between self and other from her 
study of hostility in her early works, through to her discovery of the force of history and 
the interdependence of subjectivities in her moral period, to her exploration of the forms 
of reciprocity in her mature studies, finally through to her acknowledgement of mutual 
recognition via her reflections on writing in her late works. It examines the ways in which 
Beauvoir thinks with Hegel, picking up his project, contextualizing and criticizing it, thus 
giving it life. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Beauvoir, Hegel and The Problem of The Other 
 
1.1 Simone de Beauvoir and The Problem of the Other’s Consciousness 
“this problem . . . of the other’s consciousness, it was my problem.” 1 
 - Beauvoir 
 
In an interview with Jessica Benjamin and Margaret Simons in 1979, Simone de Beauvoir identified 
the problem that had preoccupied her across her lifetime, that is, “her” problem, as the problem of the 
“the consciousness of the other.”2 In making this claim, she echoed words she had written almost fifty 
years earlier, when in 1927 as a young undergraduate student, she wrote in her journal that what 
interested her was “almost always this opposition of self and other that I have felt since beginning to 
live.”3 Bookending her career with these references, Beauvoir provides her readers with a strategy for 
reading her works as she would have them read. Her focus would not be on the problem of the 
individual in relation to his freedom.4 Such ontological questions would define and underlie the 
                                                      
1 Simons, 1999, 10. 
2 “So when you wrote in L'lnvitée that Françoise says what really upsets her about Xavière is that she has to 
confront in her another consciousness, that is not an idea that particularly came (from) Sartre? S.B.: It was I 
who thought about that! It was absolutely not Sartre! J.B.: But that is an idea which it seems to me appears later 
in his work. S.B.: Oh! Maybe! (Laughter) In any case, this problem . . .of the other’s consciousness, it was my 
problem.” Simons, 1999, 10. 
3 “Il faut que je mette au net mes idées philosophiques et peut-être que je commence ce récit que j’aimerais 
écrire. Tant d’idées qu’ont mûries mes meditations et précisées mes conversations. De mes dix-huit mois de 
pensée je devrais faire le recensement, reprendre et approfondir les problems qui m’ont sollicité, auxquels j’ai 
donné de trop hâtives solutions. Le thème est presque toujours cette opposition de moi et l’autre que j’ai sentie 
en commencant de vivre. Maintenant est venu le temps d’en faire une synthèse. Les influences étrangères sont 
écartées, et aussi le désir de tout recherché d’écriture. J’écrirai mon oeuvre dans mon propre style en cherchant 
seulement à bien exprimer ce que je sens.” CJ 367; DPS 279. 
4 Throughout this text the masculine pronoun is employed. This may seem to be a surprising choice in the 
context of writing about one of the most influential feminist writers of all times. The choice is intentional. 
Beauvoir herself used the masculine pronoun in her work. In part this decision no doubt reflected the 
conventions of the time. However, it seems as well to capture something of her own philosophical commitments 
and political reflections. As she herself notes in The Second Sex the feminine remains the marked term. (TSS2 
5, DS115 ) To change the pronoun thus is to change her meaning. When she speaks, for example of the self 
using masculine terms, she is both employing standard writing practice for her time, but she is also making a 
  2 
projects taken up by Sartre. Rather, assuming and indeed, embracing the ambiguity that defines an 
individual life, and recognizing that the individual is always already amidst a world populated by 
other individuals, her questions would center on the problems of intersubjectivity and the possibility 
of recognition.  Could the other ever be seen as the self? Could it be seen and understood as at one 
and the same time being self and other, subject and object, immanence and transcendence? And could 
the other simultaneously see the self in all its complexity not reducing it to either a pure subjectivity 
or a pure objectivity? What would be the conditions for the possibility of such recognition? And 
could mutual recognition of this sort move beyond being a theoretical possibility posited on the pages 
of philosophical essays and explored in novels to being a lived experience? Together these questions 
would frame her problem. Yet, more than twenty years after her death, no one has offered up a 
reading Beauvoir’s oeuvre as she herself suggests. That is, no one yet has read her works as a 
sustained meditation on the problem of the other’s consciousness.  
Why this hesitancy to take Beauvoir up on this task? No doubt, in part it reflects the extent of 
the undertaking. Beauvoir did not produce a sustained discussion or study of this problem but rather 
weaved her reflections and analysis of this relationship into and throughout her works. Her various 
texts – her essays, novels, plays, journals, letters -- trace an ongoing conversation, on ongoing 
investigation of the subject matter. This proves frustrating for while she may introduce a problem in 
an essay, she goes on to explore the issue in greater detail, placing it in context in one of her novels 
and then in her autobiography discusses its grounding in the historical times in which she was 
writing. She advances an answer only to reject it, revise it and re-approach it in another medium. To 
trace the development of her ideas on this question thus proves to be a daunting task. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
stronger point concerning the exclusion of women from the class of those who have their subjectivity 
recognized. 
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Moreover, the problem itself, poses challenges for Beauvoir scholars. For what is it to speak 
of the “problem of the other’s consciousness?” In so describing her project, she points towards her 
preoccupation with Hegel’s account of “the history of consciousness.” More specifically, given the 
historic context that frames these claims, Beauvoir’s very choice of words seems to be directing those 
who would study her works to turn their attention to Hegel and to his Phenomenology of Spirit. It is in 
this work that Hegel explores the question of the relationship between the self and other, considering 
whether “the subject-object distinction has become an unbridgeable gap”5 or if there remains open at 
the theoretical level (metaphysics) as well as within the realm of lived experience (phenomenology), 
the possibility for a self, a subject, to find itself, at home in the other. As Hegel in this work maps the 
moments in the development of consciousness in its attempt to find itself as self-consciousness in and 
through the other, in and through Spirit, as he uncovers the conditions for the possibility for 
discovering the “’I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I,’”6 Beauvoir traces this progression, explores this 
possibility, in and across her works. Both wonder, consider, and reconsider whether it is possible for 
each to be “for the other what the other is for it”7 that is, whether it is possible for each to recognize 
themselves as mutually recognizing one another.”8  
To describe this line of inquiry as “a question” is misleading. The problem of the other’s 
consciousness is not a single problem but rather is a cluster of interconnected questions concerning 
the relationships between agents or consciousnesses. The problem is premised on resolving the 
problem of other minds. That is, it is first necessary to establish that others exist, before 
considerations can be made as to how they exist. As such, one dimension of the problem of the 
other’s consciousness entails discovering or uncovering the existence of separate beings in the world. 
But to answer questions about the existence of the other, it is necessary at one and the same time to 
                                                      
5 Williams, 1992,41. 
6 PS § 177, 110. 
7 PS § 186, 113. 
8 PS § 184, 112. 
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raise similar questions about the self.  As Taylor notes “what appears to be a relationship of otherness 
. . . always turns out to be an aspect of mediate self- relation.”9 To speak of the other, is always 
already to speak of the self. And this in turn reveals yet another element or aspect of the problem at 
hand. As Hegel makes clear, the self is always divided – divided not only from others in the world but 
also from the other that lies within itself. The divide between consciousnesses is replicated within 
each consciousness. Thus, to address the problem of the other’s consciousness, it is necessary also to 
address the problem of the divided consciousness, to confront the risks entailed in acknowledging the 
ambiguity of the other and perhaps, more importantly, of the self.  
And it is to take up the epistemological challenges raised thereby. As noted by Douzinas and 
Jurist, recognition entails a theory of cognition, for its very pursuit, upends those accounts of 
knowledge that would focus on introspection and abstraction.10 It challenges those who would 
consider its possibility to rethink how it is that knowledge of others and of the self is acquired. If the 
other is a subject, the problem of the other’s consciousness necessitates consideration of the 
conditions for the possibility of turning, “knowledge into a process of cultural mutuality and 
exchange and self-knowledge into self-exploration and self-control through the understanding of the 
other.”11 Further, it requires careful reflection upon the implications of this shift.  To address the 
problem of the other’s consciousness is to consider how it is that the world and the self come to be 
known.  
These metaphysical and epistemological premises frame considerations of the possibility and 
the potential for inter-subjectivity – that is, they provide the conditions for the possibility of 
addressing the socio-political dimensions of this problem.  For it is not so much the problem of the 
other’s consciousness that Beauvoir centers her lifework upon as it is the problems of other 
                                                      
9 Taylor, 1987, xxii. 
10 Douzinas, 2002; Jurist 2000. 
11 Douzinas, 2002, 384-385. 
  5 
consciousnesses. The problem gives rise to considerations of what happens when two subjects 
encounter one another, each wanting to maintain its own mastery, its own subjectivity. How does one 
act knowing that others exist in the world, others who claim to have consciousnesses like one’s own? 
How should one behave given that whatever choice one makes will affect the other in ways he or she 
cannot know and would not choose? Under such circumstances, to whom is one responsible? What 
are the necessary and sufficient conditions for responsibility? And, finally, there are questions 
concerning the possibility of recognition.  
It is this cluster of questions to which Beauvoir gives the label “the problem of the other’s 
consciousness.”  Depending on her lived experience and on historical events, her attention at times is 
more clearly directed towards the ontological issues that this problem incorporates, while at other 
times, her focus centers more notably upon its ethical dimensions.  As her understanding of one of 
these issues changed, the reverberations are evident across her thinking. In her works issues unfold, as 
Sandford notes.12 What is witnessed is the setting in motion of the argument, the workings of the 
dialectic that can be traced as it changes, as new questions arise from the framing of a problem or 
from its placement in a particular context. Her work evidences philosophical reasoning. She is always 
demonstrating philosophy at work. But to take up such a reading of her oeuvre is to challenge 
perceived notions of Beauvoir’s project, notions that she herself works hard to advance. 13 
In reading Beauvoir’s work as she herself suggests, several myths that continue to frame the 
reception of her work – myths that, at times during her career, she staunchly encourages -- are 
revealed. First, her description of the guiding interest in/of her work makes clear that it is a 
philosophical issue that is the focus of her concern. Beauvoir herself claims that while Sartre is the 
                                                      
12 Sanford, 2008, 2. 
13 See Moi 1994 for a detailed discussion of Beauvoir’s attempt to undermine her own philosophical 
significance. 
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philosopher she is the writer.14 This description encourages depictions of her as a disciple of Sartre 
and undermines serious attention being paid to her unique philosophical contributions. Yet, if hers is 
“the problem of the other’s consciousness” – if that was her unique interest, it is clear that she too is a 
philosopher, not only a writer. In these statements she makes evident that the foundations of her 
investigations lie not only in Sartre’s works but also elsewhere in the history of philosophy. She 
locates her own interests within a broader historical perspective, within the tradition of Hegel and 
Husserl, Bergson and Kierkegaard, thus undermining attempts to link her work exclusively or 
primarily with that of Sartre.15 She has a distinct project – a distinctly social project focused on the 
exploration of the relationship between consciousnesses – that is neither dictated nor directed by 
Sartre whose interests were ontological and metaphysical. Viewing her work as taking up the problem 
of the other’s consciousness, that is, viewing it as part of the tradition of French Hegelianism, requires 
the abandonment of these ideals of Beauvoir, ideals, that, however false, nonetheless have proven 
difficult to dislodge, difficult to abandon.  
 It is easy to understand why this is the case. To read Beauvoir’s work as a sustained 
conversation on the problem of the other’s consciousness is, in many ways, to re-read her work, or 
perhaps better yet to read it for the first time. It is to place her writings within a different historical 
context, a different lineage and to see them anew. It is this task that this study takes up. Tracing her 
discussion of this problem from her student diaries to her final works, it aims to read Beauvoir’s 
novels, essays, studies and autobiographical work as a continuous engagement with the ideas set forth 
in Hegel’s Phenomenology, a work that would already be in the air when she was a philosophy 
                                                      
14 Simons, 1999, 9. 
15 It seems clear that in giving homage to Hegel, in noting his influence on her writing Beauvoir challenges 
attempts to read her work as either a reflection and reiteration of Sartre’s work or as providing the foundation 
for his thoughts. The question of influence that has dominated much of Beauvoir studies, most often to the 
detriment to considerations of the content and import of her ideas, will thus be set aside in this work. For a 
discussion of these issues see Daigle and Golomb, 2009; Fullbrook and Fullbrook, 2008; Fullbrook and 
Fullbrook, 1994; and Simons, 1999. 
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student, a work she would read for herself for the first time in 1940, and to which she would return on 
two subsequent occasions across her lifetime – finding therein the structure not only for theorizing but 
as well for studying the relationship between self and other against the backdrop of her descriptions 
of lived experience. Her reading of this work would provide her with a structure, with a methodology 
for framing what would prove to be a life-long phenomenological investigation into the possibility of 
recognition. It would challenge her to think and re-think the relationship between self and other as it 
arises in the context of her own life and as it is enacted on a broader historical stage.  
1.2 Reading and Re-reading Hegel 
“this opposition of self and other that I have felt since beginning to live.” 16 
 - Beauvoir 
 
This investigation is structured around Beauvoir’s own reading and re-reading Hegel’s 
Phenomenology. Three times across her lifetime Beauvoir picks up this text, in part or in whole. She 
first encounters Hegel’s ideas in her studies at Cours Désir in 1926. While this was the briefest of 
introductions, Hegel was to a great extent already in the air in 1927 when she begins her studies at the 
Sorbonne. While there is no evidence that Beauvoir read Hegel directly during her time as a 
philosophy student, it is clear from considerations of the times and of those writers and thinkers 
whom she read and studied with, that she was gaining an indirect understanding of some of the key 
concepts developed in Hegel’s Phenomenology. 
In 1940 she reads the work in its entirety for the first time along with Jean Wahl’s La 
Malheur de la Conscience Dans La Philosophie de Hegel in Bibliothèque Nationale as she finishes 
editing She Came to Stay and begins work on The Blood of Others. Reading this work at the start of 
what is characterized as her “moral period,” she finds a discussion of history and of ambiguity that 
leads her to consider the interdependence of self and other and to reflect upon the ethical 
                                                      
16 CJ 367; DPS 279. 
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responsibilities that this relationship entails, questions of particular importance during and after the 
Second World War in France.   
Once again Beauvoir returns to this text in 1947 while writing The Second Sex, this time 
taking up the concept of mutual recognition developed therein. In both this study and in The 
Mandarins (1954), she writes what she considers to be her best account of the problem of the other’s 
consciousness, offering up her best answers to the questions posed by the encounter between the self 
and the other, in her analysis of generosity and the erotic.17 But when her faith in love, friendship and 
community waivers, when she begins to question her own account of mutual recognition, she returns 
to the text once more.  
In the early 1970s, she returns to the ideas presented in the Phenomenology one final time to 
rethink the idea of reciprocity. What results are two novels that unsettle the conditions for the 
possibility of recognition and a series of essays on writing given in Japan that offer a new conceptual 
framework from which to structure and, indeed, account for relationships in which each sees the other 
as he seems himself, that is, in which self-consciousnesses encounter each other in a self-self 
relationships. Her repeated encounters with this text thus create a timeline across which to trace her 
changing views on both structure and the possible resolution of her problem.18  
This study examines how Beauvoir’s reflections on the problem of the other’s consciousness 
refracted through these repeated readings result in the development of her own account of the 
                                                      
17 Simons, 1990, 488. 
18 Any attempt to write about Beauvoir’s work in chronological order faces a challenge. She writes her life in 
her novels, in her journals and in her autobiographies. She writes and rewrites episodes going forward and 
backward – shifting form and focus. And the interpretations and the histories she offers up are often not easily 
or readily reconcilable. This clearly leaves her commentators with difficult choices to make. Indeed, it 
encourages the fragmentation of her work. It is much easier to look at just the novels, or the essays or the 
autobiographies or the diaries than it is to piece together the elements of each – to reveal and not necessarily to 
resolve the contradictions in her work. 
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dialectic and of mutual recognition.19 Tracing the development of her understanding of this problem 
from her early student diaries through to her final works, it examines the ways in which her growing 
awareness of the inescapability of history and of the inevitability of interdependence, leads her to 
reconsider her early belief that hostility frames all encounters between the self and the other and to 
investigate the possibility of mutual recognition. This investigation explores Beauvoir’s unique 
interpretation of Hegel’s work, an interpretation not reducible to that offered by Sartre, Kojève or 
Hyppolite, an interpretation that is dialectical and which allows for the unfolding of her ideas both 
within and across her works, encompassing her creative writing as well as her theoretical studies.  
It is necessary to make clear that this is not a study of Beauvoir and Hegel. That is, it does not 
aim to investigate her work in light of his. As noted earlier, too often Beauvoir’s ideas are regarded as 
appendages to the works of her male predecessors or contemporaries. This is evident in the papers 
that have been written that look at “Beauvoir and . . .” -- Beauvoir and Sartre, Beauvoir and Merleau-
Ponty, Beauvoir and Husserl, Beauvoir and Heidegger, Beauvoir and Wright. Such readings of her 
work tend to underestimate her own, unique philosophical contributions. Too often such explorations 
elaborate at length on the work of the male writer and reduce Beauvoir’s own investigations to little 
more than a footnote.20 To bring out from the shadows her own thought, herein, the focus of attention 
is on Beauvoir’s reading of Hegel’s text and on the ways that in which that reading informed her 
understanding of the problem of the other’s consciousness, rather than on her relationship to Hegel 
more generally.  
And so it is to the texts themselves that this work addresses itself. If Beauvoir’s work is to be 
re-read in the manner proposed, that is as a study of the other’s consciousness, it requires a return to 
                                                      
19 Herein, I take issue with Deutscher’s claim that Beauvoir simply restates the problem through her readings of 
her contemporaries and predecessors. See Deutscher, 2008, 16. 
20 Consider in this context Moser’s Freedom and Recognition in Simone de Beauvoir, (2008) in which she 
devotes more pages to the discussion of Sartre’s philosophy than to that of Beauvoir herself. 
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the texts to chart the unfolding of her understanding of this problem and of her proposed solutions.  In 
taking up this project, the existing scholarship on Beauvoir in English is drawn upon to frame the 
discussion. The scope of this study is limited in this way due to the particular approach to Beauvoir 
taken in the French-speaking world. As noted by Tidd, the inherent masculinism of French academe 
and the predominance of psychoanalytic approaches to feminism have ensured that Beauvoir’s 
philosophy garners little serious attention in that context.21 With few exceptions22, her work has been 
overlooked for what, on the surface, appear to be more radical, original and sophisticated theories or 
it has been characterized as the rather simplistic reflections of a Sartreuse.  Hence it is to the 
scholarship in English that the present study turns for its groundings.  But before turning to 
Beauvoir’s texts, it is first necessary to consider the work that would preoccupy her therein. In the 
opening chapter, this investigation is initiated. 
An account of the journey of spirit from sense-certainty towards absolute knowledge outlined 
in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is traced in the opening sections of Chapter Two. Consideration 
is given to the various stages of the dialectic in order to provide a backdrop for this present study. 
This overview will provide a standpoint from which to situate this present study in relation to existing 
scholarship. Beauvoir was clear as to the importance of Hegel’s influence on her work. However, the 
nature and extent of that influence has been a subject of debate. A survey of the interpretations of the 
relationship between the works of these two writers undertaken by the Moi, Gothlin, Bauer, 
Bergoffen and Moser is then undertaken in order to provide a framework on which to build this 
present interpretation. 
Chapter Three of this study, “Risk”, explores Beauvoir’s early writings within the context of 
her indirect introduction to Hegel’s ideas during her studies at Cours Désir and the Sorbonne. Already 
                                                      
21 Tidd, 1999, 3. 
22 Challenging this perception and reception of Beauvoir’s work in France has been Michelle le Doeuff (1991) 
and Claudine Monteil (2006; 2009). 
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in the 1920s and clearly by throughout the 1930s, Hegel was “en l’air.” In this context, the influence 
of Baruzi, Brunschvicg and Bergson on her reading of Hegel are explored and shown to shape her 
original belief in the opposition between self and other, a view evidenced in her journals from 1926 
through 1927, as well as in her first published work, She Came to Stay.  
Exploring Beauvoir’s writings from her ‘moral period,’ Chapter Four, “Responsibility”, 
opens with an examination of her first reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology in 1940. An encroaching 
awareness of history and of the need to reconcile freedom and facticity informs her subsequent works. 
Hers is not a wholesale adoption of his views. Her rejection of the “tranquilizing effect” offered by 
Hegel’s conception of Absolute Spirit and of his flight into the realm of the universal is examined as 
the foundation for the development of her conceptions of ambiguity and of situated freedom.  More 
specifically, in the discussion of history, interdependence and violence, this chapter examines the 
development of her conception of responsibility as a forming/framing of the problem of the other’s 
consciousness in The Blood of Others, All Men Are Mortal, her essays published from 1944 to 1947, 
including Pyrrhus and Cinéas and The Ethics of Ambiguity.  
Chapter Five of this study turns attention towards Beauvoir’s mature works and towards her 
attempt to resolve the problem of the other’s consciousness. “Reciprocity,” begins with an 
investigation of her return to Hegel’s Phenomenology in 1947, and considers the ways in which her 
writings from this time period offer up an alternative to the two accounts of Hegel’s dialectic 
prevalent at this time; namely, that offered by Kojève in his Introduction to The Reading of Hegel: 
Lecture on the Phenomenology of Spirit (1947) and by Hyppolite in his Genesis and Structure of 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1946). Placing The Second Sex in relation to these texts, that is, 
providing it with a place in the Hegel Renaissance in France at this time, offers an opportunity to 
consider the ways in which Beauvoir’s study of women shadows the Phenomenology in both its 
structure and its form. Focusing on her accounts of the experiences of love, friendship and generosity 
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as enactments of this reading, a careful reading of The Mandarins, the work in which Beauvoir 
believed she best accounted for both the problem of the other’s consciousness and of the possibility 
and potential for mutual recognition, is offered. In this later work, Beauvoir’s use of and reference to 
literature provides a means for exploring her final return to the ideas explored in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology. 
In Beauvoir’s late works, her works dating from 1958 – 1986 including her four-part 
autobiography, in her final work of fiction, The Woman Destroyed, and in her last extensive study, 
Old Age, Beauvoir turns once more to considerations of the problem of the other’s consciousness. Her 
increasing interest in exploring the economic and social conditions that frame the problem challenges 
her faith that self and other can be reconciled in experiences of love, friendship and generosity, 
leading her to return once more to Hegel’s text. Directly in her autobiographies and indirectly in her 
novels and studies dating from late 1950s through to the end of her life, she retraces the development 
of her account of this problem across her career and reconsiders the possibility of reciprocity not only 
in but also through her writing. The final chapter of this study, “Recognition,” explores her reframing 
of the problem of the other’s consciousness in and through these works and critically explores the 
solution she finds in her literature itself. That is, it considers whether the very acts of reading and 
writing provide for the possibility of the kind of recognition she found described in Hegel’s work. 
Beauvoir would think with Hegel, picking up his dialectic and giving it life. And in the process she 
would discover its limitations and its possibility for resolving the problem of the other’s 
consciousness. However, before turning to her reading and re-reading of Hegel, it is first necessary to 
turn to the text that would so engage her. It is necessary to turn to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.  
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Chapter 2 
Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit  
2.1 Hegel 
“In Hegel I found a tranquillizing influence. Just as at the age of twenty, my heart bleeding 
because of my cousin Jacques, I read Homer ‘to set all humanity between myself and my private 
grief’, so now I endeavored to sink this present experience of mine in the ‘trend of world-
development. All about me, embalmed in countless thousands of volumes, the past lay sleeping, and 
the present seemed to me like a past that was yet to come.”23 
 - Beauvoir  
In claiming that hers was “the problem of the other’s consciousness,” Beauvoir clearly directs her 
readers to look to the pages of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, to his discussion of the relationship 
between self and other. Reading her work to see how she appropriates and extends his concepts and 
ideas developed, it is first necessary to turn to this text itself – to turn to his description of this 
problem and of his identification of its solution. However, this proves to be no easy task. In his 
works, Hegel addresses a unique set of social and political issues that frame and inform even his most 
abstract philosophical reflections. Further, Hegel’s commitment to systematizing, and to the concept 
of Geist, make evident the gap between his philosophical orientation and that approach which would 
come to prevail in the western philosophical tradition after him. His critique of Enlightenment values 
and principles, in contrast with the almost wholesale adoption of these approaches in 20th century 
philosophy, make it difficult to appreciate the complexity of his conceptions of consciousness, 
recognition and spirit. In particular, his critique of rationalism and individualism in and through the 
development of these concepts contrasts with contemporary endorsements of these value systems. 
Anti-foundationalism marks all contemporary philosophies, to a lesser or greater extent, confounding 
attempts to understand the central ideas in Hegel’s work.  
The challenge of identifying, let alone interpreting, Hegel’s account of recognition are 
compounded when attempts are made by various school of thought to appropriate his work. The 
                                                      
23 PL 458; FA 472. 
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desire to read Hegel’s work within the framework of some kind of broader ideology is 
understandable. Hegel’s writing is dense and difficult. Finding footholds in the history of philosophy 
from which to access his ideas thus has its appeal. However, such readings obscure his thought.  Read 
within the parameters German Idealism or through the lens of Marxism, Hegel has little to say about 
the question of recognition. Read alongside the classics of German Idealism, Hegel’s discussion of 
mutual recognition is subsumed under and within other categories of philosophical reflection. When 
considered as a response to Kant’s ideal of the transcendent ego, for example, an unbridgeable chasm 
opens between subject and object, rendering it logically impossible to envision any form of 
reconciliation between the two. Hegel’s writings thus serve as a sustained meditation not on inter-
subjectivity but on subjectivity alone.24 A similar conclusion is reached when his work is read within 
the Cartesian tradition. If Hegel is wedded to the model of subjectivity advanced by Descartes, that is, 
if he begins with a conception of self as a disembodied, self-same ego, he seems unable to avoid 
solipsism until the problem of other minds is conclusively resolved.  Both of these approaches to 
reading the Phenomenology, as a result of presupposing the separation between subject and object and 
consequently, between self and the world, overlook or neglect Hegel’s account of inter-subjectivity – 
of the self as reflexively constructed and dependent upon the other. Finally, readings of this work 
grounded in Marxist principles such as those offered up by Sartre and Kojève, abbreviate Hegel’s 
discussion of recognition to his description of the master-slave dialectic. Read in this manner, there 
exists the possibility for inter-subjectivity. However, it is always only a possibility. Self and other are 
engaged in an ongoing “battle to the death.” Hence, this reading of Hegel presupposes that between 
subject and object there cannot be love, friendship and generosity but only conflict and hostility.  
An examination of the text itself makes evident that Hegel’s account is at once more complex 
and more encouraging of variation and change, within and across time, than any of these approaches 
                                                      
24 See Williams, 1992, 1-4. 
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or, perhaps more accurately, these appropriations of his work make evident. These readings ignore his 
interest in identifying and describing a range of venues in which recognition – whether unequal or 
equal, whether hostile or hospitable – is experienced and enacted. That is, they extract moments or 
stages from within the dialectic and treat them as if they embodied the whole of this history, of this 
phenomenology of consciousness. What is brought to light, when Hegel’s work is explored outside 
such ideological framework, is his preoccupation with developing a solution to the problem of the 
other’s consciousness at both the theoretical and practical level. His study of the problem of 
recognition can be traced across his works – beginning with his discussion of love and life in the Jena 
manuscripts25 through the writing of the Phenomenology to his presentation of his system in the 
Logic. Yet, despite his interest in this problem, in no single text does he offer up a full account of 
inter-subjectivity.  Instead, his analysis of this concept is fragmented, woven into his discussion of 
perception, his consideration of religion and his inquiry into the nature of idea. Why adopt this 
approach? It would be difficult to argue that this was an oversight on the part of Hegel, the last great 
systematizer in philosophy. An explanation perhaps can be developed from reflecting on not only the 
subject matter of his work but also his method of investigation.  
Reading Hegel, it is necessary to consider the form in which he writes as carefully as his 
content for his account of the dialectic is to be discovered as much in and through his works, as it is to 
be discovered in his conclusions. Hegel is not imposing his account of the dialectic upon the history 
of consciousness in his writings, as is often considered to be the case, but rather he is bearing witness 
to its workings. It is not used in order to make evident the movement of consciousness toward 
recognition but rather the dialectic is evidenced or revealed through his description of this history.  
This is a phenomenology. That is, the dialectic was not his methodological presupposition but rather 
was his philosophical discovery. This is a subtle yet significant difference that will prove to be 
                                                      
25 See in particular Hegel’s The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy.  
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important with regard to his understanding of the problem of the other and subsequently for his 
consideration of the possibility of recognition. 
What then can be said of Hegel’s weaving of his account of inter-subjectivity into his 
epistemology, metaphysics, theology and politics? It seems clear that the manner in which he 
broaches his subject matter mirrors his claim that consciousness is always already embedded in 
relations with others – that it is always already embodied and situated, in the midst of experience.  
Enacting and not just describing his philosophy, he does not separate his account of the relation 
between self and other from discussions of ethics or of aesthetics or of epistemology. Instead, he 
intertwines the two subject matters demonstrating how each provides for the other.  Discussions of 
self and other frame or provide the conditions for the possibility of the fields of inquiry he explores 
both the consequences and the outcomes of those investigations. As such, questions concerning the 
possibility of mutual recognition are not separable from considerations of the politics of the French 
Revolution26 or the tragedy of Antigone.27  
Hegel’s discussion of self-consciousness and of the relationship between self-consciousnesses 
would come to have a particular hold over Beauvoir’s thinking and as such deserves careful 
explication. Therein she finds an argument, or perhaps more accurately, a description, that would 
frame her consideration of the problem of the other’s consciousness, leading her to explore new 
venues and dimensions in which it is enacted, to consider possible resolutions and eventually to arrive 
at a conclusion. However, before turning to her reading of this passage, it is necessary to situate this 
section of the text within the context of the Phenomenology as a whole.  
                                                      
26 PS § 594, 361. For more on Hegel and the French Revolution, see Comay, 2011. 
27 PS § 437, 261; PS § 457, 274-275. For more on Hegel’s reading of Antigone, see Butler, 2000. 
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2.2 The Phenomenology  
“The goal is Spirit’s insight into what knowing is. Impatience demands the impossible, to wit, the 
attainment of the end without the means. But the length of this path has to be endured, because, 
for one thing, each moment is necessary; and further, each moment has to be lingered over, 
because each is itself a complete individual shape.” 28 
 
  - Hegel 
 
Charles Taylor, describing the Phenomenology summarizes its project, noting how it,  
Intends to start with our ordinary consciousness of things and to take 
us from there to the true perspective of Geist. The work is called a 
‘phenomenology’ because it deals with the way things appear for 
consciousness, or with forms of consciousness. But ‘appearance’ 
here does not contrast with ‘reality’; what is most real, the absolute, 
is essentially self-appearance. Phenomenology is not a science of 
lesser things, which can be left behind, but one way of acceding to 
Absolute Knowledge, of making the absolute ‘apparent.’29 
Three aspects of this brief but insightful overview warrant emphasis. First, herein Taylor plots the 
trajectory that Hegel’s investigations of consciousness will follow, from simple consciousness – or 
perception – through to Geist or Absolute Knowledge. Hegel in this text traces this movement of the 
dialectic along four “strands” or “threads” of experience: consciousness, self-consciousness, reason 
and spirit. While assuming nothing concluded at any previous stage, while beginning in each “venue” 
once more with the most basic of experiences of consciousness,30 each of the various strands intersect 
and intertwine, each building upon the other – both cancelling and preserving what came before, such 
that affirmation becomes inseparable from negation. 31 Moreover, the movement within any one 
strand is mirrored in the movement at a similar stage in each of the other strands. Hence, the 
distinction made between sense-certainty, perception and understanding in the discussion of 
consciousness, parallels that made in the discussion of self-consciousness between stoicism, 
                                                      
28 PS § 29, 17. 
29 Taylor, 1996, 128. 
30 Taylor, 1980, 139. 
31 Ibid, 21. 
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skepticism and the unhappy consciousness. And the unfolding of both of these threads mirrors the 
trajectory taken by spirit as it works its way, more generally, through the stages of consciousness, 
self-consciousness and reason on its way towards Absolute Knowledge. The architecture of Hegel’s 
argument, developed through the parallels that he constructs and unfolds time and time again, proves 
to be an ingenious strategy used to demonstrate both the distinct nature of each of these realms of 
experience and their overlapping and interdependence.  
Taylor further acknowledges in this passage, Hegel’s commitment to study the world as it 
appears. While Hegel’s language is abstract, his ideas were always intended to be grounded in and to 
return to the world as it is experienced -- to the realm of lived experience. This provides an important 
corrective to the reading of this text. Hegel must be read as offering up a description of the movement 
of the dialect, not offering a prescription of how history can best be read.  This is a second key point 
made evident in this description of the Phenomenology.  
Finally, while the grounding of his ideas in the realm of experience leads Hegel to focus on 
particulars, it does not limit him in this regard. Particulars should not be taken as ends in themselves 
but rather should be regarded as providing the means or mediums through which the universal is 
made accessible.  The particular draws forward toward the universal in and through the various stages 
of the dialectic just as consciousness draws forward towards Absolute Spirit across the text as a 
whole. There is a complex interplay for Hegel between these two realms of experience. As will be 
made evident, the enmeshing of the two reflects and is reflected in the intertwining of the relationship 
between self and other, between being-in-itself and being-for-others. Drawing attention to the 
unfolding of the dialectic, the focus on lived experience and the emphasis on the particular universal 
helps to situate or, perhaps better yet, helps to orient the reader to the Phenomenology. 
Within the structure of the text, recognition is spoken of three times – in the account of self-
consciousness, again in the discussion of reason and finally, in the account of Spirit. Each of these 
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moments mirrors and reframes subsequent moments. The movement in and from perception to sense 
certainty is replicated as the movement of consciousness to self-consciousness. Seeking refuge first in 
what is particular (being-in-itself) and then in what is universal (being-for-others), consciousness 
follows this motion across the moments in the dialectic. It is repeated at the level of Reason and then 
again at the level of Spirit.32 That is, the same pattern is replicated within each strand just as it is 
repeated across moments. Hence while in Self-Consciousness the self seeks to deny its universality, 
within Reason it is embraced at the expense of the particular until the two parts are reconciled and 
mutual recognition becomes possible at the level of Spirit.  
It is to the discussion of recognition in relation to the development of self-consciousness that 
this present study must turn in particular. While for Hegel recognition is achieved in the manifestation 
of Geist, for Beauvoir discussions of such universals are precluded. The individual, she argues, “is 
free to define his own conditions.”33 Having no essential qualities and being part of no necessary 
historical movement, he is not subject to the historic development of Geist. Hence, the conditions for 
the possibility of mutual recognition as outlined by Hegel, cannot be met within the logic of her 
argument. What Beauvoir seeks to do in and through her readings of the Phenomenology is to extract 
the history of consciousness from its metaphysical groundings and replant it within the framework of 
her version of existentialism. In so doing she focuses her attention on the section on self-
consciousness. Therein Hegel outlines the movement of the dialectic as consciousness first encounters 
an other that is subject34 and goes on to explore how this movement that is at first in the world comes 
to be centered in the self35 and he anticipates within this framework the possibility of recognition.36 
Whether Hegel’s account can be unmoored from discussions of Geist, that is, whether it is achievable 
                                                      
32 For a further discussion of recognition at these levels of experience see Jurist 200.  
33 EA 15, PMA 21. 
34 PS § 167, 105. 
35 PS § 197, 119. 
36 PS § 177, 110; PS § 184, 112. 
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without the absolutes to which he subscribes, is a question that will be addressed in subsequent 
chapters in exploring Beauvoir’s reading and re-reading of Hegel.  
To help navigate this key section in the Phenomenology, it is helpful to employ the account of 
the three distinct moments, or stages in this history of recognition outlined by Williams. He traces the 
movement of spirit from absolute consciousness, that is from the belief in and search for “abstract 
parochial universality” (solipsism) through the opposition of particulars (conflict and hostility as 
evidenced in the master – slave dialectic), to the development of an emergent concrete universality 
(recognition).37 At each new stage, previous moments in the unfolding dialectic are not negated but 
rather remain evident, lingering, framing the subsequent pursuits. They are not denied or subsumed 
but rather are sublimated. This dialectic, this pathway from consciousness through to mutual 
recognition, it will be argued throughout this present study, that Beauvoir retraces in and across her 
writings. Hence before turning to her works, consideration must be made of Hegel’s description of 
these stages and to the catalysts that initiate the transitions between them. 
2.3 First Moment: Consciousness 
“The knowledge or knowing which is at the start or is immediately our object cannot be anything 
else but immediate knowledge itself, a knowledge of the immediate or of what simply is. Our 
approach to the object must also be immediate or receptive; we must alter nothing in the object as it 
presents itself. In apprehending it, we must refrain from trying to comprehend it.” 38 
 - Hegel 
 
Hegel maintains that consciousness initially is oriented solely towards objects.39  It senses objects in 
the world and what it sees it regards as real and true. The self, when encountering the other, when 
encountering something that at first appears foreign, appropriates, subsumes, consumes or annihilates 
this object. There can be only one consciousness and as such all else that it encounters must be seen 
or transformed into an extension of the self. There is no other, as such, only the self and its object. 
                                                      
37 Williams, 2003, 66-69. 
38 PS § 90, 60. 
39 PS § 166, 104. 
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The self, whose boundaries were momentarily challenged, reunites with itself and once more “I is 
I.”40 Once more the self is pure being41 as consciousness presumes itself once more to be absolute and 
universal.42  
As pure receptivity, consciousness thus is capable of sense certainty. In experiencing the 
world, before words, before theories, before anything beyond the moment, there is a richness that, as 
consciousness moves through the other moments of the dialectic, it will never again experience. It 
knows the world and itself only as pure sensation. The fullness of the moment with all its 
particularities can only be sensed – sensed by a consciousness that alone in the world, sees, hears, 
feels and understands what it is that is being sensed. The self senses, that is, it immediately 
apprehends, objects in the world and knows them only as they are presented.43 With no alternative 
standpoint from which to view or consider the world, it has a kind of certainty or assurance about the 
accuracy of its knowledge in the moment of perception. 
While at first this seems to be the most true and certain knowledge possible, in fact it is, as 
Hegel notes, the "most abstract and poorest truth."44 For, while, consciousness grasps both the 
richness and the particularity of the moment, in the very next moment, the next second, it disappears. 
The experience cannot be judged true or false, it cannot be reflected on or considered. For at this 
stage there is only a stream of consciousness, as it were, an endless, unreflective series of sensations. 
Hence sense certainty is not the richest form of consciousness but the poorest as its lack of selectivity 
results in the experience being empty.45 To be grasped, experience must be mediated. 
                                                      
40 PS § 91, 58. 
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42 PS § 90, 58. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Hegel’s recognition herein of the need for selectivity and of the fleeting nature of the particular will be 
themes to which he will return throughout the Phenomenology. 
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Sense-certainty gives way to perception, however, as consciousness comes to recognize that 
there is more to the objects in the world than it directly experiences.  As Hegel describes it in The 
Phenomenology of Mind,  
“The content of sensory consciousness is in its own self-dialectical. 
The Content is supposed to be the individual; but by this very fact it 
is not an individual but every individual and just by excluding from 
itself the other, the individual content relates to another, shows that it 
goes beyond itself, that it is dependent on another, is mediated by it 
and has another within itself. The proximate truth of the immediately 
individual is therefore its relatedness to another. The determinations 
of this relation are what are called determinations of reflection, and 
the consciousness apprehending these determinations is 
perception.”46 
The move from sense certainty to perception is the move from immediacy and the universality of 
certainty to the recognition of positionality and the acknowledgement that there is more in and to the 
objects sensed than is known. There is something in and of the object that escapes the individual’s 
knowing it for certain. It is as such the first acknowledgement of both the other within and the other 
outside of the self, a moment key in the later development of recognition when this same pattern of 
understanding is repeated at the level of self-consciousness.  
In perceiving the world there is more than just an immediate awareness of objects in the 
world. Concepts are now developed to describe the properties of objects. The moment is frozen, as it 
were, and can be reflected upon, it can be given meaning. However, when experience is described 
rather than lived, the richness of the moment disappears.  When saying what it was that was once 
lived, only one dimension of the experience can be brought in focus, one dimension to the exclusion 
of all others.47 Moreover, Hegel maintains that these descriptions encompass what is seen in common 
or would have been seen in common with other things. That is, objects take on a kind of universality 
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via language.48 Hence in transforming experience into words, moving from sense certainty to 
perception, there is the loss of particularities in favour of shared and accessible commonalities. 
Words fail to capture the experience in its totality no matter how carefully they are selected 
or how many are chosen. There is the experience itself and there is the perception of the thing and the 
two cannot be the same.49 Hence it is at one and the same time other and not other. 50It is not therefore 
a single unity but rather has an element belonging the realm of the sensuous and an element that is 
universal. An opposition thus marks perception,51 an opposition that can be identified but cannot be 
reconciled. This opens the possibility not only for considerations of the truth of the experience but 
also for deception. For there exists now the possibility that things are always otherwise than they are 
described.  
In its turn, perception gives way to understanding. 52 In perceiving the world, consciousness 
comes to recognize that things may be other than they are described. And with an increasing 
awareness, it comes to recognize, more broadly, that there is more to any experience, to any object 
encountered than what can be apprehended. With this recognition, it comes to experience objects at 
one and the same time as other and not other. That is, it comes to recognize an opposition that lies at 
that heart of encounters with objects.  
At the stage of understanding via the development of the notion of Force,53 Hegel discovers a 
means by which the opposition is reconciled. There is no opposition at all he argues but rather there is 
“purely for itself, a pure self identical essence that has no difference in it.”54 That is, it attempts to see 
the object as ‘self-identical,” thus reconciling the singular individuality of apprehension with the 
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universality evident via perception. The object is subsumed by the self, it is the self and as such all 
opposition, all otherness, is negated. As Butler notes, “Force is that which impels an inner reality to 
gain determinate form, but it is also that which frustrates the absorption of that inner reality into 
determinate form. In other words, Force sustains a tension between that which appears and that which 
does not appear.”55  
2.4 From Consciousness to Self-Consciousness 
“Consciousness, as self-consciousness, henceforth has a double object: one is the immediate 
object, that of sense certainty and perception, which however for self-consciousness has the 
character of a negative; and the second, viz. itself, which is the true essence and is present in the 
first instance only as opposed to the first object.”56 
 - Hegel  
 
It is at this point that the kind of natural or practical solipsism that marks this first stage of the 
dialectic gives way with time and repetition. Consciousness encounters that which it cannot 
supersede.57 Moreover, recognizing the endless nature of desire, consciousness is led to the realization 
that there are those things in the world which are wholly other to itself. That is, it becomes aware of 
the objects that it posits as nothingnesses but which maintain or gain a kind of independence 
nonetheless.58 The object is not an “object,” or perhaps more accurately, it is not only or solely an 
object. This conditions a shift in the self’s understanding of itself. If the other is object and subject, 
then the self too can have these two qualities. The self comes to see itself not as an absolute but as a 
particular. Moreover, it is a particular that encounters or, perhaps better yet, is countered by another 
particular. The independence and universality of the self is undermined and the self finds itself at risk. 
And in need of risking itself, of risking its very life in order to re-establish its mastery not just over its 
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world but also over its own self. Divided within its self and from the objects it encounters, 
consciousness transforms into self-consciousness. 
Moving beyond the realm of consciousness into the realm of self- consciousness, what has 
been negated is not left behind but rather becomes the subject matter of the next moment of the 
dialectic. As Douzinas notes, in the history of consciousness, “Each of its concentric stages, a force or 
institution and its underlying principle is ‘sublated,” both negated and retained by its opponent.”59 
This means that the possibility of viewing the self as the only object in the world is never truly 
overcome but rather remains ever present.  However, what arises with the development of self-
consciousness is the existence of not one but of two objects: "one is the immediate object, that of 
sense-certainty and perception, which however for self- consciousness has the character of a negative; 
and the second, viz.  Itself, which is the true essence and is present in the first instance only as 
opposed to the first object."60 Self-consciousness develops with the awareness of the self or of the “I,” 
as something that is different from, even radically opposed to the rest of the world or the “non-I.” To 
be self-conscious is to be a subject reflecting on oneself as an object.”61 It is to take the self as an 
object for consciousness.62This development brings with it the possibility of self-transformation or 
self-creation.  But it also brings with it the possibility of hostility. In order to see why this is the case, 
it is necessary to consider the means by which and through which self-consciousness develops.  
Awareness of what it lacks gives rise to the desire in self- consciousness to obtain that which 
it is not.  Self-consciousness wants to resolve the disparity it finds between itself and others in the 
world and seeks the means for accomplishing this goal. Needing to restore its identity, it first seeks to 
achieve this goal through the elimination of the other. But the object escapes it – its independence is 
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not so readily or easily refuted or refused or disregarded. That is, it is an “other” that is transcendent 
to consciousness, that cannot be reduced to, absorbed within or annihilated by, the self. It is not a 
reflection or extension of the self but is different and distinct from it, equally independent and self-
contained.63  This other eludes the self as it seeks to make it for-itself.64  Hence, satisfaction of desire 
is denied.  
Frustrated by its pursuit, by these attempts, yet unwilling to settle into dissatisfaction, the 
object of desire is converted. A new object is uncovered. Thus it is that desire is not static but rather 
in and through the unfolding of time and in and through its search for satisfaction and discovery of its 
opposite, it is transformed. Hence it is through the continual “sublimation of desire”65 that the history 
of consciousness unfolds. Indeed, self-consciousness, Hegel tells us “is desire.”66 The recognition of 
what it lacks, of its difference, defines its very being. As Butler notes, “desires signifies the 
reflexivity of consciousness, the necessity that it becomes other to itself in order to know itself.”67 
Desire, she concludes, “is always desire for something other which, in turn is always desire for a 
more expanded version of the subject.”68 
Desire, no longer aimed at an object in the world, now turns unto or onto itself. Desire 
becomes a desire for itself; it becomes a desire to be desired. Durhssen perhaps best captures Hegel’s 
point here, characterizing this as the desire of self-consciousness  
. . . to impose his notion of himself upon another. To desire the 
desire of another is to exact recognition of what I am in my own 
eyes, so that my subjective certitude of my own value becomes 
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objective truth, that is to say, it is recognized by another and, at the 
limit, by all the others.69  
There is a new necessity that attaches itself to the securing of subjectivity, at this stage of the 
dialectic. There are new risks at hand. Each consciousness wants to make the other into its object. As 
such, each seeks the death of the other.70 What ensues is a battle as desire meets desire, a battle for 
“their certainty of being for themselves to truth, both in the case of the other and in their own case.”71 
Thus it is that the self enters into “a life and death struggle.”72 Seeking to re-establish its universality, 
to be recognized and affirmed as a self in its own eyes as much as in the eyes of the other, each 
consciousness enters into a struggle seeking the subservience of its opponent. In calling forth the 
need to risk everything, to risk even life itself in this pursuit, master and slave are 
established. 
2.5 The Second Moment: The Master-Slave Dialectic 
“the relation of the two self-conscious individuals is such that they prove themselves and each 
other through a life–and-death struggle. They must engage in this struggle, for they must raise 
their certainty of being for themselves to truth, both in the case of the other and in their own  
case.” 73 
- Hegel%%
 
With the world now splintered, with the self now fragmented, what ensues in the remainder of the 
Phenomenology is the attempt to reconcile what heretofore has not been divided but which 
simultaneously has never been so united. For in the division of the world into self and other, into 
masters and slaves, the two sides are as much dependent upon each other as they are opposed, though 
their interdependence is shrouded by what appears, upon first reading, to be an overwhelming, 
unresolvable hostility between them. 
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Forced to recognize the existence of others in the world, others who wish to maintain self-
certainty and dominance, the self is forced to recognize its own tenuous hold on its mastery. If the 
other is as eager to render him object, as he is to render the other to this status, the self is always 
already at risk.74 Thus it must employ all means and strategies necessary to maintain its own status. 
There cannot be two selves in the world, not from within this worldview. Each seeks to cancel the 
other as a means of preserving its original certainty and identity.75 
So it is that the two enter into a battle to the death – a battle that will see only one sustain its 
subjectivity while the other will be objectified and relegated to the level of ‘thing’ or ‘slave.’ Terrified 
by this prospect the self is willing to risk anything, to risk everything. Indeed, it is willing to risk life 
itself. In this confrontation between selves striving to maintain their subjectivity and hence their 
supremacy over the world, Hegel argues one party will back down. One party will acknowledge the 
difference between risking life and risking the conditions for the possibility of life. In the moment of 
this recognition, and in the decision to preserve the conditions for the possibility of consciousness, the 
division between lord and bondsman, between master and slave is created.76 
It is important to note that this battle is won at the level of ontology long before it manifests 
itself in the social realm. Mastery and slavery first describes a mentality, or, perhaps more accurately 
a form of being. The master is deemed “free”77 and “independent.”78 He is recognized without 
recognizing others.79 The slave, on the other hand, is determined or posited. These descriptive 
qualities when enacted take on normative association. The master comes to see and be seen as 
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“essential”80 and “pure”81 while the slave is “inessential”82 and “impure.”83 It is only once this 
ontological distinction has been established and instilled that the slave can be objectified and 
subjugated in not just thought but in action. He becomes slave not just in theory but slave in the social 
and political realms.  
Yet the paradox of this stage of consciousness is that if either one were to succeed, if one 
were to annihilate the other, the possibility for recognition would be eliminated.  The desire of the 
subject to be acknowledged as free can only be provided by the other.  For Hegel "Self-consciousness 
achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness."84 Alone in the world, it can be neither 
subject nor object.  The self needs the other to confer its status.85  Thus the battle to death is 
transformed into a battle for supremacy.  
It is necessary to reiterate this point. It is not death that is the goal of this struggle. Death is 
the negation of consciousness86 and thus the negation of the prospect for recognition. The battle must 
remain in play without ever coming to its stated end for, if either dies, so too does the possibility for 
recognition that initiated the conflict. Recall that for Hegel, “self-consciousness achieves its 
satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.”87 What is necessary is not death but subservience. 
What is necessary is that one of the two, fearing death and thus being unable to detach himself from 
his body, willingly subjects itself to the other. Rather than death, it is servitude that the master seeks 
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for the point of struggle is not to end life but to secure recognition and achieve, “inter-subjective 
legitimization of certainty.”88 
However, this desire too is confounded. For even after having created a world divided into 
subjects and objects, the master finds that his fulfillment is denied. An object can recognize nothing.  
As Hegel makes clear “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that it so 
exists for another: that is, it exists only in being recognized.”89 In relegating the slave to the level of 
object, the master has taken away the condition for the possibility of achieving his own goal. The 
slave cannot give recognition for recognition must be freely bestowed.  
Recognition requires both parties to acknowledge their interdependence and to grant to the 
other what is wished for --- the status of a self. It cannot be forced or coerced for then it is no longer 
recognition but rather is obedience. The slave is not an independent consciousness but a dependent 
one.90 Within the logic of the master-slave dialectic, recognition is only ever one-sided and unequal. 
While the master denies his immanence, the slave takes refuge therein. What results is not recognition 
at all. For if the slave is inessential, so too is any kind of recognition he may bestow.91 Hence, the 
affirmation the master seeks eludes him.  
Moreover, as he does not work but only consumes, the master lacks the ability to escape this 
situation – to transform the world or to transform his self. Indeed, what the master does to the other, 
he does to himself. 92 Rather than establishing the conditions for the possibility of independence, the 
master has in fact instituted the conditions that lead him to be dependent upon the slave for, 
interposing the other between himself and the world and thus coming to consume but not to produce, 
he becomes reliant upon the slave. He becomes the slave to a slave. As noted by Evans,  
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. . the master gains the truth of sense certainty only through the 
recognition of himself in the consciousness of the slave. In this 
respect, the dialectic as a metaphor for inter-subjective relationships 
is not simply a relation between self and other: it is also a relation of 
self to self. The master and slave are part of the same consciousness. 
The other does not determine me in my being or “know” me as much 
as s/he permits me to “know” myself.93  
The master comes to see through the slave that while he may have won the battle, he has lost in the 
realm of history. It is the slave, not the master, who holds the possibility for transcending this moment 
of the dialectic.  It is the slave who will propel history forward. 
As mediator between the realm of nature and the master, the slave, while being considered an 
object, nonetheless is capable of producing. Thus he is capable of developing awareness of his dual 
nature. As Merleau-Ponty notes,  
The slave through labour becomes capable of seeing him/her self as 
both object and subject at one and the same time.  The slave has been 
truly afraid, has given up trying to conquer by the sword, and he is 
the only one with experience of death because he alone has known 
the love of life. The master wants to exist for no one but himself, but 
in fact he seeks recognition of his mastery from someone and so is 
weak in his strength. The slave consents to exist only for others, but 
nevertheless it is he who chooses to go on living on these terms, and 
he therefore has strength in his weakness . . . His life is more frankly 
rooted in the world than is the master’s which is precisely why he 
knows better than the master what death means.94  
The slave acts in the world, and in so doing, through working, he negates the given and transforms the 
world. When he reflects on this ability, his capacity to be a subject is affirmed. That is, he recognizes 
in the moment of creation that he is at one and the same time both slave and master, both object and 
subject. He discovers that the distinction he has been drawing in the world, the distinction between 
self and other, is, in fact, a distinction that exists within him. He becomes conscious of what it is 
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truly.95 This recognition is not without its effect. If he is able to transform objects in the world, he too 
can transform the object that he has himself become. Labour, while being a form of subjugation, at 
one and the same time provides the condition for the possibility of the slave’s liberation. 
It is important to note that the slave is not automatically liberated through his labour. Work 
alone is not enough. The slave must also conquer himself, to conquer his fear. It is fear that 
subjugates the slave to the master.96In the battle to the death, the slave, fearing death more than the 
loss of freedom, that is, fearing death more than the loss of desire, submits to the master. It is not the 
master’s threats, nor the labour he undertakes on the master’s behalf that transforms a subject into a 
slave. It is the slave that makes himself a slave for he embraces this role, and subjects himself to the 
master. For while the master-slave dialectic does not offer an equitable form of recognition, it is 
nonetheless an improvement over the raw desire and unbridled violence experienced at the stage of 
solipsism. Violence is institutionalized and thus restrained.97 It is the liberation from fear that is the 
appeal of slavery. Once the slave defines himself as “inessential,” “impure” and “object,” when his 
ontological transformation from subject to object is complete, his servitude begins.  
It is only the slave that makes himself a slave, and it is only the slave that can thus liberate 
himself. The slave is his own subjugator but this means he is also his own liberator. In having 
transformed the world despite his subjugation, the slave has attained the conditions for the possibility 
to liberate himself from his fear. However this liberation will not easily be achieved nor will its 
success be guaranteed. There remain further moments in the dialectic yet to be lived. 
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2.6 Transition: From Self-Consciousness to Recognition 
“Every subject plays his part as such specifically through exploits or projects that serve as a mode 
of transcendence; he achieves liberty only through a continual reaching out toward other 
liberties"98 
 - Beauvoir  
 
What is often overlooked, perhaps because of the compelling nature of the drama offered by the 
master-slave dialectic, or perhaps because of its ease, is that the conflict between lord and bondsman 
is only a moment in the dialectic, not the conclusion or the whole of the Phenomenology. Like all 
other moments in the history of consciousness, it contains the foundation for its own overcoming.99 
The relation of mastery and slavery is inherently unstable. Neither gains what he desires. The master 
is shown to be the true slave and the slave is revealed to have the potential for true mastery. 
Moreover, as the slave makes himself a slave, that is, as the slave defines himself rather than being 
defined, hostility need not dictate his relations with others. Herein lies the foundation for something 
more than hostility to develop between self-consciousnesses.  Herein lies the foundation for mutual 
recognition.  
But this transformation will occur neither quickly nor without hesitation. Stoicism, 
skepticism, and unhappy consciousness – the subsequent stages of the dialectic – are strategies that 
the slave develops as he tries to reconcile “the subjective feeling of freedom and the objective fact of 
slavery.” 100 Mirroring the transition from sense certainty and perception to understanding, in this 
section of the Phenomenology Hegel shows how self-consciousness negotiates its duality, how it 
moves as such from solipsism – from belief in the self as the only, and the necessary subject – 
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towards some form of recognition of the complexity of itself and the other, towards the possibility of 
friendship, generosity and love.  
Recall that through labour, the slave is forced to recognize the independence of objects. Yet, 
he knows himself, at the same time, to be a freedom. To reconcile these seemingly contradictory 
traits, self-consciousness at the moment of stoicism, turns itself inward to find a resolution. The stoic 
withdraws and redefines the world as simply the object of thought.101 He develops an inner life, an 
inner-world and in so doing develops the capacity to think. And it is here that he locates and enacts 
his freedom. Limited in action and in thought the slave’s autonomy is granted full reign.  
This retreat towards inner self-identity fails, however, for the slave is an embodied subject 
whose freedom must be externally expressed. Conceiving of himself as the “pure universality of 
thought”102 necessitates his denial of his lived experience, of his own objectivity.  As Hegel describes 
it, while self-consciousness “takes itself . . . to be a single and separate, contingent and, in fact, animal 
life, and a lost self-consciousness, it also on the contrary, converts itself again into a consciousness 
that is universal and self-identical; for it is the negativity of all singularity and all difference.”103 As 
he goes on to note, “at one time it recognizes that its freedom lies in rising above all the confusion 
and contingency of existence, and at another time equally admits to a relapse into occupying itself 
with what is unessential.” 104 
Skepticism arises from this recognition that self-consciousness is divided.105 The skeptic lives 
this conflict, unable to acknowledge itself both as unity and as difference, unable to find a resolution 
to the question of its own identity. Neither subject or object, neither master or slave, neither self or 
other, he oscillates back and forth between these alternatives, succumbing to what Hegel characterizes 
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as “unsettled thinking.”106 More accurately, the skeptic is unable to decide on his nature. It is only 
when self-consciousness stops seeking such a solution, stops attempting to deny its own contradictory 
nature by reducing the whole to one of its parts, that skepticism is transcended.  
2.7 The Third Moment: Recognition 
“What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is – this absolute substance 
which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, 
enjoy perfect freedom and independence: ‘I’ that is ‘We” and “we” that is “I.” It is in self-
consciousness, in the Notion of Spirit, that consciousness first finds its turning-point” 107    
 - Hegel  
 
The unhappy consciousness results from the unity of pure thinking and individuality in a being that is 
aware of itself as such. Simultaneously mutable and immutable, alike and not alike, consciousness no 
longer aims to reduce itself to one of its parts but rather recognizes itself as “a dual-natured, merely 
contradictory being.”108 That is, it recognizes itself as and in “ceaseless movement.”109 Heretofore, as 
noted by Jurist, self-consciousness has attempted to grab “hold of one part of the self at the expense 
of the other.”110 But unhappy consciousness recognizes its own duality – that is, it acknowledges its 
being both being-for-itself and being-for-other. Herein lies the possibility of mutual recognition, in 
this acknowledgement, made by the unhappy consciousness of the interdependence of self and other, 
in the recognition of this duality not only in the world but also in the self, and in the granting of this 
same duality and the same possibilities it affords, to the other. As noted by O’Neill, there is an intra-
subjective division and an inter-subjective exchange.111  
In this moment, as Siep describes it,  
Two self-consciousnesses do not relate to each other like mere things 
that have an effect on each other, or like forces that interact with 
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each other. The reciprocal relation between two self-consciousnesses 
transcends those, because for each the other is a moment in its own 
self relation . . . neither can alter itself without co-altering the other 
insofar as it stands in relation to it . . . Recognition, as a double-
signifying act of two self-consciousnesses, is a relation in which the 
relata relate to themselves through the relation to the other, and 
relate to the other through their own self-relation. Thus the self’s 
relation to itself is made possible by the corresponding relation to the 
other.112  
There is the unfolding of the self through its distinction from and simultaneous identification with, the 
other. Recognition is thus premised on self-mediation through the other, through another, who both 
confirms and transforms self-understanding.113 This conditions a radical re-conception of the self and 
the other. 
 Taylor notes that, “Authentic subjectivity emerges through the activity of self-relation in 
which the subject externalizes or expresses itself in determinate thoughts and deeds, and then 
reconnects itself with otherness by re-appropriating difference as its own self-objectification.”114 The 
other comes to reside within the subject, it is constitutive of its own being. Consciousness thus is not 
foreign, but rather ‘consciousness of another of an object in general, is in fact necessarily self-
consciousness reflected in itself. Consciousness of oneself in one’s other.”115 Here is the realization of 
being-in-itself in another. That is, each subject becomes itself through relation to the other. The self 
“discovers itself only in and through the recognition of others, ”116 and thus is “dependent 
ontologically or factually on something other: we are at the mercy of a foreign reality.”117  
Key, herein, is the realization that  
Recognition, unlike desire, does not essentially involve a reduction 
of the other to the same. Anerkennung involves a search for 
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satisfaction in the un-coerced recognition of the other . . . this does 
not occur through the elimination of the other but through 
membership or partnership with the other.118  
As Jurist notes, while “in desire the other is a threat insofar as he or she is experienced as an actual 
other, in recognition this is no longer the case.”119 The other is not annihilated or subsumed by the self 
as in solipsism, nor is it regarded as a hostile force against which the self must necessarily battle. 
Difference is not eliminated or overlooked, but rather, it is embraced as a necessary condition for 
recognition. For, it is only through the acknowledgement of true otherness, that the self can come to 
know itself.  
Thus, solipsism and hostility give way to the development out of reciprocal inter-subjective 
mediation,120 of a social subject. Hegel relies on the notion of Freigabe – that is, on the notion of the 
release or absolution of the other in its otherness to elucidate the process by and through which the 
“I” that is” I,” that is, the I that seeks to be and to remain self-same, becomes an “I” that is a “we.”121 
As noted by Williams, “consciousness exists concretely in interaction with others, with the world and 
finds its satisfaction in an other self-consciousness. Such interaction and interdependence means that 
consciousness is not always subject and never object.”122 Thus in allowing the other to be or to go 
free, the self is set free. There is a mutual releasement. In this moment,  “the split between subject and 
object, between consciousness and unconsciousness, between certainty of self and truth, are 
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reconciled or overcome.”123 Herein resides the possibility for mutual recognition. Domination and 
mastery are renounced for the self finds intrinsic worth in its object,124 for  
Self-consciousness is in and for itself through the fact that it exists in 
and for itself for an other. That is, it exists only as recognized. The 
concept of this is unity in its doubling, the infinity realizing itself in 
self-consciousness, is a many-sided intersection of and correlation 
between multiple meanings. Consequently, these elements must on 
the one hand be precisely distinguished and kept separate, and, on 
the other hand, they must be taken and known in their opposite 
meaning, namely, in this very differentiation they are nevertheless 
not different. The double signification of the distinguished elements 
lies in the nature of self-consciousness to be infinite, or to be 
immediately the opposite of the determination in which it is posited. 
The exposition of this spiritual unity in its doubling will present the 
movement of recognition.125 
Within this new logic resides the possibility for relationships of love, friendship and 
generosity. 
To better understand Hegel’s point herein, consider, for example, his claim that “love does 
not eliminate the other but affirms and preserves it.”126 As Hegel himself notes, “The beloved is not 
opposed to us. He/she is one with our very being (Wessen): we see ourselves in him/her and 
nevertheless he/she is not we -- a miracle which we cannot comprehend.”127 But this is not a “We” 
that denies what is separate. Without the other, without another, there cannot be love, nor can there be 
friendship nor generosity. These relationships are premised on the existence, on the continued 
existence, of the other. Hence there is simultaneously separation and unity, identity and difference. 
Further, the kind of recognition which Hegel envisions herein is not, as noted by O’Neill, 
“simply the reversal of its constituent terms: it is the ethical internalization by both terms of the 
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relationship they bear to one another. In other words, reciprocity is the life of the collective in-and-
for-us.”128 There is not, as there has been at previous stages of the dialectic, either the denial of the 
other nor the inversion of roles. Hegel distinguishes here reciprocal recognition from mutual 
recognition and claims the latter to be what is achieved through the dialectic. 
Just as recognition does not deny but rather affirms the other, so too does it affirm the 
previous moments in the dialectic. Consider again, Hegel’s account of love. As Williams notes for 
Hegel, love “does not exclude, but presupposes conflict. Love cannot be thought apart from conflict. 
Love is inseparable from conflict.”129 Without the experience of conflict, there would be no 
recognition of the other within and, hence, no possibility to discover the self in the other. There would 
be no opportunity to learn of the potential for transformation. These moments in the dialectic, these 
experiences are the conditions for the possibility of love. They are necessary moments or stages 
through which the self must traverse if recognition is to be achieved. Denial of one or of all, rather 
than facilitating recognition, undermines its very possibility.  
Taylor perhaps best captures the project of the Phenomenology describing it as “the dialectic 
of human longing and aspiration, and of their vicissitudes.”130 This is the history of the overcoming, 
or, perhaps more accurately, the overturning of desire, as conquest and conflict give way to 
conciliation. While the object that is longed for and the means used to achieve it transform over time 
and across history, this is the story of the self’s longing – the longing to be itself and the discovery 
that it can only be at home in the self through the other. It is this story that Beauvoir takes up time and 
again, explores in new contexts, accepts, challenges and rewrites in and across her works, in and 
across her lifetime. 
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2.8 Beauvoir and Hegel: The Commentaries 
“The further I went, the more I diverged from Hegel, without ever losing admiration for him.” 131 
 - Beauvoir  
 
Heckman notes that each generation reads the Phenomenology with its own agenda and thus that each 
generation discovers its own Hegel.132 It is the questions raised in this text, questions concerning the 
nature of consciousness, the relationship between the particular and the universal, and the role of 
history, to which Beauvoir returns time and again. In seeking her own answers to the issues he raises, 
Beauvoir “splices” her reading of his work with the ideas of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Husserl, 
Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre,133 developing an increasingly nuanced and sophisticated account of the 
workings of the dialectic and of the possibility of reciprocity, enhanced by situating her reflections 
within lived experience and within history.  
However while Beauvoir is clear that it is this context that she intended her work to be read, 
to date there is yet to be a study that takes up her description and investigates her work as a life-long 
investigation of the problem of the other’s consciousness. A survey of the scholarship on this aspect 
of Beauvoir’s philosophy reveals five trends in the interpretation of her discussion of the relationship 
between the self and the other:  
(1) there is a tendency to discuss the notion of recognition within the confines of a single 
work; most often The Second Sex – taking it out of the context of the historical development 
of her understanding of this problem and of its possible solution;134  
(2) despite the generally agreed upon claim that Beauvoir purposefully disregards disciplinary 
distinctions, studies of her work carefully maintain disciplinary divides such that the problem 
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of the other’s consciousness is approached through her fiction135 or her theoretical works136 or 
her autobiographies;137  
(3) her insights into this problem most often are read in conjunction with or as a reflection  
on/of  the works of other philosophers primarily as the extension or advancement of the ideas  
of Jean Paul Sartre,138 Husserl,139 Merleau-Ponty,140 Heidegger,141 Hegel142 and/or Bergson;143  
(4) thus, there is a tendency to situate her discussion of the problem squarely within the 
context of the historical development of feminist theory144 or of existentialism145 and to find 
the relevance of her thought within those confines; and,  
(5) if her work cannot be so situated, at points in her work where she is most innovative, 
scholars resort to what Moi characterizes as “the personality topos”146 – that is, they seek out 
“biographical reasons (explanations)  rather than seeing philosophical achievement.”147  
There are clear advantages to studying Beauvoir’s writings within these parameters.  Most 
importantly, these strategies have ensured that Beauvoir’s work has been given a kind of visibility 
that the works of many of her peers – many other women philosophers of her time – never received.  
However, there are as well disadvantages to employing these approaches. The limitations of 
employing these strategies, singly or in combination, in investigations of the problem of the other’s 
consciousness become apparent when surveying the existing scholarship. 
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The death of Beauvoir in 1996, gave rise to the publication of a plethora of new books were 
written on her life and her work, works that would focus on her unique philosophical contributions 
including her contributions to the discussion of the relationship between self and other. It would be 
the beginning of the renaissance in Beauvoir studies.  
Eva Gothlin in her 1991 study, Sex and Existence: Simone de Beauvoir’s ‘The Second Sex’ was 
the first scholar to devote an entire volume to the exploration of Beauvoir’s account of the 
relationship between self and other. Gothlin undertakes a study of Beauvoir’s critique of Hegel, in the 
context of a careful reading of The Second Sex, a reading that places the text in historical context, 
identifying the philosophical influences and historical events that shaped and structured the 
development of Beauvoir’s ideas.148 Rejecting the heretofore-received notion that Beauvoir is 
mapping Hegel’s master-slave dialectic onto the relationship between men and women, Gothlin 
argues that Hegel serves as Beauvoir’s “foil” in this analysis.149 For Beauvoir woman is both the other 
and the Absolute Other within her society. While Hegel’s model is able to account for the former it 
cannot account for the latter; that is, it cannot account for a non-dialectical othering. To explain why 
it is that woman cannot enter into the dialectic Gothlin argues that Beauvoir must turn to non-
Hegelian principles – principles she locates in Marxism and in existential phenomenology.   
While Gothlin investigates Beauvoir’s ideas of freedom, ambiguity and recognition by 
juxtaposing them with those developed by Hegel and Sartre, Debra Bergoffen’s 1997 work, The 
Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir: Gendered Phenomenologies, Erotic Generosities, situates 
Beauvoir’s ideas within the phenomenological tradition, placing them in relation to the works of 
Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre. In so doing she gives voice to what she characterizes as the 
“muted” phenomenology of the flesh and the philosophy of the erotic that underscores Beauvoir’s 
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less subdued analysis of the dialectic, of violence and of conflict.150 Drawing attention to the often-
overlooked philosophy of generosity that Beauvoir develops, Bergoffen speaks to her account of the 
erotic articulating how this shift in attention transforms readings of Beauvoir’s account of 
subjectivity, recognition and inter-subjectivity.151 Dampening the emphasis in commentaries given to 
the project, to the search for transcendence and the need for struggle in accounts of the relationship 
between the self and the other, Bergoffen focuses on the concepts of the appeal, ambiguity, and 
responsibility in her writing, finding therein the groundwork for recognition, for forms of reciprocity 
to be achieved between consciousnesses. However, in the end she is left to address the perhaps 
difficult problem of how to harmonize the two voices that speak in and through Beauvoir’s work.152 
That is, she is left with the problem of how to reconcile autonomy with generosity.153  
Following Bergoffen’s lead and seeking a means for Beauvoir to resolve the problem of the 
other’s consciousness, Nancy Bauer offers up a series of key criticisms of Gothlin’s interpretation of 
The Second Sex specifically, and of Beauvoir’s broader project, more generally, in her 2001 work 
Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophy and Feminism. On Gothlin’s reading of The Second Sex, Beauvoir is 
left unable to resolve a series of tensions in her work, tensions framed by her dual commitment to 
Hegel’s account of the dialectic and the principles of existentialism. In particular, Beauvoir cannot 
develop a theory of recognition that does not necessitate struggle, conflict and violence and, indeed, 
she cannot offer women a means for escaping their position as the Absolute Other, nor provide an 
account of how man became master in a non-dialectical fashion.154  Arguing that for Beauvoir the 
central moment in the Phenomenology is not the battle to the death but rather the moment in which 
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subjects risk entering into the dialectic, Bauer offers an alternative reading of The Second Sex.155 
Drawing on her account of ambiguity and of freedom in Pyrrhus and Cinéas (1944) and The Ethics of 
Ambiguity (1947) she reorients the study of this later work exploring the dialectic from the 
perspective of the slave, emphasizing the vulnerability of the master and the ever present reversibility 
of roles always already at hand. In the process, Bauer brings into focus the manner in which Beauvoir 
transforms rather than adopts Hegel’s understanding of the dialectic in light of her application of 
these principles to the study of gender in this work, and to her reflections on the problem of the 
other’s consciousness more broadly, allowing for the possibility of mutual recognition.156 Through the 
content of her study but equally through the model of her scholarship, Bauer thus importantly 
encourages the reading of Beauvoir’s text(s) as works of philosophy, not books about philosophy or 
about philosophers, an approach that significantly redirects Beauvoir studies. 
That this is the case is clear when examining Susanne Moser’s 2008 study, Freedom and 
Recognition in The Work of Simone de Beauvoir. Taking up Moi’s call to consider Beauvoir’s life 
work as a sustained study of freedom,157 Moser considers the tension that arises in and across 
Beauvoir’s early works through to The Second Sex and Old Age, between the call of the project and 
the logic of love, friendship and generosity. How can individual freedom be reconciled with Mitsein? 
How is it that out of conflict and out of struggle that reciprocity and reconciliation can be achieved? It 
is these conflicts between autonomy and generosity, between transcendence and immanence, between 
the freedom and the desire for mutual recognition that become the focus of study. Pointing more 
towards the questions that are raised in Beauvoir’s writing than the solutions that she offers, Moser 
traces Beauvoir’s attempts to mediate between these differences, ultimately, between the 
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philosophical positions of Hegel and Sartre,158 beginning with Pyrrhus and Cinéas working her way 
through her major philosophical texts up to a brief consideration of Old Age.   
While each of these commentaries adopts a different focal point and develops its own 
strategy for its study of Beauvoir’s problem of the other’s consciousness, clear patterns emerge. First 
and perhaps most glaringly, it is evident that the focus of attention has been almost exclusively on 
The Second Sex. While there are references to Pyrrhus and Cinéas, The Ethics of Ambiguity, Must We 
Burn The Marquis de Sade? and Old Age in these commentaries, these are clearly considered as 
anticipating or extending the views developed in what is held to be her central work. Moser perhaps 
best sums up the position adopted by these writers when she notes that “the systematic examination of 
the problem of the other in connection with the topic of recognition is only performed in her main 
work, The Second Sex, with an entirely new approach namely that of gender relations.”159 Moser and 
others take this view despite Beauvoir’s own claim that this problem followed her throughout her 
work. The relationship between the self and the other is as much under investigation in her later 
works including in her autobiography, her lectures on literature and in her final works of fiction as in 
her early writings. Moreover, this focus ignores her assertion that it was in The Mandarins that she 
offered up her best solution to her problem.160 Indeed, this brief survey reveals how little attention is 
given to her novels in this research. Scant references are made to She Came to Stay with its epigraph 
from Hegel’s Phenomenology while the later novels are given no consideration at all. Similarly, her 
autobiographies are left unexplored in this context. This selective reading of Beauvoir’s account of 
the problem of the other’s consciousness and of its possible resolution under appreciates both 
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Beauvoir’s knowledge of Hegel’s Phenomenology161 and the originality of her reading and extension 
of this work.162 
In tracing Beauvoir’s readings of Hegel, in bearing witness to the unfolding of her account of 
the problem of the other’s consciousness, this study follows the development of her theories of 
recognition, from doubt to realization in and through her work itself. It is to Beauvoir’s student 
journals this investigation first turns, for therein is found her initial encounter with this problem.  
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Chapter 3 
Risk 
3.1 The Early Works 
“Courage, be everything to yourself. Seek your truth; construct your life, a beautiful life; be strong 
and passionately cherish yourself to console yourself for being so alone in the midst of all those 
who love you. Again this necessity to be strong!” 163 
 - Beauvoir  
 
The publication of Beauvoir’s student diaries in 2006 necessitated a reappraisal, a re-reading of her 
entire oeuvre for in those diaries dating from 1926 - 1930, Beauvoir sets out the agenda that she 
would follow throughout her career. More specifically, therein she identifies the issues concerning the 
self and the other that she would address again and again in her novels and essays, as well as outlines 
the methodology she would employ in attempting to resolve those issues.  
Considering her own life as we as well as her philosophical interests, she undertakes to  
Clearly spell out my philosophical ideas, and maybe I will begin the 
narrative that I would like to write. So many ideas that have matured 
with my meditations and become more precise through my 
conversations. I should take stock of my eighteen months of thought, 
reassess and go more deeply into problems that enticed me, to which 
I gave overly hasty solutions. The theme is almost always this 
opposition of self and other that I have felt since beginning to live. 
Now has come this time to make a synthesis of it. Foreign influences 
are remote, and also the desire for affectation in writing. I will write 
my work in my own style seeking only to express well what I feel.164 
Perhaps there is no more succinct statement of Beauvoir’s lifelong philosophical project, her agenda, 
than that offered up in this passage. First, she grounds her philosophy in the realm of lived 
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experience. Second, she is clear that the problem that preoccupies her is that involving the 
relationship between self and other. Third, she recognizes the importance of conflict in this 
relationship. And fourth, she acknowledges the need to recognize the “synthesis” of self and other.  
This entry, dating from July 10 1927, comes toward the end of these journals dating from her 
days as a student at the Sorbonne. A careful reading of these works offers the opportunity to see how 
she arrived at this conclusion. More specifically, it allows for consideration of the influences that 
shaped her thinking, of the development of her method for taking up this project, and of her early 
study of love that would come to shape her “theme” and frame her first extended study of a possible 
synthesis in her first novel She Came To Stay.  As noted by Tidd, the diaries, when read in this light, 
reveal that Beauvoir`s early interest in the ontological and ethical issues relating to gender, 
subjectivity, and recognition.165  And, they reveal her earliest preoccupation with the problem of the 
other in relation to friends and lovers.166 However, before looking at the content of these reflections, it 
is necessary first to consider the style in which they are written, for in considering novel use of a 
diary, in order to record her reflections, there is much to be learned about her understanding of this 
problem and of the issues it entails. 
3.2 A Matter of Influence 
“I cannot say I was influenced by anyone in particular … or perhaps I was influenced by 
everyone.” 167 
 - Beauvoir 
 
Beauvoir states that “one receives influences if one is ready to welcome them”168 In these diaries, 
there are references to philosophers169, novelists170, poets,171 visual artists172, friends and teachers all 
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of whom play a role in shaping the development of Beauvoir’s project, that is, all of whom figure in 
shaping her understanding of philosophy – its subject matter and its method for investigation. From 
Proust to Schopenhauer, from Wilde to Alain-Fournier, those referenced in her diaries directly and 
indirectly inform her understanding and shape the structure of her investigation of the problem of the 
other’s consciousness. In particular, these early journals reveal that Beauvoir had a greater 
understanding of German philosophy earlier in her career than has heretofore been acknowledged.  
Beauvoir’s introduction to the problem of the other’s consciousness – to discussions of the 
opposition of self and other, would have come in 1924 while studying advanced philosophy at Institut 
Adeline-Désir or Cours Désir. The year was remarkable for it was the first year that girls were 
allowed to take advanced philosophy and Latin in school. As a result of the economic hardships 
suffered by bourgeois families during WWI, the traditional assumption that girls would marry was 
undermined, for the funds were simply no longer available to put towards dowries. In light of these 
social and economic changes, girls were given more course options in order to allow them to acquire 
the necessary skills and knowledge to acquire careers.   
Thus it was that Beauvoir was amongst the very first girls in France allowed to take 
Philosophy at an advanced level. Taught by L’Abbé Trésal, Beauvoir was given an introduction to the 
key problems in philosophy using Father Charles’s Manuel de Philosophie.173 Included in this 
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textbook was an introduction to Hegel’s account of self and other via a reference to the master-slave 
dialectic.174 In his brief overview, Lahr attributes to Hegel the view that  
Everything starts from the self which creates itself in positing itself. 
And in that very instant creates the non-self. The self posits itself, 
that is the thesis, but at the same time it opposes the non-self. This is 
the antithesis and in that very way he identifies with it, this is the 
synthesis.175 
 
It would not be until 1940 that she would turn to reading the complete text of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit on her own and begin to challenge this interpretation of Hegel’s work. 
During the interim, her understanding of Hegel’s ideas would develop indirectly.  Many of the 
novelists and poets most frequently referenced in these texts were those who were associated with 
Hegel’s philosophy. The poet Jules Laforgue and the novelist Louis Aragon as well as the 
philosopher Alain (Emile-Auguste Chartier) were all clearly influenced by Hegel’s writing, by his 
philosophy of history in particular. Moreover, Alain-Fournier, the author of Le Grands Meulnes and 
Jacques Rivière who wrote Aimée, Beauvoir’s two favourite novelists at this time, were both attracted 
to German philosophy, in particular, to the discussions of idealism and subjectivity therein. Rivière, 
for example, in his correspondence with Alain-Fournier writes of his desire to undertake a thesis on 
Hegel’s aesthetics.176 Her understanding of the ideas explored in context in these works and of 
German philosophy, more generally, would develop as she continued her education at the Sorbonne 
and came in contact with two influential professors with opposing views on phenomenology in 
general, and Hegel‘s philosophy in particular. 
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While Hegel was not officially included in the curriculum at the Sorbonne,177 much of 
Beauvoir’s knowledge of German phenomenology may have developed from her studies with her 
Jean Baruzi.178 Beauvoir’s mentor while she attended the Sorbonne, Baruzi had studied Leibniz and 
James under the direction of Henri Bergson179, and in the process developed an interest in German 
philosophy. As early as 1926, references to Husserl can be found in his work, allowing questions to 
be raised concerning the extent of Beauvoir’s knowledge of phenomenology prior to her reading of 
Husserl’s work in 1931.180  
The significance of her studies with Baruzi cannot be overlooked. If Beauvoir was familiar 
with the method, though not necessarily the scholarship, on phenomenology, it would explain her 
commitment to the development of a philosophy that was in and of the world. That is, it would help 
to explain both her knowledge of this methodology and her willingness to put it into practice. It 
would explain both her approach and her confidence as a student in challenging the ideas and 
assumptions of her professors. To make this point clear, one need only turn to consideration of the 
influence of Léon Brunschivcg on the development of Beauvoir’s thought.  
While Baruzi was encouraging of Beauvoir’s studies, he would not serve as her thesis 
supervisor. Her dissertation on Leibniz would be under the supervision of Leon Brunschivcg. This is 
an important connection for it suggests that her introduction to the problem of the other’s 
consciousness pre-dates what has hitherto been regarded as the originating point.  In the 1920s and 
1930s, Brunschivcg was the leading philosopher in France. His adherence to neo-Kantianism, to 
rationalism, and his focus on the realm of the abstract, led him to regard as irrelevant the realm of 
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experience. Furthermore, his commitments to these principles led him to reject outright Hegel’s 
concept of Geist or Spirit. Indeed, the year that Beauvoir completed her dissertation, Brunschivcg 
published his most important study, La progresse de La Conscience d’Occidentale (1927) that 
included a critique of Hegel that focused on his metaphysics and his conception of reason.181 While 
there are no direct references to this text in Beauvoir’s journals, given her demonstrated knowledge of 
his ideas182 it is clear that she would have been familiar with this text. This again suggests that her 
knowledge of Hegelianism, even if limited, pre-dated 1940.  
Beauvoir was highly critical of Brunschivcg’s philosophy for being too abstract to be of 
relevance. Indeed in her 1927 diary she notes that he is for her “zero.”183 What can be traced 
developing here in Beauvoir’s early studies, is an understanding of philosophy in and of the world. 
With her rejection of Brunschvicg’s abstraction and her knowledge – however superficial -- of 
alternative approaches to her chosen field of study, she would redefine philosophy for herself.  
That Beauvoir in these diaries already is coming to develop her own understanding of 
philosophy – of the kind of philosophy that she would study and practice – is clear. The account of 
philosophy both developed in and demonstrated through these writings clearly reflects her basic 
orientation towards phenomenology. However, it is as well reminiscent of the commitment to 
immediate experience advocated by Henri Bergson in his Essai sur Les Données Immediate de La 
Conscience.  
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Simons’ investigations of the philosophical import of Beauvoir’s student diaries points 
towards what had been the unacknowledged influence of Bergson on Beauvoir’s thought.184 
Reflecting on Beauvoir’s entries, Simons identifies how the notions of time, memory, of the 
“givenness” of the world and of becoming in Bergson find their place in Beauvoir’s account of the 
self.185  While clearly these aspects of Bergson’s thought shaped Beauvoir’s work, two key elements 
of his philosophy that shaped Beauvoir’s account of the problem of the other’s consciousness in 
particular; namely, his account of the two selves and his focus on lived experience, warrant further 
investigation.  
In her diaries, Beauvoir quotes at length from Bergson’s Essai.  What particularly “thrilled 
her” in these works was his account of the self it offered. Bergson writes that  
. . . there are two different ‘selves,’ one of which is, as it were, the 
external projection of the other, its spatial and, so to speak, social 
representation. We reach the former by deep reflection, which leads 
us to grasp our inner states as living beings, constantly in the process 
of forming, as states not amenable to measure, which penetrate one 
another and of which the succession in duration has nothing in 
common with a juxtaposition in homogeneous space. But the 
moments at which we again thus grasp ourselves are rare, and that is 
why we are rarely free. Most of the time we live outside ourselves, 
hardly perceiving anything of ourselves (notre moi) but our own 
colourless ghost, a shadow that pure duration projects into 
homogenous space. Hence our existence unfold in space rather than 
in time; we live for the external world rather than for ourselves; we 
speak rather than think; we ‘are acted’ rather than act. To act freely 
is to recover possession of self and to get back into pure duration.186 
It was this duality identified by Bergson that Beauvoir recognized that she “so often observed 
between the being that I am within myself and the being seen from outside, not deformed, seen 
exactly by me, having become an observer, between the true being considered from the exterior or the 
                                                      
184 While key influence on Beauvoir’s philosophy as witnessed to in the diaries, reference to his works is 
remarkably absent from her essays, text and autobiographies. 
185 Simons, 1999, 194. 
186 DPS 60 as transcribed from Bergson, 1927, VI, 125; trans. F.L. Pogson, 231-232, CJ 59. 
  54 
interior.”187 As she notes, “The first is; the second lives.”188 More specifically, there is, for Bergson, a 
social self which we are seen to be for and by others and there is a “real” self composed of what Gunn 
has described as “a qualitative multiplicity of conscious states flowing, interpenetrating, melting into 
one another, and forming an organic whole, a living unity or personality.”189 In other words, there is 
an external self that is seen as being and an inner self  -- a “deeper, passionate self” which is always 
in the state of becoming. 
 It must be clear, that Bergson is not here stating that there are two selves – but, rather, that 
these are two ways of envisaging the self.190 Indeed, endorsing this view Beauvoir notes that these 
two ways of considering the self ultimately must not be kept apart but must be considered together for  
. . . to be complete, it is not like Ponti appears to believe, to 
juxtapose two diverse tendencies; it is to live according to each as 
completely as if it were alone. He tells me that I am strangely double. 
There isn’t any duplicity either. There is only one unique essence 
expressing itself completely in each of its attributes. One must love 
and judge.191 
That is, what is divided conceptually is never lived separately.   
The importance of this model of the self in structuring Beauvoir’s understanding of the 
problem of the other’s consciousness while having gone unrecognized to date, cannot be 
underestimated. It provides her with a standpoint from which to see the self as simultaneously divided 
within itself yet united. Echoes of this view are heard throughout Beauvoir’s fiction and nonfiction 
from She Came To Stay through to her last major work, Old Age. Consider how, in this later project, 
she notes that while in the first half of her study of the elderly 
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We have looked at the aged man as an object, an object from the 
scientific, historic, and social point of view: we have described him 
from the outside. But it is also a subject, one who has an intimate, 
inward knowledge of his state and who reacts to it. Let us try to 
understand how he experiences his old age – how he actually lives it. 
The difficulty is that one can adopt neither a nominalist nor a 
conceptual view of age. It is just something that happens to people 
who become old and this plurality of experiences cannot possibly be 
confirmed in a concept or even in a notion. But at least we can 
compare them with one another; we can try to isolate the constraints 
and to find the reasons for the differences.192 
In this passage the same two perspectives on the self are identified and it is argued that they need to 
be considered as interconnected, reflecting Bergson’s lasting influence on Beauvoir understanding of 
her own theme, the theme of the self and the other.  
Bergson provided Beauvoir with an account of intra-alterity that, when conjoined with an 
account of intersubjectivity that she would later develop out of her reading of Hegel, would allow for 
her to explain how it is that the other comes to reside as much within the self as in the world. 
Consider, the example above in this context. That the world sees the elderly man as “the other” is 
clear. How he comes to see himself in this regard requires a more complicated account of 
consciousness, an account which Hegel assumes in his discussion of the self-other but which Bergson 
can be seen as articulating and filling out. The external self, as he describes it, allows the view of the 
old man as old, to take on not just an exterior reality but for it to move inside and become part of his 
self-conception. It allows as such the self to be divided from within and from itself as much as it is 
divided from the other and from the world193  
Perhaps more significant to the study of Beauvoir’s work from the perspective of the 
development of her account of recognition, a point heretofore overlooked, is Beauvoir’s adoption of 
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Bergson’s focus on lived experience as the foundation for philosophical reflection and his account of 
the self. Following Bergson, Beauvoir rejects philosophy that remains in a vacuum194, that is, 
philosophy that is a form of abstraction. Rather, even this early in her career, she states her 
commitment to developing, to practicing, a philosophy that is “attentive to life”195 – that is, a 
philosophy that is not a game196 but rather one that must be from life.197 The problems that others live 
in their minds, “I live them with my arms and my legs,”198she states. To be able to write of herself, as 
a living self, in this two-sided fashion, she would turn to her journal, and therein reinvent its very 
form to be able to capture her developing philosophy. 
3.3 The Diaries 
“This is what I am going to do: in this notebook I will recount my experiences that I accept as 
varied and even absurd; this will be in terms of my weaknesses. Then I will attempt a work of 
thought in which everything will result in a strong, detached and disdainful judgment. There will 
be no dilettantism or splitting in two.” 199 
 - Beauvoir  
 
The unique nature of Beauvoir’s diary is easily overlooked. Reading through the pages, it seems both 
in style and in content typical of the kind of journal that any young woman in her late teens might 
write, typical for any young woman writing in the late 20th century or early 21st century. But this 
journal begins in 1926, when understandings of both the function and the purpose of a diary were 
very different.  
While there is a long tradition of women in France keeping journals, the form and uses to 
which Beauvoir put her volumes were unique. The earliest diaries found in France date back to the 
16th century. The diary was then considered a tool to be used by Catholics and Christians to examine 
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and correct behavior. The idea that such writings would be personal reflections or that they would in 
some ways be private would have been foreign to their authors. They were written with the 
knowledge that they would be shared with the parsonage/priests/religious leaders/ -- that they would 
be made public and used to direct the behavior of the author as well as others who might learn by 
example.  
As Klaw notes in her introduction to Beauvoir’s student journals, by the 18th century secular 
diaries were kept but they were considered primarily mnemonic devices.200 They more closely 
resembled modern social calendars than private journals, for they listed and recorded the activities of 
their authors. This tradition continued through into the 19th century when diarist, particularly the 
woman diarist, was expected to use their journals to account for their use of time. 
From the mid 1800s up until the mid 20th century, the old tradition of employing diaries as a 
didactic medium was revived. Considered, in particular, to be a means to be employed for the moral 
and spiritual education of women, young girls were expected to keep journals in which they would 
recount their actions and thoughts that they would then present to their mothers for the purpose of 
correction. Indeed, in Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter, Beauvoir recalls keeping such diaries, recalls 
having her mother read their contents.201 Yet she would a few years later, dramatically reconceive the 
purpose and the subject matter of the diary. But it is only when considering history of diaries in 
France, that the novelty of Beauvoir’s early student diaries becomes evident.202 
Beauvoir conceives of her diary as a private space in which she can contemplate issues of 
concern to her, to try on or try out new ideas and new identities, and express not only self-reprimand 
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but self-love.203And she does so not fearing recrimination. Clearly, this is modern journal in which 
she writes to herself, of herself not for the purpose of correction but revelation. 
Simons notes that Beauvoir had no diary to imitate to help give form or structure to her own 
private writings. Few women’s diaries were published at the time204 and journals written by men 
would have been censored by her mother.205 It is unclear then the inspiration for her taking up her 
diary and employing it in this fashion. Perhaps it was the influence of Montaigne’s writings.206 Or 
perhaps it was the consequence of her growing sense of individual freedom. Whatever the cause, the 
importance of the style of writing she adopts herein is key to understanding what she would come to 
call the problem of the other’s consciousness. 
What has gone overlooked but what must now be evident is that Beauvoir, in writing of her 
own life in this manner, does not merely contemplate but enacts Bergson’s two selves. She 
simultaneously views herself from the internal perspective as she writes, and from the external 
perspective as she takes herself as her own subject matter. She is at one and the same time subject and 
object. Moreover, she realizes that “our two selves” are “Distinct but fraternal.”207 She cannot write of 
one without always already enacting the other. That is she cannot solely write of herself from an 
internal perspective for in committing the words to the page she is already transforming herself into 
an object, allowing herself to reflect back upon her own actions as if they were the actions of another. 
That is, as if they were external to her. Nor can she write of herself solely from an external 
perspective for in writing she must take up the pen and give voice to the self she is describing, 
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creating for her self a narrative. Thus, not only is she revealing her two selves in this diary, she is as 
well, through the very act of writing, showing their interrelation.208 Taking up Bergson’s ideas in this 
manner, Beauvoir enacts in her writing, what Deleuze would theorize forty years later, the union of 
heterogeneity and continuity.209 
It is important as well to note that in her diary entries Beauvoir adopts the notion of 
philosophy found in Bergson as well as in the German phenomenologists. For them, philosophy was 
not concerned with presuppositions and assumptions about experience. Rather, it focused on things in 
themselves, the experience itself for, as noted by Heinämaa, without that “understanding (of) how 
meanings are constituted in experience, (s)he cannot base (her) his studies on the realities that are 
claimed, supposed or known to be behind experience.”210 That is, in a manner reminiscent of the 
young Hegelians, particularly Fichte, Beauvoir substitutes an “anthropological humanism” for 
Hegel’s speculative dialectic.211 To do so required her to challenge both how philosophy was written 
and what was to be regarded as its appropriate subject matter. 
Thus, for Beauvoir, the problem of the other’s consciousness was not just a conceptual issue 
to be addressed in abstract terms, but, rather, it was a problem that was lived. Throughout the text she 
raises the problem of recognition clearly within the framework of her own experience. More 
specifically, herein her study of the problem of the other’s consciousness takes root in her discussions 
of love.  
                                                      
208 This use of Bergson’s two selves in writing is evident as well in Beauvoir’s later works, particularly in her 
autobiographies. See Chapter Six of this study. 
209 Deleuze, 1966. 
210 Heinämaa, 1997, 25. 
211 The question of whether the content of Hegel’s dialectic can be extracted from within a metaphysics 
grounded on and in the Spirit, is an issue to which it is necessary to return to later in this work for it underscores 
many of Beauvoir’s criticisms of her own attempts to resolved the problem of the other’s consciousness.  
  60 
3.4 On Love 
“But after all, what is loving?’ 212 
 - Beauvoir 
 
In these early journals, Beauvoir turns to her experience of love to ground her reflections on the 
relation between self and other. Many of Beauvoir’s readers have been disenchanted, disappointed 
upon reading in her student journals of her infatuation with her cousin, Jacques, her willingness – 
almost – to abandon her own ideas and her work to love – of her impatience with her friend, Zaza, 
and her use of her sister, Poupette.213 How could this be the person who would criticize the woman in 
love in The Second Sex? How could this be the founder of the second wave in feminism?  
These criticisms seem in many ways uncharitable. Taken in context, perhaps it is best to ask 
how it could not be Beauvoir. When Beauvoir wrote in The Second Sex of women’s willingness to 
allow themselves to be overtaken by love214, she did not write from pure reflection – that is, in 
adherence to abstract principles and ideas. She knew of what she spoke in terms of her own lived 
experience. Theory for her helped to elucidate life, it did not define it or replace it. Nowhere is this 
more evident than in her discussion of love in these journals. She finds herself in these pages 
struggling with love – struggling to understand its limits and restrictions. And she finds herself 
enjoying the moments of attention, the sense of belonging and purpose that she experiences when 
with Jacques or her friends. She feels the pull of romantic love. Those critical of Beauvoir’s account 
of love in this work need to recall that she writes these passages not as a thirty-nine year old 
successful author and public intellectual but as an eighteen year old philosophy student.  
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The timing of the writing of these journals makes for important points of comparison. In 1929 
while Virginia Woolf was writing A Room of One’s Own, Beauvoir was living in just such a room.215 
While studying for the aggrégation, she rooms at her grandmother’s house and for the first time has 
the freedom to come and go as she wishes, has the freedom to read what she likes, and to write what 
she thinks. For the first time, she knows something of independence. Keeping this in mind, if, at times 
she seems frivolous, it is perhaps understandable. And while she is no doubt infatuated with Jacques, 
while she is no doubt tempted to be the woman that her mother wants her to be – to marry Jacques 
and settle down216 – it does not mean that she does not bring to her experience of love, at least on the 
page, a kind of criticality and seriousness. Already in these writings, Beauvoir takes as her subject 
matter for philosophical reflection “lived experience.” This focus of attention would sharpen over 
time informing and developing in and through her novels, essays and studies. 
Of particular interest in these journals is her recognition of the dual nature of love. She 
desires to unite with the other – whether it is in friendship, passionate love or in service (generosity).  
As she notes, “To love is to identify with the object that one loves; it is to want oneself in the 
other.”217 That is, it is to be founded upon “‘absolute reciprocity and the identity of consciousness.”218 
Indeed she notes how “Once I love, I probably desire to be loved. And to found a true love, this 
reciprocity is necessary.”219 And it is the source of comfort, continuity and connection. 
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She realizes that love is more complicated than this, however. “I speak mystically of love; I 
know its price. But I know also that it does not put an end to my solitude. Besides, it is not made for 
that.”220 In this passage she realizes the limitations, indeed, the dangers of love, dangers which she 
sees as involving 
. . . the abandonment of all of oneself that is a simple cowardice 
because a being is never an end, because evidently duty is all the 
same above love, and because duty forbids the alienation of one’s 
liberty.” . . .Nor would I like a being who would always be superior 
to his love, because it would be proof that his passion is not great 
enough if it never overwhelms him.221 
She worries that she will “be subsumed by others in/through love” or alternatively that she will come 
to subsume them, as she willingly confesses she loves “others only inasmuch as they are me.”222 
Love, she worries, is simply a disguise for egoism – a faint attempt to shroud the desire to dominate 
with the language of romance and care.  
What holds true for romantic love is true as well of friendship and service to others. Love in 
these guises can lead to harmony or it can lead to conflict. She notes this of her own relationships 
with Zaza and Poupette. She loves them yet she recognizes her desire to dominate them. And she 
realizes the threat they pose to her. “One abdicates the self attempting to serve others.”223 However, 
the more one serves the other “the more the other comes to seem incapable of acting for himself.”224 
She acknowledges, as such, that there is fine line that exists between care and conflict, between power 
and passion, between love and labour. “(W)hat then is love? Not much; not much; I come back to this 
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idea. Sensitivity, imagination, fatigue, and this effort to depend on another; the taste for the mystery 
of the other and the need to admire; wonderment,”225she concludes. 
In thus describing her experiences of love, Beauvoir is led to an important conclusion. She 
notes that as a result of this intermingling of selves – of affection, thought and desire – the lines that 
distinguish self from other blur. Reliance results in the other coming to reside not only within the 
world but also within the self such that she is at one and the same time, self and other. This point is 
made clear when, in describing memory, she notes that  
I would like to understand how I can isolate myself thus from my 
dearest memories and my closest desires – I often experienced that 
already: some mild afternoon, some moving conversation, I attribute 
them to another … They issue from fiction. I cannot immerse myself 
in them: they are not my memories.226  
It is significant that in this passage Beauvoir not only recognizes that the other lies not only within the 
world but within the self, but that Beauvoir as well characterizes the self in terms of a fiction, more 
specifically, as the product of self-creation.  
Rejecting the Cartesian conception of the self, Beauvoir abandons the idea that the self is to 
be found, discovered or uncovered.  Relying on the many eyes of others, on the images of the self that 
they reflect, the self is created by the other, and then re-created by the individual yet again. Beauvoir 
claims, “I will construct my life. I will take myself as an end.”227 Further, she goes on to note that it is 
“only by free decision and thanks to the play of circumstances that the true self is revealed.”228 The 
self or self-consciousness thus is always in the process of self-creation.229 There is no self but only the 
becoming of the self in relation to others, and to the past. In works written from her ‘moral period” 
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onward, one of Beauvoir’s primary goals would be to outline what kind of self should be create in this 
process – turning from considerations of ontology to reflections on ethics. 
3.5 Self and Others 
“Since beginning to live . . .” 230 
 - Beauvoir  
 
In her 1927 diary Beauvoir writes,  
I must clearly spell out my philosophical ideas, and maybe I will 
begin the narrative that I would like to write. So many ideas that 
have matured with my meditations and become more precise through 
my conversations. I should take stock of my eighteen months of 
thought, reassess and go more deeply into problems that enticed me, 
to which I gave overly hasty solutions. The theme is almost always 
this opposition of self and other that I have felt since beginning to 
live. Now has come this time to make a synthesis of it. Foreign 
influences are remote, and also the desire for affectation in writing. I 
will write my work in my own style seeking only to express well 
what I feel.231 
Beauvoir begins this passage noting that relations between self and other are grounded in opposition. 
She notes that there is at the heart of all relationships this desire to dominate the other.232 And, she 
speaks of this desire even with regard to those she cared for – with respect to Jacques, Zaza and 
Poupette. That is, she acknowledges that, even in those relationships most important to us, there is 
always conflict. But conflict is not the only element defining our relations with others. There is 
opposition but also there is the possibility of a synthesis of self and other. But in order to capture 
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these two moments on the page, she would turn from her personal reflections to develop a new form 
of writing in order to find a medium adequate for recounting and enacting this synthesis. 
As has been seen, even in her earliest writings, Beauvoir not only undertakes to revise the 
form and function of the diary, she as well rethinks how philosophy is written.  She makes clear that 
she will write neither fiction nor non-fiction but will develop a hybrid. More specifically, she states 
that she will  “Write ‘essays (éssais) on life’ that would not be novelistic, but rather philosophical, by 
linking together both passion and reason vaguely with a fiction,”233 with the goal of seeking “to find 
the truth, not to express or to describe the search for truth.”234 The influence of Bergson is evidenced 
herein again. Reflecting on his writing, she notes that since 
. . . one cannot say everything, it is imperative that the written 
sentences, the signposts, force readers to fill up the pages as they 
themselves have been filled up. When one composes a scene (I am 
thinking of Balzac), one sees it first inwardly and then one translates 
one’s vision on paper. The translation must be such that the reading 
recomposes the vision exactly as the author conceived the author.235  
It is in fiction that she finds the beginnings of an ontology that would allow for her to explain 
the complicated and often contradictory lived experience of her relationships. That is, it is here in the 
fiction that she would find the foundation for her resolution to the problem of self and other, though it 
remained unrecognized and unwritten for the next 50 years of her life. Already in these early works, 
reflections on the problem of the other’s consciousness led her to considerations of writing and of 
reading.  
While Beauvoir was yet to develop the philosophical sophistication and knowledge to ground 
her ideas, she nonetheless in these early writings intimates what will be her conclusion to this 
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problem. In these entries, she grounds her faith in reading and writing. Reflecting on Bergson’s 
discussion of literature she notes how  
Words, in books, that strike you and that are retained from the first 
reading on. One does not understand them, but one knows that they 
are rich with possibility and indeed, for a long while after sometimes, 
when we take a run at the mood (état d’âme) that the author was in 
and that he condensed in a short sentence, this short sentence appears 
immense and a great sympathy (in the etymological sense) unites 
you to its author. I conclude from this that when one writes, one must 
not seek to be understood right away; the first tendency is to want to 
say everything; but as Cocteau says, what is interesting is what one 
reads between the lines.236 
Fiction that is successful “leaves blank pages” that the reader uses to reconstruct the vision of the 
author, thus reversing the author’s act of creation/communication.237 In one and the same moment, for 
both the author and for the reader, the two sides of the self are brought together. The reader is object 
but also subject both reading and writing in the same act. The author is subject for she actively 
constructs the words on the page yet, simultaneously in committing her experience onto the page she 
transforms herself into an object.238  
Discussing reading and writing, Beauvoir provides an account of empathy that explains the 
kind of emotion that facilitates love and friendship. As Beauvoir goes on to note, to have empathy for 
another is to “love them and rejoice in their differences from me, but without desiring to be such as 
they are.”239 It entails the recognition of another consciousness as both self and other. Beauvoir is 
cognizant of the fact that experiences of love and friendship grounded in our ability to empathize, 
overcome the gap between self and the other, while recognizing that such relations are double-edged. 
                                                      
236 DPS 87, CJ 86. 
237 DPS 87, CJ 88. 
238 Remarkably this account of writing is endorsed anew in Beauvoir’s last works, with a recognition that, as 
Proust had recognized, “literature is the true site of intersubjectivity.” See “My Experience as a Writer” in LW 
296 translated from “Mon expérience d’écrivain” in LE 456. 
239 See Simons, 1999, 221. 
  67 
And she recognizes here in her earliest works, that much can be learned from the experience of 
literature in attempts to understand this relationship.  
This kind of hybrid of philosophy and fiction, Merleau-Ponty labels the “metaphysical 
novel.”240 Such writing is premised on the recognition that  
The tasks of literature and philosophy can no longer be separated. 
When one is concerned with giving voice to the experience of the 
world and showing how consciousness escapes into the world, one 
can no longer credit oneself with attaining a perfect transparence of 
expression. Philosophical expression assumes the same ambiguities 
as literary expression, if the world is such that it cannot be expressed 
except in stories, and as it were, pointed at.241 
As Simons describes it, the metaphysical novel “is able to disclose the reality of human experience in 
its opacity, ambiguity and temporality, which is not possible in an abstract essay.”242 
Literature is a site where life and thought merge for Beauvoir. Novels allow the reader to 
encounter the ambiguities, contradictions and difficulties of lived experience without attempt to 
resolve or settle the disagreements. It provided an opportunity to reflect on lived experience, 
revealing/disclosing/unveiling what is universal therein, not via explication but rather through 
elucidation. 
This new kind of fiction provides Beauvoir with a means for writing lived experience. In 
“Mon expérience d’écrivain” she writes how  
If I want to render the lived aspect of an experience, with its 
ambiugity and contradictions, with this inexpressible side requiring 
the creation of aliterary work which must close again on silence, then 
of course, I write ina completely different way. I take care to 
emphasize these ambiguities, nuances and contradictions which are 
the very reason for my book, which lead me to compose not an essay 
but a literary work which must close again on silence. To try to 
render this ‘lived sense of being-in-the-world of which Sartre spoke, 
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I have resorted, on the whole, to two different forms; first, the novel, 
then autobiography.243  
She uses a particular story or a particular character in that story, to reveal what is universal. As such, 
for her the novel was more real than any sociological study could ever be. 
In turning towards the novel, in being a writer, Beauvoir was turning towards the philosophy 
of life -- towards life not towards the development of systems. The novel allowed her to grasp and 
grapple with the realities of our lives. To use D.H. Lawrence’s terms, the novel allowed her to 
describe “man alive,”244to capture “the whole” complete with its “incongruous parts.”245 In literature, 
the ambiguities of life could be revealed as the reader was provided not with explanations but rather 
elucidations. Indeed, this link between philosophy and fiction in which “lived experience could be 
described and phenomenological descriptions given”246 would become one of the hallmarks of French 
phenomenology. Beauvoir’s contribution to its development and to its enactment has, however, often 
been underestimated or overlooked, as her contribution more generally to the development of French 
philosophy. 
3.6 Philosophy and Literature 
“the great philosophers are Descartes, Hegel, etc. Sartre, in my opinion, will be among them. But 
not I.” 247 
 - Beauvoir 
 
Beauvoir herself encouraged the downplaying of her philosophical contributions claiming that she 
was not a philosopher but a writer.248 And scholars readily followed suit. It is often forgotten that 
Beauvoir came in second in the national exam in philosophy for École Supérieure in 1928, placing 
just behind Simone Weil and in front of Merleau-Ponty, and the following year was granted second in 
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her aggregation in a controversial decision that gave Sartre first place249. That Beauvoir encouraged, 
at best, such forgetfulness and at worst, the denigration of her academic accomplishments is 
perplexing. Was Beauvoir simply being modest? Was this an example of her playing the role of a 
Sartreuse? Was she bowing to the social conventions of her time?  
A common response to Beauvoir’s claim to be a writer and not a philosopher is to consider 
this to be a lie that Beauvoir told in order to allow herself the necessary freedom to think and write as 
she wished.250 Those who advocate this interpretation of Beauvoir’s self-description emphasize the 
context in which she wrote. As a woman writer, Beauvoir would be granted greater social acceptance 
than as a woman philosopher. A woman writer in the 1930s and 40s, would not have been considered 
an anomaly. She would find a place within a tradition that included other great French women of 
letters including George Sand251 and Madame de Stael.252  
Given this precedence, commentators including Fullbrook and Fullbrook have suggested that 
Beauvoir’s claim to be a writer rather than a philosopher was a strategic decision on her part.253 To be 
considered a woman writer in France would allow her greater freedom to work and to publish than 
she would be granted if she characterized herself otherwise. Indeed, even her fiction was carefully 
scrutinized. The introductory chapters of She Came to Stay were not published for the depiction of 
female masturbation found therein was deemed to be too explicit.254  
If she were to be challenged as a woman writer, as a woman philosopher, she would be all the 
more suspect. Who would take her seriously? Beauvoir was only the sixth woman in French history to 
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receive her aggregation in philosophy. Her predecessors in the field are unknown in the history of 
philosophy. There is, of course, Madame Mercier, Beauvoir’s own teacher, who was an important 
influence on Beauvoir’s choice of pursuing a career in philosophy. But Madame Mercier taught 
philosophy in a girls’ lycée255.  Rather than being ignored as a philosopher, Beauvoir characterized 
herself as a writer in order to secure a path to publication. 
While there is certainly much merit in considering the social context in which Beauvoir lived 
in order to explain not only what she wrote, but how she wrote256, to focus solely on this explanation 
would be to overlook her philosophical commitments. For her to disallow herself to be a philosopher 
out of fear of retribution or of being ostracized is inconsistent with her head-on confrontation with 
many other conventions of her time. Her decision to study philosophy in the 1920s, her 
unconventional relationship with Sartre in the 1930s, and her discussion of the role of women in 
1949, all make evident the need to recognize that there were other motives informing this claim.  
Moreover, in her diaries she herself notes that it is her goal to “make a philosopher” out of herself.257 
To gain a better understanding of Beauvoir’s claim to be a writer not a philosopher, it is 
necessary to look at her account of philosophy. In other words, it is necessary to regard Beauvoir’s 
claim to not be a philosopher as a critique of a particular philosophical tradition. Beauvoir notes that  
A philosopher is someone like Spinoza, Hegel or like Sartre: 
someone who builds a great system, and not simply someone who 
loves philosophy, or can teach it, who can understand it, and who can 
use it in says, etc., but it is someone who truly constructs a 
philosophy.258  
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Henri IV in 1939. 
256 That is, the means and the methods she employed. 
257 DPS 289, CJ 379. 
258 Simons, 1999, 11. 
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Such system building she describes as “a concerted delirium” that required philosophers to give their 
“insights the value of universal keys.”259 She has no interest in building such systems. She rejects that 
model of philosophy that focused on abstract discussion of esoteric topics of interest only to other 
philosophers. She makes clear that she is not going to create any kind of philosophical system. It is 
not that such systemizing had no role or place in academe. Indeed, Beauvoir admires those she 
classifies as philosophers in this case. However while there is a place and role for such 
philosophizing, she notes it need not be the whole of the intellectual tradition. She will opt for a 
different project. She will “use philosophy.”260 
For Beauvoir, philosophy should be neither abstruse nor arcane. To philosophize was to 
embed oneself in the world, in its contexts and confusions, not for the purpose of the explanation or 
the vilification of precepts or concepts but rather for the elucidation of the complexities and 
challenges of lived experience. Perhaps nowhere did she better achieve this goal, than in her first 
novel, She Came to Stay.  
3.7 She Came to Stay 
“Every consciousness seeks the death of the other” 261 
 - Hegel  
 
None of Beauvoir’s novels has received as much attention and careful study as her first published 
fiction, She Came to Stay.262 In part due to the controversy surrounding the intellectual relationship 
between Sartre and Beauvoir, and in part a result of the surprising conclusion, this novel has garnered 
significant attention from those interested in Beauvoir’s work from both a historical and philosophical 
perspective.  
                                                      
259 As cited by Simons, in DPS 5. (FA 254) 
260 Simons, 1999, 11. 
261 This epigraph from She Came to Stay comes from Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. (PS, §187, 113). 
262 See for example, Fallaize, 1988, 25 – 43; Fullbrook and Fullbrook, 1994, 98-111; Holveck, 67 – 90; 
Shepherd, 2004, 77 – 100.  
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Literature, according to Beauvoir, `is born when something in life goes slightly adrift.”263 
Perhaps this is true of none of her novels more than She Came to Stay. Based upon Beauvoir’s own 
relationship with Sartre and Olga Kosakiewicz, this work can be read as her first foray in writing the 
kind of philosophical novel she had envisioned in her student diaries. More specifically, it is an 
exploration of the logic of self and other in the context of friendship and love, an introduction, as 
such, to what will become “her” problem.  
The novel centers on its main character, Françoise, a successful playwright and promising 
novelist, who, at the beginning of the novel, befriends Xavière, a young girl from Rouen. Agreeing to 
be her patron and friend, she provides Xavière the opportunity to remain in Paris instead of returning 
home to her family and a future with few opportunities. What ensues is a study of both a figurative 
and literal battle to the death between these two women, these two consciousnesses, as they become 
caught up in a love triangle with Françoise’s long time partner Pierre.264  
 
From the opening pages of the novel, Françoise is portrayed as a solipsist – that is as a 
singular consciousness, as the singular consciousness in her world. She notes how 
Her presence snatched things from their consciousnesses . . . gave 
them their colour, their smell … She alone evoked the significance 
of these abandoned places, of these slumbering things. She was there 
and they belonged to her. The world belonged to her.265  
                                                      
263 PL 365, FA 374. 
264 Problems with translation plague the English version of this text. In the key scene in the novel, Françoise 
sees Xavière as another “conscience.” As noted by Simons (2004, 5) this term has been translated literally from 
French overlooking that the word conscience can be translated as either “conscience” or “consciousness.” As 
such, her problem is translated as an individual issue when it was deemed by Beauvoir to be a social problem. 
Herein the Hegelian underpinnings of this work and other works in which this confusion has been made, has 
been re-established. In the context of the present discussion of She Came To Stay, Beauvoir’s original and 
intended meaning is restored to this text. 
265 SCS 1, LI 10. An alternative translation is offered in the 199 Norton edition of this text. Herein, this passage 
reads. “Her presence revived things from their inanimateness; she gave them their colour, their smell . . . she 
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Françoise experiences the world as coming into being with herself.  “I feel like the things that do not 
exist for me, simply do not exist at all,” she tells Gerbert.266 This is true for not only objects but, as 
well, for people. She looks at the faces of the men and women and notes that, “if I turned away from 
them, they would disintegrate at once into a deserted landscape.”267 Having taken a young friend “in 
hand,”268 be it Gerbert, or Ines, or Canzetti, or Xavière, they then belong to her. Nothing ever gave 
Françoise such intense joy as this kind of possession.”269 This possession, or perhaps, better yet, this 
domination, is all-encompassing, She possesses them completely  “possessing her even in her past 
and in the still unknown meanderings of her future.”270 
As noted by Merleau-Ponty, for Françoise “nothing can claim to exist without somehow 
being caught in the web of my experience. I am not this particular person or face, this finite being: I 
am a pure witness, placeless, ageless, equal in power to the world’s infinity.”271 She is pure 
consciousness and as such rejects anything that would limit that would limit her, including her own 
body.272 Françoise is the subject and everything, everyone else is an object which lives but which 
does not necessarily exist.273 Xavière is her pawn or her plaything, Elisabeth her foil,274 Gilbert her 
physical satisfaction. As she sees it, Françoise cannot allow another person, another consciousness to 
                                                                                                                                                                       
alone released the meaning of these abandoned places, of these slumbering things. She was there and they 
belonged to her. The world belonged to her.” SCS2 1, LI 10. 
266 SCS 6, LI 14. 
267 SCS 29, LI 29. 
268 SCS 15, LI 23. 
269 SCS 11, LI 19. 
270 SCS 26, LI 34. 
271 Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 28. 
272 Perhaps this best explains Françoise’s claim that “most of the time, she was not even aware that she had a 
face.” SCS 13, LI 21. To have a face, to have a body would give to her existence a kind of immanence that she 
both desires, knowing that it is a condition for the possibility of identity, and abhors, for it limits her freedom.  
273 This is an important distinction made by Hegel and later picked up by both Beauvoir and Sartre. To live is to 
exist only at the level of consciousness, that is, it is to exist as an object in a world of objects. On the other hand, 
to exist is to choose one’s way of living in the world. One chooses, one creates and as such, one demonstrates 
that one is a subject and not just an object. One as such exists. For more on this distinction in Beauvoir’s work 
see Spelman, 1990, 57 - 79. 
274 She sees as her antithesis Elisabeth who cannot create herself but rather can find herself only in the images 
of herself provided by others. 
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exist, for to grant them this status would be to risk the possibility that she could be considered an 
object.  
That this is the case is made ever more evident by Beauvoir through her decision to make 
Françoise a script-writer, a decision that has gone under appreciated in commentaries on this work. 
Françoise, mirroring Beauvoir, is the writer at the theater– she gives to them their lines and their 
scenes, their stories. They are the actors on the stage she has created, rehearsing the lines she has 
written for them, acting out the scenes she has constructed.275 How better could Beauvoir construct a 
solipsist? 
Given this role, given this perspective she takes on life, what worries Françoise despite her 
claim to the contrary, “is other people.”276 For her,  
It’s almost impossible to believe that other people are conscious 
beings, aware of their own inward feelings, as we ourselves are 
aware of ours (qui se sentent du dedans comme on se sent soi-meme). 
.. To me it’s terrifying when we grasp that. We get the impression of 
no longer being anything but a figment of someone else’s mind. But 
that hardly ever happens, and never completely.277  
Across the pages of the novel, Françoise’s optimism that this “hardly ever happens,” is undermined 
and slowly erodes as she is forced to discover that there exists other consciousnesses and that far from 
being able to subsume or annihilate them, she is instead always already caught up with them in “a 
battle to the death.”  
                                                      
275 See SCS 11, LI 19; SCS 24, LI 32; SCS 113, LI 115; SCS 120, LI 122.  Readings of this novel have tended 
to overlook or underestimate the significance of Françoise being a playwright and the theatre being cast as the 
backdrop for this novel. 
276 SCS 6, LI 14. 
277 SCS 7, LI 14 -15. The alternative translation offered up of this passage in the 1990 translation reads as 
follows: “It is almost impossible to believe that other people are conscious beings, aware of their own inward 
feelings, as we ourselves are aware of ours . . . To me it’s terrifying, especially when you begin to feel that 
you’re nothing more than a figment of someone else’s mind. But that hardly ever happens, and never 
completely.” SCS2 16. 
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The oppositional account of the relationship between self and other referred to in her student 
diaries is given context and given play in this novel. Françoise is the self or she is an object. There is 
no alternative, no means for her being both at the same time, that is, of embodying what she would 
later discuss as ambiguity. She is a self alone or she becomes “just anyone . . . just anything.”278 
It is from within this logic, the logic of self versus other, that it is necessary to consider 
Françoise relationships, her experiences of friendship and love. Indeed, keeping this in mind helps 
perhaps to explain some of the more perplexing elements of the structure and content of this novel. It 
helps to explain, for example, Beauvoir’s characterization of Pierre.   
Beauvoir herself noted that Pierre was never given a voice in this work. Writing in limited 
third person, she shifts the perspective from which the sections of the book are written from Françoise 
to Xavière and even to Elisabeth and Gerbert.279 It is remarkable as such, that the reader is never 
given access to Pierre’s thoughts, to his view of the characters in the book especially since so much of 
the action in the book revolves around him. Why this exclusion?  
While Beauvoir considered her portrayal of Pierre a failure for he lacked what she 
characterizes as a three-dimensional quality,280 read as a study of the problem of the other’s 
consciousness, perhaps her approach to Pierre is more consistent with the logic of the novel than she 
acknowledged. He is characterized at various points in the text as an actor, a ghost281 and even, as 
God.282 He is ephemeral, never quite becoming fully realized on the page, fully human.  
                                                      
278 SCS 180, LI 187. 
279 This would be the only novel that Beauvoir would write in the third person – hereafter, her works would all 
be written as first person narratives. Yet neither does she adopt an omniscient third person stance either – 
rejecting, along with Hemingway, one of her most revered writers, the use of objective description in her work. 
See PL 344, FA 353.  
280 PL 342, FA 350. 
281 SCS , 288-289, LI 298. 
282 SCS 260, LI 269; SCS 300, LI 309; SCS 308, LI 317. 
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That is, Pierre is never cast as an individual, as a subject with a voice. To understand why this 
must be the case within the logic of the novel, it is necessary to consider the account of love set 
forward by Françoise and Pierre in the early pages of this work. Pierre tells Françoise early on in the 
novel that, “You and I are simply one. It is true you know. Neither of us can be defined without the 
other.”283 Françoise shares Pierre’s conviction noting how, “Nothing that happened was completely 
real until she had told Pierre about it; it remained poised, motionless and uncertain, in a kind of 
limbo.”284 Indeed, the oneness achieved in this relationship is such that Xavière notes that she is never 
sure with whom she is speaking, Françoise or Pierre.  
This recognition is key to understanding Beauvoir's construction of this character for it 
explains why Pierre need not have, indeed, why he cannot have a voice of his own. His words and 
thoughts, never take over the narrative and his lines and actions seem stiff – planned or scripted – 
acted, as it were. He cannot have an independent existence – cannot have that “true to life” quality 
that Beauvoir seeks for him, as he is nothing but an appendage to Françoise – her other part, her other 
self – herself. He and Françoise are not two: they are one.  
This interpretation of the characterization of Pierre offered up by Beauvoir conditions the 
need to carefully rethink received readings of the text. At first seeming to be an example of 
reciprocity, or, perhaps more accurately, as an example of the possibility of reciprocity, this 
relationship, is revealed across the course of the novel to be yet another example, a remarkably subtle 
example, of the opposition of self and other.    Being one, the conditions for the possibility of 
reciprocation are not met. Pierre is not a separate consciousness. Rather, he is yet another reflection of 
Françoise as is Xavière, Elisabeth, and Gerbert – yet another one of her possessions. As such, their 
relationship cannot be, could never be, an example of reciprocity.  There is no other consciousness 
                                                      
283 SCS 17, LI 25. 
284 SCS 17. LI 25. 
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with which to enter into such a relationship. Pierre is subsumed by and into Françoise. Hence, this is 
an example of domination not a portrait of reconciliation.  
There is a growing awareness of this reality by Françoise as the oneness of their love slowly 
dispels across the novel. Françoise comes to see that her claim to be “but one” with Pierre was simply 
a convenient illusion, a “convenient confusion.”285 She comes to see that they were, they always were  
“two separate persons … she was aware that he lived his own life, and the result of her blind trust was 
that she suddenly found herself facing a stranger.”286 Pierre “lived only for himself.”287 Love was 
merely a disguise. It was yet another means used to transform the other into an object. The reciprocity 
that Pierre claims once existed between himself and Françoise, the give and take between them 
premised on the belief that “the moment you acknowledge my conscience, you know that I 
acknowledge one in you, too” is undermined by the inability or perhaps unwillingness of both parties 
to renounce individual self-importance. The implication for this recognition is great. Romantic love 
and friendship become “impossible.”288 And, for Françoise, it means that someone would have to kill 
Xavière.289 To understand how Françoise arrives at this conclusion, it is necessary to consider the risk 
she takes in attempting to subjugate Xavière and consider the price she pays when she fails at this 
project.  
When the novel opens, Françoise is clear that, for her, Xavière is a new conquest, a new 
opportunity to exercise her ability to dominate, to possess another. That is, she provides a new 
opponent against which to wage a battle to the death – a battle to establish her own subjectivity. She 
undoubtedly believes that this will be an easy victory.  But unlike Elisabeth and Gerbert, Xavière 
does not readily or willingly capitulate.  
                                                      
285 SCS, 131, LI 138. 
286 SCS, 131, LI 138. 
287 SCS 154, LI 161. 
288SCS 302 -303, LI 312. 
289 SCS 303, LI 312. 
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Xavière represents for Françoise a challenge to her dominance over the world and more 
importantly, over herself. Xavière will not conform to Françoise’s image of her no matter how she 
tries. Françoise treats her with tenderness and with anger. She asks others to intervene, and, yet 
regardless of the strategy she employs, she cannot render Xavière an object. And as she works to get 
Xavière to succumb, increasingly she becomes aware that she is losing her self – that she is losing the 
ability to create and act on her own wishes. Becoming increasingly aware that Xavière exists, that she 
exists on her own terms, for herself, Françoise finds herself coming under the sway of Xavière’s 
“gentle tyranny.”290 
The slow erosion of Françoise’s subjectivity is traced across the novel. She is   ‘transformed,” 
to use Beauvoir’s term,291 from a subject into an object. That this is the case is clear from a 
consideration of Beauvoir’s use of mechanical imagery. Françoise acknowledges that, “she did treat 
Xavière rather like a piece of machinery, but at least she handled the delicate mechanism with the 
greatest of care.”292 However, as the novel progresses it is Françoise who takes on a mechanical 
quality. “She felt herself turning into a lump of lead from head to foot.”293After recognizing that she 
can never truly trust Xavière, that is, having recognized that it “was impossible to give herself up 
unreservedly to this friendship; she had a peculiar taste in her mouth, the taste of metal shaving.”294 
The significance of this small beginning to Françoise’s transformation is made clear later in the novel 
as she watches Paula perform a dance as a mechanical person. Françoise wonders what it is to be 
considered and to consider oneself to have nothing but “motions of steel” – to be part of a machine – 
a cog in a wheel, as it were, acted upon and acting not based on one’s own free will but rather as a 
simple consequences of other machinations beyond her control. Indeed, she will experience what this 
                                                      
290 SCS 133, LI 140. 
291 PL 338, FA 347. 
292 SCS 90, LI 97. 
293 SCS 102, LI 109.  
294 SCS 141, LI 144. 
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means, how this feels when through the course of the novel she recognizes that she had “lost all 
control over her body and her thoughts kept eluding her. She was an old, broken down machine.”295 
Throughout these passages Françoise is transformed from a subject into an object, from a self to an 
other. 
Beauvoir incorporates into the text a second analogy to further make evident the subtle means 
by which a subject is transformed into an object.296 She considers what it must be like to be a jacket:  
It (her old jacket) was old and worn but it could not complain as 
Françoise complained when she was hurt; it could not say to itself, 
“I’m an old worn jacket.” It was strange, Françoise tried to imagine 
what it might be like if she were unable to say ‘I’m Françoise, I’m 
six years old, and I’m in Grandma’s house.” Supposing she could say 
absolutely nothing: she closed her eyes. It was as if she did not exist 
at all; and yet other people would be coming here and see her and 
would talk about her. She opened her eyes again; she could see the 
jacket, it existed. Yet it was not aware of it exists. There was 
something disturbing, a little frightening, in all of this. What was the 
use of existing if it couldn’t be aware of its existence? She thought it 
over: perhaps there was a way. “Since I can’t say ‘I’, what would 
happen if I said it for the jacket?’ It was very disappointing; she 
could look at the jacket, see absolutely nothing but the jacket and say 
very quickly, “I’m old, I’m worn; “ but nothing happened. The jacket 
stayed there, indifferent, a complete stranger, and she was still 
Françoise. Besides if she became the jacket, then she Françoise, 
would never know it. Everything began spinning in her head and she 
ran downstairs and into the garden.297 
Herein, Beauvoir provides her readers with a poignant account of the experience of being an object. 
As noted by Simons, in so doing, she explores the phenomenon both from the external and the 
internal perspective, offering perhaps her clearest homage to Bergson’s philosophy.298 It is an account 
                                                      
295 SCS 349, LI 360. 
296 This passage was drawn from the original two chapters of this novel that were excluded from the published 
version of this novel by Gallimard. See this passage for a more detailed description of the parallels being drawn 
herein. PE 41, LE 275. 
297SCS 120, LI 122. 
298 Simons, 203, 121. 
  80 
not only of what it is to have others look at an object but as well to begin to think of oneself only in 
these terms. 
Despite her knowledge of the risks at hand, Françoise wages a battle with Xavière. And she 
loses. Consider the parallels between her description of the jacket in the passage above and her 
account of her moment of recognition when she realized Xavière had usurped her subjectivity and 
made her nothing more than an object – an old and worn object – in the passage below: 
For many weeks Françoise had no longer been able to dissolve 
Xavière`s hatred, her affection, her thoughts, to harmless vapours. 
She had let them bite into her; she had turned herself into a prey. 
Freely, through her moments of resistance and revolt, she had made 
use of herself to destroy herself. She was witnessing the course of 
her own life like an indifferent spectator, without ever daring to 
assert herself, whereas Xavière, from head to foot, was nothing but a 
living assertion of herself. She made herself exist with so sure a 
power, that Françoise, spellbound, had allowed herself to be carried 
away so far as to prefer Xavière to herself, and thus to obliterate 
herself. She had gone so far as to be seeing places, people, and 
Pierre`s smiles, through Xavière`s eyes. She had reached the point of 
no longer knowing herself, except through Xavière`s feelings for her, 
and now she was trying to merge into Xavière. But in this hopeless 
effort she was only succeeding in destroying herself.299 
Xavière’s attempt to take back her own subjectivity and in so doing, to render Françoise an 
object, culminates in the scene in the novel at the Spanish bar. Experiencing Pierre’s jealousy while 
simultaneously feeling jealous of Françoise, Xavière takes up her own hand and “pressed the lighted 
end (of her cigarette) against her skin, a bitter smile curling her lips”300. Beauvoir, in this instance, 
demonstrates Xavière’s refusal to play the role that Pierre and Françoise have assigned her --- she 
refuses to be their pet, their object of affection. In this moment, not allowing another to take up her 
hand but taking it up herself and burning herself, she asserts, she announces her own subjectivity. In a 
choice between fidelity and freedom, Xavière chooses freedom and in so doing wins her subjectivity. 
                                                      
299 SCS 292 – 293, LI 302. 
300 SCS 283, LI 293. 
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Having risked everything in this battle to the death, she becomes something of what Beauvoir will 
later discover is a Hegelian master. And Françoise is transformed into a slave.  For, it is in this 
moment Françoise realizes that while “For a long time Xavière had been only a fragment of 
Françoise’s life, . . .suddenly she had become the only sovereign reality, and Françoise had no more 
than the pale consistency of an image.”301  
Beauvoir’s careful construction of this novel reveals upon study that this scene -- the man and 
the woman at the table in the bar or the cafe – and the decisions to be made, decisions simultaneously 
known and unknown, about desire and subjectivity, is played out repeatedly as the novel moves 
towards this climax. Earlier in the novel there is a scene in which a blond girl and a very young man 
are tenderly holding hands but she does not seem to notice it,302 a young woman looks at a man’s 
hand that has “just pounced on hers,”303 a woman who “coquettishly fingers her black hair which is 
hidden in a hair net as she tells the young man that she is with that  “nobody has ever seen my hair. It 
belongs only to me.”304 In each of these scenes the simple act of hand holding conditions an 
existential crisis in which the woman struggles to see herself as both facticity and transcendence – 
that is, she struggles to accept her own ambiguity. Rather than acknowledge that she is body and 
                                                      
301 My translation. The 1964 translation of this passage reads “For a long time Xavière had been only a 
fragment of Françoise’s life, and suddenly she had become the only sovereign reality, and Françoise now 
possess no more than the colourless contours of a reflection. “ (SCS 292)  An alternative translation offered in 
the 1990 edition of the text reads “For a long time Xavière had been only a fragment of Françoise’s life, and 
suddenly she had become the only sovereign reality and Françoise had no more consistency than a pale 
reflection. “ (SCS2 291) These are differing translations of the original  “Longtemps, Xavière n’avait étéqu’un 
fragment de la vie de Françoise: elle était soudain devenue l’unique réalité sourverain et Françoise n’avait plus 
que la pale consistence d’une image.” (LI 301) Note how the meaning and significance of this passage changes 
given these various interpretations.  
302 SC 21, LI 29. 
303 SC 52, LI 61. 
304 SC 228, LI 234. 
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consciousness, object and subject, she denies one part of herself and plunges into what Sartre will 
describe as “bad faith.”305 She lies to herself.  
But not so for Xavière. She does not follow suit. She will not allow others to reduce her to an 
object. She takes up her own hand and burns it and feels nothing. She is neither body nor 
consciousness but both and neither in that moment.306 She risks both in this single act, and, as in 
Hegel’s account of “the battle to the death,” in risking everything, in that single moment wins her 
freedom, wins the role of master, of consciousness, absolute consciousness.  
And for Françoise, it is the moment of her defeat. For in that moment before her  
. . .very eyes, and yet apart from her, something existed like a 
sentence without an appeal: detached, absolute, unalterable, an alien 
conscience was taking up its position. It was like death, a total 
negation, an eternal absence, and yet, by a staggering contradiction, 
this abyss of nothingness could make itself present to itself and make 
itself fully exist for itself. The entire universe was engulfed in it and 
Françoise, forever excluded from the world, was herself dissolved in 
this void, of which the infinite contour no word, no image could 
encompass.307  
What Françoise recognizes is that Xavière “has a consciousness like mine.”308 Or perhaps, more 
accurately she had a consciousness like that which Françoise once had.  
For in her recognition of Xavière’s subjectivity she finds herself in a situation that she herself 
recognizes as “intolerable.”309  Pierre gives voice to the dilemma she now faces:  “It’s quite true that 
everyone experiences his own consciousness as an absolute. How can several absolutes be 
compatible? This problem is as great a mystery as birth or death, in fact, it`s such a problem that 
                                                      
305 Sartre defines bad faith as the hiding, from oneself, a displeasing truth or the presenting as a truth a pleasing 
untruth.” (Sartre, BN 89) In his discussion of this phenomenon, Sartre would adopt this scenario of the couple 
holding hand as his model for explaining bad faith. (Sartre, BN 96 – 97) 
306We are, as Sartre noted, “a being which is what it is not and which is not what it is.” (Sartre, BN 100) 
307 SCS 292, LI 301. 
308 Ibid. 
309 SCS 296, LI 305-306. 
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philosophers break their heads over it.”310 Françoise quickly recognizes that this is not just a 
philosophical puzzle, a “metaphysical problem” to be pondered and dropped. It is for her, 
. . . something concrete. The whole meaning of my life is at stake . . 
.to me, an idea is not a question of theory . . . It passes the test or, if it 
remains theoretical, it has no value. . .Otherwise, I wouldn’t have 
waited for Xavière’s arrival to be certain that my consciousness is 
not unique in the world.311  
If Xavière is another consciousness, if she is not a machine or a pet or an actress, Françoise’s own 
consciousness is denied. It is her life, her freedom that is not merely at stake, but lost in this 
recognition. In granting Xavière her subjectivity, she already had forfeited her own. It is in this 
moment that Françoise’s transformation is complete. 
Françoise’s growing awareness of Xavière’s existence as a self-consciousness coincides with 
her own growing understanding of herself as object. Beginning with her illness and culminating in her 
looking in the mirror before going out to the Spanish bar on the night of her final defeat, she is forced 
more and more to acknowledge that she is a body, that she is a finite being who is as much an object 
for herself as she is for others.312 Xavière sees Françoise as petty, jealous, and vengeful, and 
Françoise is as such. There is nothing that Françoise can do to negate that view. Her belief that she 
was a consciousness, that she was the only consciousness, had saved Françoise from recognizing that 
she not only created herself but that others also created her. As noted before, she forgets she has a 
face, she shows little concern for her appearance, she takes little concern for her bodily needs.313 All 
these are strategies for maintaining her view of herself as an infinite subject. Xavière’s insistence that 
she be regarded as a consciousness requires Françoise to recognize herself as object, to see herself as 
others see her.  
                                                      
310 SCS 302, LI 311. As noted earlier, herein the term conscience is better translated as consciousness than 
conscience in Beauvoir work. The original translation of this text has been modified to reflect this herein. 
311 SCS 302, LI 312. Not in the original text the term “conscience” is used in place of “consciousness.” 
312 SCS 273, LI 282. 
313 See, for example, SCS 169, LI 179; 187 – 188; SCS 348, LI 360. 
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Xavière forces Françoise to confront this external view of her self, and to take it inside 
herself.  Reflecting on this relationship in his review of this novel, Merleau-Ponty recognizes that  
all our actions have several meanings, especially as seen from the 
outside by others, and all these meanings are assumed in our actions 
because others are the permanent coordinates of our lives. Once we 
are aware of the existence of others, we commit ourselves to being, 
among other things, what they think of us, since we recognize in 
them the exorbitant power to see us.314  
Perhaps it is because Xavière compels Françoise to see “herself from the outside for the first time,”315 
more specifically, to see herself with qualities she has not seen in herself that explains why she 
remains tied to Xavière throughout the novel. She cannot let Xavière go, cannot cut her free, even 
after she has betrayed her, even after she has lied. She cannot let Xavière continue to see her in this 
way, for, if she does, Françoise cannot help but see herself in this manner as well. When she again 
looks at herself in a mirror, “She faced herself. ‘No,’ she repeated, ‘I am not that woman.’”316 
Merleau-Ponty aptly describes this experience when he notes that in this moment “The fundamental 
contingency of our lives makes us feel like strangers at the trial to which others have brought us.”317  
Indeed it is a trial that Françoise is all too familiar with. It is a trial to which Françoise herself 
had brought Elizabeth to stand before such judgment. She criticizes Elizabeth for only being able to 
see herself through others.318 She becomes what others need her to be. Elizabeth is the quintessential 
actress on the stage of her own life, “slavishly” repeating her lines, acting her part, remodeling herself 
for others.319 Françoise’s judgment is swift; her sentence is harsh. She learns just how swift and how 
harsh as the novel unfolds and she is forced to recognize that she is not as different from Elizabeth as 
she might wish.  
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She herself reaches “the point of no longer knowing herself, except through Xavière’s 
feelings for her. And now she was trying to merge into Xavière. But in this hopeless effort she was 
only succeeding in destroying herself.”320  As she recognizes later, “(S)he had fallen onto the trap. 
She was at the mercy of this voracious conscience that had been waiting in the shadow for the 
moment to swallow her up. Jealous, traitorous, guilty. She could not defend herself with timid words 
and furtive deeds. Xavière existed; the betrayal existed.”321And so she must fight, she must fight to 
regain her subjectivity, fight to regain her own self.  And fight not with fond remarks, affection, 
nights out at dancehalls or gossip in cafes. These tactics having failed her, Françoise now wages a war 
on another front – in harsh deeds, deception and ultimately, in violence.  
Reflecting on this change of circumstance, this inversion of roles, Françoise asks herself 
“Why should it be she rather than I? She need only have said one word, she need only say ‘it is I.” 
But she would have had to believe it; she would have had to choose herself.”322 In choosing herself, 
she will first choose Gerbert.  She wages her battle by seducing Gerbert and then by turning both 
Pierre and Gerbert against Xavière revealing her deceptions while covering up her own. Having 
achieved these goals, she declares “she has won,”323 that she has returned to herself having taken back 
from her rival what she had lost to her. But she is quick to discover that this is an insignificant and 
short-lived victory. Finding that Xavière has stolen the key to the desk in which she kept the letters 
she had received from Pierre and Gerbert, letters that lay bear her betrayals, Françoise recognizes that 
she had not only failed to achieve a victory over Xavière but that “There would be no victory.”324  
In order to regain herself, in order to once again become subject, Françoise concludes that she 
has no choice but to eliminate, ”to annihilate” Xavière, for she  
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. . . was there, existing only for herself, entirely self-centered, 
reducing to nothingness everything for which she had no use; she 
encompassed the whole world within her own triumphant aloneness, 
boundlessly extending her influence, infinite and unique, everything 
that she was, she drew from within herself, she barred all dominance 
over her, she was absolute separateness.325  
It is only by murdering Xavière that Françoise believes she can recover her self, that is, to re-establish 
herself as a consciousness, as the consciousness. Her victory lays not so much in the death of her rival 
as in her choice of herself, for, in her mind,  
She had acted alone: as alone as in death. … No one could condemn 
or absolve her. Her act was her very own. ‘It is I who will it.’ It was 
her own will which was being accomplished, now nothing at all 
separated her from herself. She had at last made a choice. She had 
chosen herself.326 
It is telling that the play that Françoise had written and helped to stage with Pierre is Julius 
Caesar,327 a fact overlooked by commentators on this text to date. Beauvoir carefully plots the scenes 
in her novel so as to mirror the play. Both are tales of betrayals undertaken by friends. Both raise 
questions about the very possibility for love. Both conclude with murder as the means for taking back 
of power. Both make clear that there can be only one subject one’s self to rule and that to gain that 
title one must be willing to risk everything to risk all. In the act of killing Xavière, Françoise reclaims 
her subjectivity, reclaims the status of the self or the subject by literally turning her nemesis into an 
object, a corpse. Or has she?  
A careful reading of the novel reveals that Beauvoir foreshadows the murder that will 
conclude the book. With the growing awareness of Xavière as a distinct consciousness, references to 
Xavière`s death, whether by her own hand,328 or that of Françoise,329 intensify. Indeed, Françoise’s 
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last desperate act is foreshadowed by Elisabeth, who, when frustrated by Claude’s failure to leave 
Suzanne, imagines what it would be like to kill him.  “(T)his dark murderous desire violently took 
possession of her. She sighed – she was no longer young enough for insane violence – that was too 
easy.”330 Elisabeth thus stands in this instance as a “disturbing challenge” to Françoise.331 
But while Elisabeth was willing to live with her rival, to take up her role as other or object or 
slave, Francoise is not so content. She gives up looking for ethical solutions to Xavière’s 
“invasion”.332 Thus the murder of Xavière is a brutal and irrational act,333 an act through which she 
regains her subjectivity. Beauvoir herself noted that this interpretation of her conclusion was not 
uniformly accepted.334 Her critics questioned whether Francoise could re-establish her self as a 
subject for, with Xavière gone, there was no one to play the part of the slave and grant to her the 
recognition she sought.335  In killing Xaviere Françoise was left unable to either affirm her mastery or 
confirm her slavery. She had left behind the logic of self and other, and, indeed, all logic. Read in this 
fashion, this is can be considered the first of a series of descriptions Beauvoir offers of instances in 
which the master-slave dialectic is negated or stepped beyond.336 The battle to the death does not end 
in the securing of mastery for one at the expense of the objectivity of the other. Rather as Beauvoir 
enacts in this novel, this battle results in the inability of either party to ever secure their subjectivity. 
Beauvoir readily acknowledges the inadequacy of her conclusion to this novel. From a 
philosophical perspective, she notes “murder is not the solution to the difficulties engendered by 
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coexistence. Instead of stepping around them, I wanted to face them squarely.”337  Beauvoir maintains 
that the conclusion was the weakest aspect of what she considered her weakest novel. There is, she 
notes, a difference between dreaming of murder and building up the malice and hatred that would 
lead one to commit the act. In Françoise she could never build up these emotions enough and 
convincingly to warrant her killing Xavière.338 
While the ending to She Came to Stay indeed seems unanticipated and, in many ways, 
implausible, its inadequacies reveal more than just Beauvoir’s own frustration with this project339 or 
stylistic limitations; it reveals deeper philosophical shortfalls underpinning the novel. Françoise 
cannot recognize her own ambiguity. Or, perhaps more accurately, she refuses to recognize her own 
ambiguity. And this failure makes it impossible for her to acknowledge the ambiguous existence of 
those around her. Within this framework, there was either self or other, subject or object. Hence, it 
was either Françoise or Xavière.  
In light of this conclusion, commentators have read She Came to Stay as either a study of 
self-discovery or as an advocation of a view of our relations with others grounded fundamentally on 
hostility or conflict. In light of this exegesis it should be clear that neither of these interpretations does 
justice to the story. Françoise does not discover herself, that is, she does not discover anything about 
the self in this story. In fact, quite the opposite is the case. At the end of the story Françoise holds 
onto the same misconceptions about herself and about her relations to others that she began the story 
with. She continues to believe that there is only one subject that in order for one to be that subject one 
must render all others objects. Far from being a story about self-discovery, this is a story of self-
deception.  
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Françoise remains as unwilling in the end to acknowledge that she is both subject and object, 
both created and self-creating as she was on the first page of the novel. She deceives herself into 
believing that if she acts there will no longer be anything keeping her from herself. She cannot gain 
herself back, for she never had herself. She cannot create herself anew for she is unwilling to entertain 
the possibility that she is both self and object. This reveals yet another element of her deception. 
Françoise characterizes all relations as grounded in hostility. Far from advocating this account of the 
relation between self and other, this story reveals the inadequacies of such a view. 
Beauvoir’s growing awareness of history – or perhaps more accurately – of her inability to 
deny history – is evident in She Came to Stay. In the early pages of the novel, with the threat of war 
already providing the backdrop for the story unfolding, Françoise notes how “She had never believed 
in the possibility of war. War was like tuberculosis or a railway accident: something that could never 
happen to me. Things like that happened only to other people.”340 As the pages pass, Françoise has a 
growing awareness of history but maintains that it will not affect her “even if war came, we should go 
on living”341 Pierre questions what this means. Indeed, he comes to question whether history or art 
has any meaning at all. He responds to Françoise’s optimism concerning the value of art in light of 
the political upheavals of their time, telling her that “`It`s not a question of producing my play at all 
costs. . .It`s rather one of finding out just how much sense there is in producing plays at all.”342 
This is an attitude that Françoise will slowly grow to adopt for, as the war approaches 
“Everything seems pointless to me . . .How can I explain it to you? In the old days, whatever I did, I 
had the impression of being thoroughly involved in things: for instance, in my novel. It existed. It 
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demanded to be written. Nowadays, writing is simply heaping up pages”343 Gerbert has not this 
luxury. He is drafted and history takes hold of his future.344 
No doubt in framing the problem of the other’s consciousness, Beauvoir was conditioned by 
her own experience in wartime Paris. Like Françoise in her novel, Beauvoir had wanted to stand 
outside of history. But with the oncoming war this would be impossible. She would find herself 
embedding history and would need a theoretical basis to explain what she would come to describe as 
her “situatedness.” And she would need an account of history to give her hope in the dark times she 
would face. To find this account, she would turn to Hegel, to his Phenomenology of Spirit. 
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Chapter 4 
Responsibility 
4.1 The Moral Period 
“I decided to go to the Bibliothèque Nationale every day from two to five o`clock and work on 
Hegel. It`s the most soothing activity I could find. First of all the very setting reminded me in a 
poetic way of the year of my aggregation. Then there`s the reality of books, of the ideas in the 
books and about human history of which this is only a moment – I felt more assured in the world 
than I had for a long time.” 345 
 - Beauvoir 
 
In She Came To Stay, Beauvoir adheres to the logic of the master slave dialectic in her plot. 
However, in her diaries and autobiography, she reveals an increasing awareness of the limitations of 
this philosophy even as she attempts to complete the work. First, while writing the novel, she comes 
to face the ways in which history is structuring her own life in wartime Paris, and so too do her 
characters become ever more conscious of their own subjection to the force of time. As noted earlier, 
in the early pages of the novel, Françoise denies, indeed, condemns history’s attempt to shape her 
world.346 Across the pages, she is forced to realize that history, in this instance war, is not a factor that 
she can choose to ignore. Gilbert and Pierre are mobilized. The city shuts down at eleven each night. 
The sirens sound. History cannot be overlooked or escaped. Yet nothing in Hegel’s account of the 
master-slave dialectic makes evident this need to frame the relationship between self and other, to 
situate this relationship, in time. There is, as such, a growing and encroaching awareness of history 
and thus of the presence of others, not supported by her early reading of Hegel. Further, Beauvoir is 
dissatisfied with the conclusion to the novel. In her original draft, Françoise kills Xavière in self-
defence.347 Even as she writes a new ending it seems that she remains convinced that this is a roman à 
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these --- that the novel does not merely suggest but demonstrates a theory.348 But she did not find this 
device convincing. In her notes she makes clear that while she can account for why Françoise would 
dream of killing Xavière; she is not sure she has given to her enough reason to account for why she 
would act upon this desire.349  “Murder is not the solution to the difficulties engendered by 
coexistence,” she writes350. This literal “battle to the death,” seemed false, a device more than part of 
the story itself. It is while seeking an alternative ending to the story that she turns to reading Hegel’s 
Phenomenology.351 
What leads Beauvoir to take up this particular text in 1940 is uncertain. Perhaps she was 
directed to this reading by her need for structure during the early days of the war. Paris was occupied. 
Sartre was in service and her world was dramatically altered. In her diaries and letters she recounts 
her visits to the Bibliothèque Nationale where, for three hours a day, she went to study the 
Phenomenology, in order “to soothe” herself.352 Perhaps, discussion of Kojève’s lectures amongst her 
friends and colleagues as well as in the popular press peaked her interest in the text. Or, perhaps she 
came to this work in search of a distraction as she tried to finish a novel that now seemed far removed 
from whom she was and what she believed when she had began to write. There are few clues as to her 
exact motive. But regardless, it is to the Phenomenology she turns, and therein she finds an account of 
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the relationship between self and other that would not only account for hostility between 
consciousnesses but would provide her with the apparatus necessary to hold open the possibility for 
relationships that transcend such conflict. In so doing, it would challenge her to rethink her account of 
the problem of the other’s consciousness, placing it within history, recognizing its moral implications 
and in so doing, giving rise to a more complex understanding of both self and other. 
Within the confines of discussion of “Lordship and Bondage,” Beauvoir can only recognize 
the antagonism between consciousnesses. Consciousness is either master or slave, either subject or 
object. The singularity of the self is replicated in the singularity of the kind of relationships into 
which he can enter. But turning to the text in its entirety, she encounters an alternative account of the 
relationship between consciousnesses. Reading beyond this moment in the text, beyond this moment 
in the dialectic, Beauvoir identifies “A profound idea by Hegel in his recognition of consciousnesses 
the one by the other.”353 
As noted earlier, Hegel in “The Unhappy Consciousness” complicates the model of the self 
that is found in “On Lordship and Bondage” and in so doing, secures the conditions for the possibility 
of recognition. In this later section, self-consciousness recognizes itself as both subject and object, 
and struggles with the possibility of holding both positions at one and the same time, sometimes 
falling prey to the temptation to see itself only as object (stoicism) and at others only subject 
(skepticism). And what self-consciousness finds within itself it finds mirrored in its world. Unhappy 
consciousness not only acknowledges its own complexities, it further and consequently recognizes the 
shifting nature of its relation to others in the world. At times subject, at times object; reciprocity is at 
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hand. This more complicated conception of the self and of its relation to the other is reminiscent of 
that which Beauvoir found in Bergson.354 
As she reads beyond the discussion of the master and the slave, as she navigates her way into 
later sections of the text, she reads alongside them Jean Wahl’s La Malheur de la conscience dans la 
philosophie de Hegel along with “some English commentators.” 355 Wahl’s work is worthy of 
mention here for this text marks not only the beginning of Beauvoir’s study of Hegel but also the 
beginning of the Hegel Renaissance in France. Wahl, a student of Bergson, is often considered to 
have introduced the French academe to Hegel’s ideas through a study of his early works. While 
references to Hegel can be found in French studies prior to this time, the focus of attention lies on the 
Logic and the System.356 Wahl, along with Alexandre Koyré, the other key figure in this revival, 
offers readers a different Hegel, gleaned from his Jena Writings and from the Phenomenology.  
Roth identifies two key themes that frame Wahl’s reading of Hegel.357 First, in a manner that 
foreshadows Hyppolite’s seminal work on Hegel in France, The Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology358, Wahl focuses on the unhappy consciousness in his reading regarding it not only as 
emblematic of Hegel’s philosophical development but also holding the potential for finding in this 
work modern resonances. In this context, he emphasizes that, while conflict and alienation are key 
components pushing forward the dialectic, encouraging both personal and historical progress, 
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reconciliation remains the goal and an open possibility for self-consciousness.359 This recognition 
gives way for the development of Wahl’s second theme in his writings on Hegel, namely, his 
consideration of Hegel’s philosophy of history.  
For Hegel, history bears witness to that fact that conciliation is possible and progress is made 
despite great loss – despite, or perhaps more accurately, in light of the pain of alienation and 
separation. Or so it does on Wahl’s reading of his texts. The dialectic provides the grounds for 
believing that suffering incurred is redeemed at some future point. However, Wahl argues that that 
time in history is not near nor can it be known. That is, for him, while all of history is the movement 
towards Absolute Spirit, it is a movement that can never achieve its goal.360 
Read in this fashion, Hegel’s philosophy offered a means for overcoming the divide between 
self and other, it gave solace for losses incurred and it provided the necessary impetus to fuel future 
political actions. It is clear why these ideas resonated with the French populace. In a time when even 
the victory in The Great War seemed problematic, Hegel’s philosophy, as read by Wahl, offered 
hope. It provided an explanation of the violence that had been done and the violence that had been 
suffered raising questions concerning the attribution of responsibility. It provided solace for the losses 
that had been accrued and offered up a justification for the sacrifices that would still yet be required. 
And in so doing, it held open the possibility of redemption and reconciliation in the interwar years. 
While for many this Hegel which provides consolation to horrors encountered and those undertaken 
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which drew them to his texts in the 1940s, it was this Hegel, this “tranquilizing” Hegel361 that 
Beauvoir encounters in Wahl’s commentary that she finds untenable and will seek to refashion.  
4.2 Reading Hegel’s Phenomenology 
“As soon as one considers a system abstractly and theoretically, one puts himself, in effect, on the 
plane of the universal, thus of the infinite, that is why Reading the Hegelian system is so 
comforting. I remember having experienced a great feeling of calm on reading Hegel in the 
impersonal framework of the Bibliothèque Nationale in August 1940. But once I got into the street 
again, into my life, out of the system, beneath a real sky, the system was no longer of any use to 
me: what it had offered me under the show of the infinite was the consolations of death; and I 
again wanted to live in the midst of living men.” 362 
 - Beauvoir 
 
In her journal, Beauvoir notes that Wahl and the other “English commentators” were of little help in 
her attempt to follow Hegel’s argument in the Phenomenology since “each of them makes clear at 
length how he understands nothing.”363 Almost as quickly as she reads Hegel and is consoled, she is 
frustrated and dissuaded by what she identifies as the limitations of his thinking, of his system. Her 
dissatisfaction centered on the concept of the Absolute that framed the Phenomenology. In 
challenging the need and legitimacy for this frame, she consequently places into question his notion 
of the dialectic, his understanding the relationship between the particular and the universal and his 
inability to account for the ambiguity that defines the human condition. Yet, as will be seen, despite 
her rejection of these aspects of his philosophy, Beauvoir’s admiration of the Phenomenology leads 
her to rework his ideas in her novels and essays.  
For Hegel, all of History364 is the working out, the working towards of Absolute Spirit or 
Absolute Knowledge. Each moment or stage of the dialect, as interpreted by Beauvoir, surpasses the 
previous moment ensuring progress as Reason makes its way across time destined to achieve this 
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goal. It is this appeal to a foreign Absolute that assures the outcome of the dialectic that is the focus of 
Beauvoir’s critique of Hegel. For her, there could be no a priori principles or values directing the 
dialectic. There are no infinite ends drawn and authorized from “the civilization, the age and/or the 
culture”365 that serve to justify all actions.  There are no such guarantees.366 Such “mythical ends”367 
serve only as abstract evasions that undermine the truth of life and “If man gives himself up to an 
indefinite pursuit of the future he will lose his existence without ever recovering it; he then resembles 
a madman who runs after his shadow.”368  
Indeed, if Hegel is right, if all of History is seen as the progress of Reason individuals do 
indeed become nothing more than shadows. In Hegel’s account of History, as it is recounted by Wahl 
and as it is interpreted by Beauvoir, the self “is abolished within the universal. Spread out to infinity, 
my place in the world is erased just as if I had succeeded in containing it in one dimensionless 
point.”369 In the “trend of world–development” the individual self merged with Universal Being 
allowing one “to observe one’s own life in the perspective of Historical Necessity, with a detachment 
that also carried implications concerning one’s attitude to death”370 She is quick to conclude 
How ludicrous did this brief instant of time then appear, viewed 
against the world’s long history, and how small a speck was this 
individual, myself. Why should I concern myself with my present 
surroundings, with what happened to me now, at this precise 
moment!371  
She explains her reasoning pointing towards the fact that  
In Hegel the individual is only an abstract moment in the history of 
absolute mind. This is explained by the first intuition of the system 
which, identifying the real and the relational, empties the human 
world of its sensible thickness; if the truth of the here and now is 
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only space and time, if the truth of one’s causes is its passage into 
another, then the attachment to the individual substance of life is 
evidently an error, an inadequate attitude. The essential moment of 
Hegelian ethics is the moment when consciousness recognize one 
another; in this operation the other is recognized as identical with me 
which means that in myself it is the universal truth of my self which 
alone is recognized; so individuality is denied, and it can no longer 
reappear except on the natural and contingent plane; moral salvation 
will lie in my surpassing toward the other who is equal to myself and 
who in turn will surpass himself toward another. Hegel himself 
recognizes that if this passage continued indefinitely totally would 
never be achieved, the real world peter out in the same measure; one 
cannot without absurdity, indefinitely sacrifice each generation to the 
following one.372 
For Hegel, at the moment when self-consciousnesses recognize each other, at the moment of 
recognition, both are lost into a universal truth or totality, into the Absolute. Hence recognition, in its 
Hegelian formulation, is not the moment when the self is at home in the other but when the self 
becomes lost along with the other.  
In Hegel’s account, so understood by Beauvoir, the individual is shown to have always 
already been irrelevant to the working of the dialectic. If all of History is the unfolding of reason 
towards Absolute Spirit, then individual choices are ultimately irrelevant. They soon are forgotten. 
They do not, they cannot, affect History; they cannot change its course which has already been 
determined. Considered within the backdrop in which she was reading this text, the war and all its 
atrocities were justified as necessary moments leading towards individual self-consciousness and the 
collective self-consciousness attaining some higher order existence.  
Beauvoir recognizes that this argument, examined carefully, presupposes and necessitates the 
individual. As she notes, “this effort to identify myself with the universal immediately receives a 
denial. It is impossible for me to assert that it is the universal that is since I am asserting it – by 
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asserting, I make myself be: it is I who am.”373 In claiming the existence of a universal, the individual 
is assured his existence, as it is he who must make the claim. Hence for reasons both logical and 
ethical “no individual can lose himself in the circumambient universe.”374 
Beauvoir’s critique of Hegel on this count reflects her readings of Heidegger. She juxtaposes 
the views of these two philosophers, noting how she must choose “Hegel or Heidegger?”375 While 
Hegel takes up the particular into the universal, loses the particular in the universal, on Beauvoir’s 
reading, Heidegger, she argues, remains ever focused on the individual, on the individual experience, 
in and of itself. Meaning need not await or reflect the Absolute – Absolute Knowledge, Absolute 
Spirit, and/or God. Hence she confronts a choice. She asks herself, in light her of reading of Hegel via 
Wahl,  
Why would my individual destiny be so precious if consciousness 
can transcend itself? I can’t decide. At times it seems to me that the 
Hegelian-Marxist universal point of view deprives life of all meaning 
and that wanting to give it one is a delusion. The idea of personal 
salvation – but why that idea? (Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Kafka, etc.). 
Does it have meaning? Where is the truth and where is the delusion? 
Do we need only to think that it has meaning? But how could the 
universal have meaning if the individual has none?376 
For Beauvoir, if the individual is nothing, then “society cannot be something;”377 they appear in 
tandem or not at all.  Indeed, it is only in relation to the individual that meaning is at all possible. 
Indeed, “if one denies with Hegel the concrete thickness of the here and now in favour of the 
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universal space-time, if one denies the separate consciousness in favour of the mind, one misses with 
Hegel the truth of the world.”378 
While Hegel holds, on Beauvoir’s reading, that meaning can only be understood from within 
the logic of journey of consciousness towards Absolute Spirit, that is, while meaning is always 
reflected in and through the relation of the particular to the universal, Heidegger, with his focus on 
lived experience (l’éxperience véçue), finds meaning within the particular itself. Reflecting on these 
questions in 1940, she realizes that  
The further I went, the more I diverged from Hegel, without ever 
losing my admiration for him …. I was bound up with my 
contemporaries; now I was learning that this dependent condition 
carried a complimentary burden of responsibility. Heidegger has 
convinced me that ‘human reality’ is accomplished and expressed in 
each separate living identity. Conversely, each person also commits 
and jeopardizes that reality as a whole. The individual’s concept of 
himself, either as a man among men or an ant on an anthill, will 
depend on whether his society is aiming at the achievement of 
freedom, or content to endure mere passive bondage; yet each one of 
us has the power to challenge that collective decision, to reject or 
confirm it.379 
The particular, the individual, is the source of meaning, outside of considerations of the 
transcendental, for “In order for the world to have any importance,” she concludes, “in order for our 
undertaking to have a meaning and to be worthy of sacrifices, we must affirm the concrete and 
particular thickness of this world and the individual reality of our projects and ourselves.”380 In so 
siding with Heidegger, Beauvoir lays out the plans for her next novel, a novel that “will be about the 
individual situation, its moral significance and its relation to the social. The importance of this 
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metaphysical dimension.”381 Her recognition of what she describes as “the thickness of the world,” 
poses yet another challenge to the theory that had once “soothed” and “calmed” her.  
She notes how  
The least flutter of my heart gave such speculations the lie. Hate, 
anger, expectation, or misery would assert themselves against all my 
efforts to by-pass them, and this ‘flight into the Universal’ merely 
formed one further episode on my private development.382  
Lived experience did not reveal the unity of experience. It did not reveal the cohesive and progressive 
movement of Spirit towards some set end or goal but, rather, it revealed the individual confronted 
with ambiguities that could not be reconciled in Aufhebung. Not only is the individual lost in the 
universal, so too are the multitude of ambiguities which define his day-to-day existence.  
 Upon reflection, Beauvoir concludes that “neither History nor the Hegelian system could, any 
more than the Devil in person, upset the living certainty of ‘I am, I exist, here and now, I am 
myself.”383 The flight from the particular into the universal that Beauvoir finds in the Phenomenology 
not only necessitates the abandonment of the individual for the universal, it also encourages the 
turning away from lived experience.384 Mind and body, immanence and transcendence, eternal and 
temporal, finite and infinite, freedom and servitude, self and other in the Absolute these ambiguities 
of daily life dissolve within the logic of the transcendent being reduced to one or the other – to matter 
or mind, pure interiority or pure exteriority. As Beauvoir notes,  
As long as there have been men and they have lived, they have all 
felt the tragic ambiguity of their condition, but as long as there have 
been philosophers and they have thought, most of them have tried to 
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mask it. They have striven to reduce mind to matter, or to reabsorb 
matter into mind, or to merge the two within a single substance.385 
And yet these very ambiguities define human experience giving to it its “thickness.” The challenge as 
such is to “not conceal the antinomies between means and ends, present and future; they must be 
lived in a permanent tension; one must retreat from neither.”386 This is in the end what is hard, what is 
difficult, in existentialism; it “is worrisome not because it despairs of man but because it demands a 
constant tension from him.”387 
It is clear that Beauvoir is employing the notion of ambiguity herein. In particular, as she 
herself acknowledges, it is important that  
The notion of ambiguity must not be confused with that of absurdity, 
to declare that existence is absurd is to deny that it can ever be given 
a meaning; to say that it is ambiguous is to assert that its meaning is 
never fixed that it must be constantly won. Absurdity challenges 
every ethics; but also the finished rationalization of the real would 
leave no room for ethics; it is because man’s condition is ambiguous 
that he seeks, through failure and outrageousness, to save his 
existence.388 
 In recognizing the ambiguity which frames the human condition, Beauvoir is pointing towards the 
fact that individuals are faced with, indeed, are defined by an indefinite questioning rather than given 
the assurance of an answer as Hegel’s Absolute provides. No decision is ever made in complete 
assurance that it will lead to progress, but rather “The man of action, in order to make a decision, will 
not wait for a perfect knowledge to prove to him the necessity of a certain choice; he must first 
choose and thus help fashion history.”389  In juxtaposing this open-ended and ambiguous nature of 
individual experience with her reading of Hegel’s account of the dialectic’s pathway towards the 
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Absolute, Beauvoir lays bare her indebtedness, not to Heidegger, in this regard, but rather to 
Kierkegaard. 
“At the beginning of existentialism,” as Le Doeuff notes, 
. . .it was either Hegel or Kierkegaard, Husserl and Heidegger re-read 
by the French. Either the idea of a struggle between consciousness to 
transcend a reciprocal exteriority seen as a given or a theory centered 
on one consciousness and one alone; mine, defined at first for-itself, 
and by a “fissure” within consciousness, ‘in an ipseite (selfhood) to 
which comes to be added an ‘other’ who constitutes me.390 
The French philosophic tradition out of which Beauvoir is writing opposed Hegel against those 
writing more directly within the tradition of existential phenomenology and, in so doing, to force a 
choice between the particular and the universal, between lived experience and abstraction, between 
the division and the unity of consciousnesses. It is to Kierkegaard’s writings and to Fear and 
Trembling in particular, that Beauvoir turns to find a conception of ambiguity as an alternative to 
Hegel’s totalizing Absolute.391  
Despite Beauvoir’s own recognition of the influence of Kierkegaard’s thought on her work, 
despite the many references in the essays from her moral period as well as in her later works, most 
notably, in The Second Sex, to his texts, to date little has been written exploring her use and her 
critique of his ideas.392 While such an investigation exceeds the bounds of this present study, in order 
to better understand her critique of Hegel and to identify the ideas guiding her attempt to rewrite his 
phenomenology outside the bounds of the Absolute, it is important to consider her claim to have 
chosen Kierkegaard to ground her ideas. Her account of ambiguity is clearly indebted to him. Neither 
finite nor infinite, neither body nor mind, neither particular nor universal, neither subject nor object, 
neither singular or plural, but rather always and necessarily both, Kierkegaard maintains that human 
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existence is framed by, defined by inescapable and irreducible ambiguities and hence by irresolvable 
anxieties. Never is any choice made wholly satisfying; never is it wholly correct. To kill Isaac is as 
wrong as to let him live, Kierkegaard concludes in this text. Such is the fate of human existence, 
never to know, never to do right. To live with and in ‘indefinite questioning.” It is some such notion 
of ambiguity and of anxiety that Beauvoir finds lacking in Hegel which she aims to incorporate into 
his dialectic in her re-envisioning of the Phenomenology. But there are questions as to whether she 
need necessarily make this move or if, indeed, it escapes the problems that she intends it to. 
Kierkegaard’s account of ambiguity is often contrasted with Hegel’s Aufhebung. While 
Kierkegaard sees dualities within the world, dualities that are inevitable and irresolvable, Hegel 
argues for the possibility of the reconciliation of such ambiguities.393 What is often overlooked is that 
Hegel does not deny the centrality of such ambiguities in his account of human existence. Self-
consciousness struggles to experience itself as self and other, as subject and object, while 
simultaneously trying to encounter the other in both of these dimensions. Indeed, it is desire, the 
recognition of all that the self is not, all that it lacks, that fuels this dialectic. Thus, Hegel’s 
phenomenology gains its impetus via the recognition of the ambiguity. 
Moreover, Hegel does not maintain, contrary to many French commentators on this work, 
including Beauvoir, that there are no ambiguities, for what seems to be a dualism dissolves into some 
kind of “synthesis.” For Hegel, the ambiguities which frame our lived experience never disappear, but 
rather they are encompassed in the movement of the dialectic. The particular is not lost in the 
universal but rather it entails the universal just as the universal entails the particular. That is, for 
Hegel, self-consciousness both is master and slave, self and other, body and mind, divine and human, 
in-itself and for-itself. The use of the term “synthesis” with regard to the dialectic has been 
misleading in this regard, for a synthesis suggests the intermingling and the disappearance of all that 
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comes before. Beauvoir herself notes this arguing that it is not a Hegelian surpassing that is at hand 
but rather a conversion, something akin to the Husserlian epoché that best captures the movement of 
the dialectic. For Hegel, “the surpassed terms are preserved only as abstract moments,”394 that is, they 
are reduce one to the other or folded both into some kind of (Absolute) third.395 She wants these 
moments not to be subsumed in this manner but rather assumed – not suppressed or lost but rather 
always ever present. Clearly, this frames her introduction of the idea of the “conversion” of 
moments.396  Yet upon reflection, this seems an unnecessary move of her part, one made based on 
misreading of Hegel. As discussed earlier, the stages of the dialectic do not disappear but rather are 
preserved and transcended in each subsequent moment..397 As readily as Kierkegaard, Hegel admits 
that the subject “must not attempt to dispel the ambiguity of his being but, on the contrary, must 
accept the task of realizing it.”398 
Beauvoir’s avocation of Kierkegaard’s existentialism not only is grounded upon her failure to 
account for these aspects of Hegel’s Phenomenology but is as well premised on an oversight in her 
reading of Fear and Trembling.  For while she notes that for Hegel the dialectic culminates in 
Absolute Knowledge or Absolute Spirit, a point Beauvoir is quick to recognize and criticize, she 
seems oblivious to Kierkegaard’s similar faith in God to dissolve the ambiguities he describes in his 
recounting of the story of Abraham and Isaac. Both Hegel’s Phenomenology and Kierkegaard’s Fear 
and Trembling attest to the fact that individuals live lives defined by ambiguities, lives characterized 
by anxieties as such. And both too in their closing pages seek solace from a world too hard in an 
Absolute – through the culmination of the Absolute or via the leap of faith. Both treatises end with 
the avocation of the universal, that is, both end with the resolution of ambiguities into some better 
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end. In a manner more similar to Hegel than different, Kierkegaard in his later works will speak of 
this turn as a leap of faith that is undertaken by the individual not so much in spite of, as in light of, 
such ambiguities.399 Ambiguities are ever present yet surpassed in this turn towards God. If Hegel is 
to be criticized for his resolution or dissolution of the contradictions that define human existence in 
some form of totalizing ideal, in an Absolute, it seems that Kierkegaard too must be subject to such a 
critique. Yet Beauvoir does not offer up such criticisms of his works but rather aligns herself with his 
philosophy. It seems that what she is able to overlook or divorce from the philosophy of one she 
cannot similarly disregard with regard to the other. Her critique of Hegel seems unduly harsh. But, as 
will be seen, this harshness will be generative. 
Just months after reading the Phenomenology Beauvoir already recognizes that she is “far 
from the Hegelian point of view that was so helpful to me in August. I have become conscious of my 
individuality and of the metaphysical being that is opposed to this historical infinity where Hegel 
optimistically dilutes all things.”400 It seems Beauvoir rejects Hegel from the outset. However, an idea 
lingers; the profound idea referred to previously, captures her attention. 
As much as she might want to abandon the logic of the Phenomenology, she is struck by 
Hegel’s account therein of  
. . .the exigency of mutual recognition of consciousnesses – it can 
serve as a foundation for a social view of the world – the only 
absolute being this human consciousness, exigency of freedom of 
each consciousness in order for the recognition to be valid and free: 
recognition in love, artistic expression, action, etc.401  
Thus, rather than reject his philosophy, she turns to re-writing it, extracting this concept from the 
broader Hegelian dialectic, re-framing it outside references to the Absolute, grounding it in the lived 
experience of situated consciousnesses, and uniting it with what she describes as “the existential idea 
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that humanity reality is nothing other than what it makes itself to be, that toward which it transcends 
itself.”402 Rather than subsume each decision within the Absolute each action must be seen as a free 
decision that needs to find its meaning in itself.403 As she notes, “The ends of action . . . are neither 
given nor even prefigured in reality, they have to be willed.”404 For Hegel  
Particularity appears only as a moment of the totality in which it 
must it must surpass itself. Whereas for Existentialism, it is not 
impersonal universal man who is the source of values, but the 
plurality of concrete, particular men projecting themselves, toward 
their ends on the basis of situations whose particularity is as radical 
and as irreducible as subjectivity.405 
This means that each decision need be legitimized concretely406 within the context of the situation in 
which it arises. Hence each action entails “the risk of inventing an original solution.”407  
Actions as such must be undertaken  
. . . in uncertainty and risk, and that is precisely the essence of 
freedom. Freedom is not decided with a view to a salvation that 
would be granted in advance. It signs no pact with the future. If it 
could be defined by the final point for which it aims, it would no 
longer be freedom.408 
Freedom does not affirm pre-existing values but rather sets up values.409 And hence freedom comes 
with responsibility. Responsibility cannot be renounced410 in favour of some “great current of 
history,”411 nor in light of some inner purity or foreign object or ideal.412  
                                                      
402 Ibid. 
403 EA 128, PMA 185. 
404 “Moral Idealism and Political Realism” in PW 181. 
405 EA 17-18, PMA 24 -25. 
406 EA 148, PMA 214. 
407 EA 142, PMA 206. 
408 PAC 139, PEC 365. 
409 EA 149, PMA 215. 
410 “Existentialism and Popular Wisdom” in PW 211. 
411 “Moral Idealism and Political Realism” in PW 181.  
412 “Moral Idealism and Political Realism” in PW 190. 
  108 
What Beauvoir thus proposes is not a deterministic account of the dialectic but rather one that 
is open-ended, that allows, as Beauvoir notes, for Cleopatra’s nose or Cromwell’s wart to change the 
course of history. It is a synthetic account of the dialectic,413 an account that does not undermine but 
rather relies upon and preserves individual freedom amidst the thickness of life.414 Attempting to 
reconcile these themes, she offers up her interpretation of the text in the essays and novels that she 
would write starting in 1941.  
The period between 1940 and 1947 is often characterized as Beauvoir’s “moral period”.415 
Following the completion of She Came to Stay, and her first reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology, her 
philosophical agenda shifts. Recounting this change of focus, Beauvoir notes how while she,  
. . . had come to recognize the fact of other people’s existence, it was 
still my individual relationships with separate people that mattered 
most to me, and I still yearned fiercely for happiness. Then, 
suddenly, History burst over me, and I dissolved into fragments. I 
woke to find myself scattered over the four quarters of the globe, 
linked by every nerve in me to each and every other individual.416 
In her subsequent works she would advance a “broadened individualism” and as a result 
make “a transition to the social”417 More specifically, Beauvoir’s critique of Hegel’s Phenomenology 
provides the starting point from which she would, in her subsequent novels and essays, develop a 
more complicated conception of the self and of its relation to the other, recognize the role that history 
played in framing those relationships, and consequently, hold open the possibility for recognition. To 
speak of the self, she will make evident, is to speak of the other and, as a result, to speak of history 
and responsibility. History and ethics become the new focus of her attention as they frame and shape 
the conflict and the recognition that is possible to achieve between self and other. What results is a 
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new stage in her thinking, a stage in which she addresses “the problem of caring for the other without 
jeopardizing, relinquishing self,”418 that is, in which she redresses the problem of the others 
consciousness. To best understand how these factors restructure her understanding of the problem and 
how they condition her consideration of the possibility of recognition in acts of generosity and of 
love, it is necessary to turn to her first published essay, to turn to Pyrrhus and Cinéas. 
4.3 Pyrrhus and Cinéas 
“One must assume our actions in uncertainty and risk, and that is precisely the essence of freedom. 
Freedom is not decided with a view to a salvation that would be granted in advance. It signs no 
pact with the future.” 419 
 - Beauvoir  
 
Pyrrhus and Cinéas is the first in a series of works that Beauvoir publishes between 1944 and 1946 
that question the relation between self and other within the framework of her war experiences. 
Written in Occupied Paris and published in the early days of Post-war France, it was in its time a 
remarkable success for a then unknown author. Yet, despite this acclaim, it remained untranslated and 
virtually unexamined for fifty years. This has had serious consequences for understanding the 
development of her understanding of the problem of the other’s consciousness for, in the course of 
her discussion of individual freedom herein, Beauvoir first attempts to conceptualize a theory of 
recognition in and through her reflections on responsibility, violence and generosity.  
 In line with her reading of Hegel and her discovery of history, Beauvoir realizes that “All 
men live a political existence and so almost all are faced with the problem of action.”420 It is this 
question of action that she turns to addressing in Pyrrhus and Cinéas. She frames her meditation on 
with consideration of the claim made by Voltaire in Candide that “We must cultivate our garden.” 
Beauvoir agrees with this assertion that lives are determined through action but she is clear that “This 
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advice will not be of much help to us because what is my garden?”421 It is to this question that she 
more specifically addresses herself herein.  
To begin an essay with so abstract a question as “what” or “where” is my garden may seem 
inappropriate given the historic backdrop in which it was written. Yet, in many ways this was one of 
the most pertinent questions to be raised in Beauvoir’s time.  Written under Nazi occupation and 
published in the early days after the liberation, the significance of the question and its central import 
becomes clear. For whom am I responsible? And, for what?  It is to ask, in other words, “Who is my 
neighbour?” and to enquire as to “What . . . is the measure of a man? What goals can he set for 
himself, and what hopes are permitted him?”422 With the war coming to a close, and questions 
looming as to what was to be done with collaborators, these questions no longer were theoretical 
queries but instead became pressing practical issues to be addressed in both public and private 
domains.423 Raising these questions, Beauvoir undertakes a brazen meditation on the issue of 
violence. While others seemed to turn away from these pressing issues pertaining to the aftermath of 
war, satisfied to take up logical problems or to find solace in their idealism, Beauvoir dared to ask if 
violence ever justified and to force consideration of who was to be held accountable for the violence 
committed and the violence suffered.  
Beauvoir structures her response and thus her essay into two parts. In section one, Beauvoir 
demonstrates the inadequacies of grounding a response, a theory of responsibility, on considerations 
of God424 or some generalized vision of Humanity.425 Returning to her arguments against Hegel and 
Marx, she gives voice to her belief that attempts to sidestep the question of responsibility through 
flights into pure immanence or pure transcendence are destined to fail. “Man,” she recognizes,  “can 
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neither indefinitely reduce his being, nor expand it to infinity. An indefinite project is absurd since it 
leads to nothing.”426 Having recognized as such, that “There exists no readymade attachment between 
the world and me,”427 in part two of this essay she turns considering what she describes as the 
“positive basis for morality.”428 That is, she identifies those factors that must be taken into 
consideration when attempting to determine the limits or parameters of moral obligation. In so doing, 
she offers up not only a theory of subjectivity but also simultaneously an account of intersubjectivity.  
In some regards, the account of the self that Beauvoir presents in this essay is consistent with 
that she enacts through the main characters in She Came To Stay. In both works, freedom is the 
defining feature of the subject. It is through her ability to act and to escape being acted upon that 
Françoise defines herself as a consciousness, more accurately, as self-consciousness. Similarly, in this 
work freedom is taken to be the identifying feature of subjectivity. However, herein she gives more 
specific content to this account attempting to articulate what it means to be free.  
She begins by making clear that her garden cannot be delineated in words or via other “empty 
pretensions.”429 Freedom is not a thought, nor is it a rhetorical device. Rather, 
What is mine is therefore first what I do. But as soon as I have done 
it, the object goes and separates itself from me: it escapes me . . . in 
order for the past to be mine, I must make it mine again each instant 
by taking it toward my future.430   
To be free, as such, is not to have acted or to think of acting. Rather, it lies in present actions 
undertaken and in the ability to act and act again.  
What is more, for an act to be free it must be undertaken without knowing or being assured of 
an outcome. Hence, “One must assume our actions in uncertainty and risk, and that is precisely the 
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essence of freedom. Freedom is not decided with a view to a salvation that would be granted in 
advance. It signs no pact with the future.”431 Referring herein to her critique of Absolutes via her 
reading of Hegel, Beauvoir claims that with the future undetermined, freedom must be won in and 
through the choices made not only as to how to act but, indeed, whether to act at all. 
Kruks identifies two key assumptions that inform this account of freedom.432 First, Beauvoir 
asserts that individuals are first and foremost defined by their freedom and hence by their separation 
from others. Human existence is grounded in the fact that individuals are born free and that they can 
will themselves free that is, in “wanting to practice their freedom.”433 What is initially a matter of 
constitution then becomes a matter of choice. Second, Beauvoir asserts that freedom and hence 
subjectivity are indestructible.434 While freedoms can encounter one another, they cannot destroy each 
other. A prisoner in jail can be locked away, a political dissident tortured, but even in so doing it not 
possible to deprive the individual of his or her own freedom. To understand why this is the case it is 
necessary to consider the distinction drawn by Beauvoir between freedom and facticity. 
In the course of offering up her description of subjectivity, Beauvoir recasts the mind/body 
distinction advanced by Descartes into a discussion of interiority and exteriority. While the subject is 
defined by his freedom, there is, she argues, no escaping his facticity. As she notes  
A man is freedom and facticity at the same time. He is free, but not 
with that abstract freedom posited by the stoics; he is free in 
situation. We must distinguish here, as Descartes suggest, his 
freedom from his power. His power is finite, and one can increase it 
or restrict it from the outside . . . violence can only act upon the 
facticity of man, upon his exterior. Even when it stops him in his 
élan toward his goal, violence does not reach him in his heart 
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because he was still free in the face of the goal that he proposed to 
himself.435  
Born free, the potentiality for action remains ever-present. This acknowledgement shapes the extent 
and the nature of relations between consciousnesses. The actions of others can affect only the 
exteriority of a subject. Freedom itself, while it is limited by the situation, cannot be destroyed.436 
Hence subjects can neither do anything for or against the other. Their freedoms are not directly 
connected but rather, she argues herein, they are intertwined via their projects.  
To say that individuals are defined by their freedom is to recognize that they are defined by 
the “projects” that they have freely chosen to act upon. Born free, they must exercise that right, they 
must will themselves free. However, the moment the action is complete, the project comes to a close. 
As such, alone in the world, projects would be limited. Hence it is necessary to appeal to the other to 
pick up our projects to give them a future beyond the limits of the self.  
Beauvoir notes that “In truth, society has been all about me from the day of my birth; it is in 
the bosom of that society and in my close relationship with it, that all my personal decisions must be 
formed.”437 I find myself thrown into a world in which there have always already been others. And 
while these others are unknown and in some regards unknowable to me, they are nonetheless 
necessary for me – necessary for me to know and be known in the world, necessary for me to know 
and be known by myself.  For, as she explains,  
                                                      
435 PAC 124, PEC 326 -327. 
436 Beauvoir here anticipates her later discussion of situated freedom in The Ethics of Ambiguity. Therein 
rejecting the idea of radical freedom encapsulated in Sartre’s claim that “even a prisoner in chains is free.” BN 
622; BN 703. Beauvoir recognizes that “The negro slave of the 18th century, the Mohammedan woman enclosed 
in a harem have no instrument, be it in thought or by astonishment or anger, which permits them to attack the 
civilization which oppresses them. Their behavior is defined and can be judged only within the given situation, 
and it is possible that in this situation, limited like every human situation, they realize a perfect assertion of their 
freedom. But once there appears a possibility of liberation, it is resignation of freedom not to exploit the 
possibility, a resignation which implies dishonest and which is a positive fault.” EA 38, PMA 56. This concept 
will be explored in detail in relation to The Second Sex.  
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I am thrown into the world among these strange freedoms. I need 
them, because once I have surpassed my own goals, my acts will fall 
back upon themselves inert, useless, if they are not carried by new 
projects towards a new future … the movement of my transcendence 
appears vain to me as soon as I have transcended it; but if through 
others my transcendence prolongs itself always further than the 
project I presently form, I will never be able to surpass it.438  
To explain this point Beauvoir notes how a writer “does not only want to be read; he wants to have 
influence. He wants to be imitated and pondered.”439 In this regard, the writer seeks a reader to take 
up his project and give it a future beyond his own.  
In order for individuals take up and give meaning to projects not their own, it is necessary 
that they recognize each other as freedoms. Echoing Hegel’s argument, she recognizes that in order 
for freedom to be acknowledged, for it to be recognized the subject must be willing to grant to the 
other the same kind of freedom he attributes to himself. Without such freedom, others are nothing 
more than objects and objects cannot pick up such project, let alone extend them into the future.  As 
such,   
In enlightened, consenting gratitude, one must be capable of 
maintaining face to face these two freedoms that seem to exclude 
each other: the other’s freedom and mine. I must simultaneously 
grasp myself as object and as freedom and recognize my situation as 
founded by the other, while asserting my being beyond the 
situation.440  
This necessitates that there not just be one but that there be rather “several freedoms” that there be “a 
multiplicity of freedoms, each supporting the others, which can overcome individual infinite”441 
Because there are those who are capable of taking up the projects initiated or perpetuated by others, 
and giving to them a future which goes beyond not only the present, but beyond death, the subject is 
able to transcend himself.  
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As Moser notes, Beauvoir in this essay develops not an ethics of progress such as that 
outlined in Hegel’s Phenomenology but rather “an ethics of the project.”442 Via the projects initiated 
and those picked up the dimensions of Beauvoir’s garden are established – that the limits of moral 
obligation are established. In a passage from Pyrrhus and Cinéas that Beauvoir will revisit in The 
Blood of Others, a child is reprimanded for crying over the death of servant’s baby.443 In both 
instances, “His parents let him weep, but then became irritated. ‘He wasn’t your brother.’ The child 
dried his tears.”444 This scene warrants repetition for herein Beauvoir makes her central claim evident 
that it is through the act of crying or refraining from crying that the subject determines for whom he is 
responsible.  
It is because my subjectivity is not inertia, folding in upon itself, 
separation, but on the contrary, movement toward the other that the 
difference between me and the other is abolished, and I can call the 
other mine. Only I can create the ties that unite me to the other. I 
create it from the fact that I am not a thing, but a project of self 
toward the other, a transcendence . . . I am not first a thing but a 
spontaneity that desires, that loves, that wants, that acts.” This little 
boy is not my brother.” But if I cry over him, he is no longer a 
stranger to me. It’s my tears that decided before me. When the 
disciples asked Christ “Who is my neighbour?” Christ didn’t respond 
by enumeration. He told the parable of the Good Samaritan. The 
latter was the neighbour of the man abandoned on the road; he 
covered him with his cloak and came to his aid. One is not the 
neighbour of anyone: one makes the other a neighbour by making 
oneself (se faisant) his neighbour through an act.445  
There are no readymade ties between the world and the subject or between subjects. Rather, such 
bonds are forged through actions. It is thus through the enactment of his freedom that individuals give 
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the world meaning and themselves “only take a form, an existence,” as Beauvoir notes, only if they 
cast themselves “into the world, loving, doing.”446 
There is as such a need for the other – for the “foreign freedoms” whom the subject is thrown 
amidst in the world.447 As she goes on to argued “I need them because once I have surpassed my own 
goals, my actions will fall back upon themselves, inert and useless, if they have not been carried off 
toward a new future by new projects.” Hence,  “An individual … only receives a human dimension 
by recognizing the existence of others.”448  
In this regard Beauvoir claims “our freedoms support each other like stones in an arch, but in 
an arch that no pillars support,”449 for “the other both simultaneously makes and, more importantly 
gives the world to me.”450 This necessary and inescapable interdependence of subjects, however, 
comes with risks. As will be seen, it is this intertwining of subjectivities that serves as the condition 
for the possibility of violence.  
4.4 Reframing the Problem: On Violence and Generosity 
“We are condemned to failure because we are condemned to violence. We are condemned to 
violence because man is divided and in conflict with himself.” 
 - Beauvoir  
 
In light of her recognition of the intertwining of selves, the intertwining of projects that define and 
advance freedom, Beauvoir is led to accept violence as an inevitable and unavoidable reality. It is 
impossible to act without in some regard affecting the freedom of the other. Each act creates a “new 
situation” for the other.451 It offers a new point of departure, if others respond and pick up the appeal 
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that it entails. But what if no one responds to this call? Respect for the other’s freedom being “the 
first condition for my successful effort. I can only appeal to the other’s freedom, not constrain it. I can 
even the most urgent appeals, try my best to charm it, but it will remain free to respond to those 
appeals or not, no matter what I do.452 It is for this reason that “in order for men to be able to give me 
a place in the world, I must first make a world spring up around me where men have their place. I 
must love, want and do. My action itself must define the public to which I propose it.”453 But what if 
charm fails? What if it is given no public? “Wherever persuasion fails, only violence remains to 
defend oneself,”454 Beauvoir argues. In failing to have their appeal heard, individuals are denied their 
freedom and thus they are turned into objects amidst other objects. In this regard,  
It is this interdependence which explains why oppression is possible 
and why it is hateful. As we have seen, my freedom in order to fulfill 
itself requires that it emerge into an open future; it is other men who 
open the future to me. It is they who, setting up the world of 
tomorrow, define my future; but if, instead of allowing me to 
participate in the constructive movement, they oblige me to consume 
my transcendence in vain, if they keep me below the level which 
they have conquered and on the basis of which new conquests will 
be achieved, then they are cutting off from the future, they are 
changing me into a thing.455  
Echoing Hegel’s account of the master-slave dialectic, Beauvoir herein makes evident the need to 
resort to violence in order to regain freedom and hence to re-establish subjectivity.456 
Such violence, in one sense, is not evil for it can affect only the facticity of the subject. The 
freedom of the other – their birthright remains intact. Yet, while it is not an evil, it does not mean that 
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it is not without its moral consequences. For while it does not affect the interiority of those on whom 
it is perpetuated, it does affect the freedom of him who would perpetuate such acts. In acting violently  
. . we give up taking the other as a freedom and we restrict 
accordingly, the possibilities of expanding our being. The man to 
whom I do violence is not my peer, and I need men to be my peers. 
The resort to violence arouses correspondingly less regret in cases 
where it seems less possible to appeal to the freedom of the man to 
whom violence has been done.457  
In so reducing opponents to things, to their facticity, the subject denies himself the conditions for the 
possibility of seeing himself as a freedom. As she notes “The other’s freedom alone is capable of 
necessitating my being, my essential need is therefore to be faced with free men.”458 Without such 
others, he becomes a thing among things.459  
The ambiguity of human existence thus requires that there be recognition that  
We are condemned to failure because we are condemned to violence. 
We are condemned to violence because man is divided and in 
conflict with himself. Because men are separate and in conflict 
among themselves . . . renouncing the struggle would be renouncing 
transcendence, renouncing being. However, no success will ever 
erase the absolute outrage of each singular failure.460  
It is for this reason that Beauvoir concludes that while violence cannot be avoided, “one cannot . . . 
light-heartedly accept resorting to force. It is the mark of a failure that nothing can offset.”461 
In her subsequent essays, Beauvoir will go on to make clear that “Freedom which is 
interested only in denying freedom,” Beauvoir argues, “must be denied.”462 In this important passage 
from The Ethics of Ambiguity, she gives further direction as to those circumstances in which violence 
is justified, claiming that  
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It is not true that the recognition of the freedom of others limits my 
own freedom: to be free is not to have the power to anything you 
like; it is to be able to surpass the given toward an open future; the 
existence of others as a freedom defines my situation and is even the 
condition of my own freedom. I am oppressed if I am thrown into 
prison, but not if I am kept from throwing my neighbour into 
prison.463  
In attempting to stop those who would deny others their freedom, it is necessary, Beauvoir recognizes 
“to destroy not only the oppressor but also those who serve him, whether they do so out of ignorance 
or out of constraint.”464 Their deaths cannot be made right by any kind of utilitarian calculation – by 
any kind of appeal to future good nor with references to necessary sacrifices offered up in the name of 
progress or in the working out of History. The ambiguity of human existence necessitates that such 
actions be seen as failures, not valorized. Yet even in such instances, in fighting to maintain one’s 
own freedom in and through the fight for the freedom of others, the intertwining of subjectivities 
makes evident the possibility for something more than violence to exist between subjects and objects. 
For, as she notes in An Eye for an Eye, while our actions “always imply a failure, . . . this failure must 
not keep us from loving and acting. For we have not only to establish what our situation is, we have 
to choose it in the very heart of its ambiguity.”465  
Beauvoir recognizes that while the intertwining of freedoms provides the conditions for the 
possibility of violence, it simultaneously holds open the potential for recognition. How is this 
possible? Given that subjects are free and that the actions of one necessarily limits the action of 
another, how are relations with others not grounded in conflict possible? Beauvoir responds to this 
question by noting that in claiming that individuals are defined by their freedom, she is not forced to 
conclude that relations between freedoms are necessarily discordant. She notes that, “freedoms are 
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not united or opposed,” but, rather, that they are separate.466 What is the distinction to be drawn 
herein between opposition and separation? Beauvoir seemingly is attempting to avoid the immediate 
assumption that the schism between freedoms, between consciousnesses, necessarily results in acts of 
hostility and domination. That is, she is trying to escape the kind of individualism enacted in She 
Came To Stay and thus of charges of solipsism leveled at her work and at existentialism more 
generally.467  Returning to her reading of the Phenomenology directly, Beauvoir notes how   
‘Each consciousness,’ said Hegel, ‘seeks the death of the other.’ And 
indeed at every moment others are stealing the whole world away 
from me. The first moment is to hate them. But this hatred is naïve, 
and the desire immediately struggles against itself. If I were really 
everything there would be nothing beside me; the world would be 
empty. There would be nothing to possess, and I myself would be 
nothing. If he is reasonable, the young man immediately understands 
that by taking the world away from me, others also give it to me, 
since a thing is given to me only by the movement which snatches it 
from me.468  
Being separate from other freedoms hence does not necessitate acts of violence and hostility, but 
neither does it discount such actions. 
Beauvoir in this essay for the first time ventures to consider the potential for relationships 
developing that are not grounded in the conflict between self and other but rather in their 
acknowledgement of each other as subjects. The example she provides is that of gratitude or 
generosity. An act of generosity must by definition meet two conditions, two conditions that ensure, 
by definition, that it is an example of recognition. First, such acts must be free. Each assumes their 
actions as nothing more than “situations that will be new points of departure for others.”469 If not so 
entered into on the subject’s own accord, the act is not generous but rather at best is an instance of 
reciprocity, at worst a subtle form of coercion. There can be neither debt nor devotion at hand. 
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Nothing is owed and nothing deserved. Indeed, “Between what he has done for me and what I will do 
for him, there can be no measure.”470 For this reason, generosity cannot be repaid. Indeed, any such 
offerings, any such “gifts are not touching; they wound.”471 For they deny a second condition which 
acts of generosity must fulfill. To be generous not only necessitates the free action of a subject; it 
further requires the subject to see the other as he sees himself.  “In enlightened, consenting gratitude,” 
or “lucid generosity” as Beauvoir describes it,  
One must be capable of maintaining face to face these two freedoms 
that seem to exclude each other: the other’s freedom and mine. I 
must simultaneously grasp myself as object and as freedom and 
recognize my situation as founded by the other, while asserting my 
being beyond the situation.472  
The self must grant to the other the same qualities he ascribes to himself. Generosity thus goes 
beyond acts of reciprocity involving not the taking of turns at being subject to being an example of 
recognition in the confrontation of subjects.  
The novelty of Beauvoir’s project in Pyrrhus and Cinéas is twofold. First, she articulates the 
outline of the theory of subjectivity that informs and frames of her writing of She Came To Stay and 
her reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology. She dares to identify the conditions for the possibility of 
freedom being not just voiced but enacted. In so doing, secondly, she conceives of relationships 
between consciousnesses that are defined not only nor necessarily by hostility and conflict but that 
give way to the recognition of subject by subject. However, while advancing on her earlier project in 
these important regards, Beauvoir nonetheless remains dissatisfied with this essay.  
Her concerns about the essay are multiple. Firstly, the essay yet still too detached from the 
history and the particularities of the situation which gave rise to the questions concerning freedom 
and responsibility that had sparked its writing. Divorced of particularities the abstractions it entailed 
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confounded rather than clarified the questions concerning responsibility for the other it takes up. 
Further, she found that she had not successfully escaped the kind of subjectivism or individualism 
that had pervaded her previous novel. As she describes it, in this essay  
Coexistence appears as a sort of accident that each individual should 
somehow surmount; he should begin by hammering out his ‘project’ 
in a solitary state, and only then ask the mass of mankind to endorse 
its validity. In truth, society has been all about me from the day of 
my birth; it is in the bosom of that society and in my own close 
relationship with it, that all my personal decisions must be formed. 
My subjectivism was, inevitably, doubled up with a streak of 
idealism that deprived my speculations of all, or nearly all, their 
significance.473  
What she had written of herein, the interdependence of freedoms, did not so much build the 
framework for recognition as it elucidated the way projects in which overlapped incidentally rather 
than showing how they revealed each other’s freedom necessarily.  
With these criticisms in mind, Beauvoir turns to writing a new novel. Therein the abstract 
formulation of the problems raised in Pyrrhus and Cinéas give way to a more grounded or 
contextualized consideration for the ethical issues which marked post-war France. More specifically, 
such generalized considerations of “What is my garden?” evolve into more detailed reflections on the 
question of violence and the nature (extent, dimensions, limitations) of responsibility. And she would 
therein take seriously what perhaps can best be understood as the difference between the revealing, 
the reciprocity and the recognition of freedoms. She would do so by having her new main character 
take up the challenge of determining how to live amidst others recognizing at one and the same time, 
that he is separate yet dependent upon others, acknowledging that he is responsible and yet not 
responsible for them. In so doing, she would revisit Hegel’s philosophy and further complicate her 
understanding of the problem of the other’s consciousness.  
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4.5 The Blood of Others 
“Another aspect of consciousness of the other: in a sense it is the enemy but then again, nothing 
has value except through it (Hegel). The only absolute is the consciousness. The only absolute is 
the consciousness of the other, whether embodied (as Sartre is for me), or indistinctly, denied. If 
the meaning of the value of these consciousnesses disappears, then the value of mine does not exist 
either. A profound Hegelian idea of the mutual recognition of consciousnesses. This could be the 
theme of a new novel that would be more intimately linked to the social than the first novel. 474 
” 
 
 - Beauvoir 
 
Writing of her plans for a new novel in her Wartime Diaries, Beauvoir notes how she wants 
.to illustrate this relation to the other in its existential complexity. It 
is a beautiful subject. To suppress the other’s consciousness is a bit 
puerile. The problem gets back to the social, etc., but must start off 
from an individual case. I must find a subject-object relationship; 
perhaps simply a case of unrequited love.475  
Wanting to move beyond the limitations of her first novel and incorporating her growing awareness 
of the complexities of the relationship between self and other and of the role of history in shaping 
those relationships, she takes up this project and turns to writing The Blood of Others.  
The novel opens with the main character, Jean Blomart, sitting at the bedside of his friend 
and sometimes lover, Hélène. She had joined him in his Resistance efforts and is fatally wounded in a 
shelling. As Hélène lies dying, Blomart reflects on whether he will order bombings for the next day. 
In so doing he finds himself recounting the story of his life. For Blomart, “the voice speaks and the 
story unfolds. My personal history.”476 But it is not just his personal history. As Blomart discovers, to 
tell the story of his life, he must necessarily tell the stories of the lives of others: 
Because of me – first Jacques and now Hélène. Because I did not 
love her and because I loved her; because she came close to me and 
because she remained so far apart. Because I exist and she, free, 
solitary, and eternal, is bound to my existence, unable to avoid the 
brutal fact of my existence, fettered to the mechanical sequence of 
her life; and at this last link of the fatal chain her very heart struck by 
                                                      
474 WD 322, JG 365. 
475 WD 321, JG 364. 
476 BO 215, SDA 203. 
  124 
the blind steel, by the hard presence of metal, by my presence – her 
death. Because I was there, solid, inevitable, for no apparent 
reason.477 
In this important quote, Blomart acknowledges the intertwining of narratives and of actions. He 
begins to tell the story of his life but inevitably ends up speaking of the lives and deaths of his friends, 
Hélène and Jacques. He cannot help it. While he does not want to be implicated in the lives of others, 
while he does not want to be responsible for them, his intentions are irrelevant. His personal history is 
part of the “March of History,478” part of a series of links between consciousnesses that run both 
backwards and forwards, to which individuals ascribe meaning. Both the content and the structure of 
the novel mirror his growing awareness that his personal history, his life, is made up of his 
“relationships with the remainder of the world.”479  
Beauvoir regarded The Blood of Others as a continuation of the study of the problem of the 
other began in her early philosophical studies and first brought to the public in She Came to Stay. But 
as noted earlier, in these works there is a shift in her understanding of the problem arising from her 
reading of Hegel in 1940. Beauvoir herself notes this difference when contrasting the main characters 
in these novels. She writes that,  
My new hero, Jean Blomart, did not insist, as Françoise had done, on 
remaining the one sentient personality when confronted with other 
people. He refused to be a mere object where they were concerned, 
intervening in their lives with the brutal opacity of some inanimate 
thing; his problem was to get around this stumbling block and 
establish a clear relationship with them, involving freedom on both 
sides.480  
While Françoise could only conceive of relationships with others within the logic of self versus other, 
of subject versus object, Blomart attempts to conceptualize relations between consciousnesses in 
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which the freedom of both is acknowledged. As Simon notes, through this character, Beauvoir 
undertakes “a study of the problem of the Other . . . establishing a relation of freedom and 
freedom.”481  
Blomart’s desire to be respectful, to recognize the freedom of others is confounded by his 
recognition that his actions were never wholly self-regarding but inevitably affected the lives of 
others. It is not just that in telling his story he tells the stories of others. Moreover in acting, he acts 
both on and for others. Blomart insists upon freedom being the defining feature of all 
consciousnesses. He never argues for this premise – he assumes it. The belief that individuals are free, 
acts as his point of departure. But the call to act is not as simple as it might first appear. Firstly, 
individuals must act, but act without guarantees – act without knowing all the possible consequences 
of those actions. There are ripple effects. One cannot control the limits of an action. One cannot know 
what one is doing. For as Beauvoir will acknowledge in The Ethics of Ambiguity, the individual 
always must, in the end, “decide by himself in the darkness,”482 that is, he must, “not wait for perfect 
knowledge to prove to him the necessity of a certain choice; he must first choose and help fashion 
history.”483 The indeterminacy of action has important implications for the creation of meaning and 
value. To act always entails risk. 
As actions have unforeseen, unanticipated consequences, they cannot be easily categorized or 
judged. There is no universal standpoint from which they can be assessed.  
‘Others live and others die . . . But it does not prevent each person’s 
life being unique, and each person dying on his own account . . . It’s 
absurd to try to see the world as if we were standing on Sirius; we’re 
not on Sirius but on the beach, each of us in our own skin,’ 484  
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notes Blomart.  There are no right or wrong acts. Rather, he realizes that, “whatever I did. I was in the 
wrong.”485 Blomart must choose but it will always be a choice between two unsatisfactory options – 
between wrong and wrong, between right and right.  
Beauvoir elaborates on this point in The Ethics of Ambiguity when she notes that ‘chances 
and risks must be assumed or not the given circumstances must be decided without help, and in so 
doing one sets up values.”486 The implications of this claim must be carefully considered. That there 
is no absolute or universal standpoint, no Sirius from which to evaluate actions, does not mean there 
is no value to be attributed to them. Value is not conferred from powers above or outside the acts 
themselves but, rather, the individual gives meaning and significance to those actions. As such, there 
are risks entailed in acting and those risks have moral implications -- moral implications that come 
with few consolations. For while the individual acts, while he makes choices and offers up meanings, 
in so doing he can expect no comfort from others. He must act, act in ignorance, and act alone. There 
is no escape. 
“Choose,” “decide,” “act,” are words which resonate throughout the text. So too are the 
words “alone,” and “separation.”  Individuals are free and as a result, Blomart discovers that they are 
alone. No one can act for another individual. No one can understand another’s experience of freedom. 
As he notes,  
People are free … but only so far as they themselves are concerned; 
we can neither touch, foresee, nor insist on them using their liberty. 
That is what I find so painful; the intrinsic worth of an individual 
exists only for him, and not for me; I can only get as far as his 
outward actions, and to him I am nothing more than an outer 
appearance, an absurd set of premises; premises which I do not even 
choose to be.487  
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The freedom of another can never be known. Individuals are free and separate and thus “There was 
no place in the world where the absolute separation of those fates could again be fused.”488 Yet, 
Blomart, in recounting his life with Jacques, Marcel, Madeleine, Denise and Hélène, recognizes the 
paradox implicit in this claim.  
For if he decides, if he acts, inevitably he affects the lives of others. True, each individual 
exists only if he or she acts, but there is no way that he or she can act without affecting others, 
without limiting or framing the ways which he or she can act. This point does not go unnoticed by 
Hélène. In the final scene of the novel, she tells Blomart how he often told her to choose yet even in 
insisting on her acting he treated her like a “little dog.”489 The more Blomart attempts to treat Hélène 
like a freedom, the more in effect he ends up relegating her to the level of an object. They are separate 
freedoms yet they are nonetheless intrinsically interdependent. He notes that when it comes to Hélène 
. . . to leave her free was still tantamount to deciding for her; to 
remain inactive and docile to her will, was still to create by my own 
authority a situation to which she could not submit. She was there, 
bound by my docile hands, imprisoned in a joyless love. In spite of 
herself and in spite of me.490  
She is free yet determined, separate yet dependent.  
Initially, Blomart attempted to deny his responsibility for others. He indeed finds his union 
activities appealing for he sees himself as “merely an instrument through which it expressed its 
existence.”491 He believes himself to be a conduit. He “took no decision; each member of the union 
expressed his own will, or the collective will.”492 And, as such, he did not feel responsible for the 
consequences of those decisions.  
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But Jacques’ death reveals the deceptive nature of this claim. His death does not seem to be 
the simple reflection of collective will; it does not seem necessary for the greater good. This critique 
of the communists’ conception of individual accountability leads Blomart to recognize that being 
responsible is the outcome of existing: “It wasn’t a question of what I did – the fault lay in no act of 
mine – I was beginning to understand; it lay in the essence of my being; it was my own self.”493 He is 
responsible because his very existence makes it impossible for him to not be.   
And it becomes particularly salient as he confronts the deaths that surround him. Revisiting a 
scene first set out in Pyrrhus and Cinéas, Blomart’s narrative begins with him recounting a time 
when, as a small child in the home of his father, he cries learning of the death of the son of their maid, 
Louise. He cries for the child until his father tells him that, “it’s very sad that Louise’s baby is dead, 
I’m deeply grieved for her, but not all our life are we going to mourn it. Now, just you hurry up.”494 
The themes of death and blood link together the moments of this novel. There is the death of Louise’s 
baby noted above, the death of his friend, Jacques, Hélène’s aborted fetus, the death of the Jewish 
population at the hands of the Nazis who occupy Paris, the death of Hélène and the pending death of 
the innocent people who will be harmed if Blomart decides to order the bombing of a city site.  It is 
the blood of others that marks the cornerstones of Blomart’s narrative and leads him to reflect on the 
themes of history, responsibility and risk. His story is an attempt to justify the loss of the blood of 
others at his hand.  
As his actions affect others, he is responsible yet not responsible, for others. Moreover, he is 
responsible whether he acts or whether he fails to act. As he notes, he has “learned … that there’s as 
much guilt in sparing blood as shedding it.”495 He is responsible even for those consequences of his 
action or inaction that are unforeseen. Blomart notes that he “didn’t create the world, but I create it 
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again, by my presence at every instant.”496 He is always already in a world that is inter-subjective – a 
world filled with meanings that he did not give it, and yet which shape what he can do, how he can 
act. In continuing that world, he is responsible. The world is not given but is willed through actions. 
And as such he is responsible for the world that he has created. To quote Merleau-Ponty, “we choose 
the world and the world chooses us.” 497 It is in Blomart’s experiences of guilt that his recognition of 
the responsibility this entails is manifest.  
Just as action defines human existence, so too does guilt. Guilt is the means though which the 
interconnectedness of all freedoms is demonstrated. Throughout the novel, Blomart struggles with his 
guilt, guilt for his role in spilling the blood of others, noted above.498 But guilt cannot render him 
inactive. It cannot be an excuse for him to avoid action. Rather, guilt must be borne.  This is to a great 
extent the lesson of Blomart’s narrative. He cannot live without risk any more than he can live 
without guilt. At best, he can hope to bear the burden of his recognition of this responsibility.499 
Beauvoir will note in The Ethics of Ambiguity that this account of action and responsibility derives 
from Hegel who recognizes that “the essence of duty and the essence of thinking and willing subject 
are absolutely identical.”500 Because subjects are free, even though they are determined, because they 
are separate, even though interdependent, they are responsible, even though not responsible.501 And 
there is no escaping this ambiguity.  
Blomart describes this as  “the curse of being a separate being.”502 It is the “crime of 
existing.”503 “How can we choose for the other,”504 this Beauvoir tells us in her journals was to be the 
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question on which this novel centered.  Her answer is clear. How can she choose for another? She 
chooses because she cannot help but choose.505 As Blomart acknowledges “You are the fates of 
others.”506 Blomart comes to recognize this as the inevitable fate of subjects. Whatever he does, 
whether he acts or does not act, his decisions will affect others in the present, in the future and indeed, 
even those in the past, as he effectively re-writes history through his actions.507 Blomart is struck by 
the recognition that  
. . . there is not an inch of my path which does not trespass on the 
path of someone else: there is no way of living which can prevent me 
overflowing from myself at every moment. This life, which spins 
from my own substance, presents a thousand unknown faces to other 
men; it flows impetuously through their fate.508  
Hence the epigraph for the novel: “Each of us is responsible for everything and every human being,” 
as Dostoyevsky, notes. In her later essays Beauvoir will elaborate on this point noting that “immobile 
or in action, we always weigh upon the earth. Every refusal a choice, every silence has a voice. Our 
very passivity is willed in order to not choose not to choose. It is impossible to escape.”509  
Throughout the works written during Beauvoir’s moral period, there is an emphasis on the 
ambiguity that defines human existence. It is her goal to demonstrate that this ambiguity that was the 
cornerstone of existentialism did not lead to the impossibility of ethics. Convinced of his freedom, 
Blomart must learn of his facticity in the course of his telling of this story, his story. History reveals 
this ambiguity. It reveals that individuals are both actors and acted upon – they give the world 
meaning and the world gives meaning to them.  
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This revelation is enacted in both the content and the structure of this novel. Beauvoir offers 
up two narratives in this text – that told from Blomart’s perspective and that offered up from the 
perspective of Hélène. Subject and object, master and slave, neither tells the full story. The two parts 
of the self are divided into the two narratives. While his story is told from the perspective of pure 
universality, pure abstraction, hers is grounded in time and space, immanent and particular. In other 
words, while Blomart represents the flight into subjectivity, Hélène embodies the opposite tendency, 
that is, she embodies the reduction of the self to pure objectivity. 
Hélène, in the early parts of the story, considers only her own wishes and desires – her own 
comfort and convenience. As she notes “I need no one, I exist me, Hélène; isn’t that enough?”510 It is 
with this attitude, thinking only of her own self, that she has Blomart brought back from the front 
against his wishes. The same motive leads her to associate with the German. Indeed, she plans to 
leave Paris for Berlin for a more luxurious life. All this she does for no reason other than her own 
pleasure and ease.  Others are mere instruments in her pursuits. As she tells Blomart, she does what 
she wants. “You were just a stone. Stones are necessary to make roads, otherwise how could one 
choose a way for oneself.”511   Maintaining this attitude, an attitude reminiscent of that held by 
Françoise in She Came To Stay, Hélène is not able to understand the political activism of Paul and 
Jean. She sees collective action as useless for “we always seek to further our own interests … and I 
think we are quite right … after all, we only have ourselves.”512 It is to a kind of individualism that 
she is wed. But her story is not that of Beauvoir’s earlier character. Her individualism does not hold, 
cannot hold as the war encroaches and as she becomes ever more aware of her own freedom and 
hence her responsibility.  
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As the novel progresses, Hélène begins to question whether she can live in a purely self-
regarding fashion or if, in so doing, she comes to “no longer (be) herself.”513 In losing the other by 
reducing them to nothing but an object for herself she finds that she has “lost herself.”514 Hélène 
believes that she has herself, that all her decisions should benefit herself. She maintains this view, 
clings to it until she catches a glimpse of herself “in the looking-glass”515 when dancing with the 
German. In that moment, she sees herself as others see her and realizes that the ideal she has hung 
onto is an illusion. It is not enough to assert her desires. It is not enough that she knows herself. She is 
what others see her to be. In this key scene, Hélène recognizes that it is the other who gives her to 
herself. To be a self, is to be what others see. Individualism, solipsism of any sort, fails on this count. 
The self and the other are so intertwined that the one cannot exist without the other. In recognizing 
the role others play in her life, Hélène simultaneously recognizes herself.516  
In recounting this transformation, Beauvoir clearly is responding to critics who would claim 
existentialism to be a form of individualism. In this scene as well as that in which the Nazis come to 
get Yvonne,517 Hélène realizes that her own fate is tied up with the fate of others. She cannot live 
alone in the world. She needs others. She needs both their objectivity, that is, their otherness and their 
freedom or their subjectivity. And for the same reasons, in and for her duality, they need her. She 
discovers that she is already implied in the lives of others. She acts and is responsible for those acts. 
Or, she does not act and nonetheless is responsible.518 That this is the case is made evident when 
                                                      
513 BO 205, SDA 194. 
514 BO 207, SDA 195. 
515 BO 214, SDA 202. 
516 This scene is reminiscent of that in She Came To Stay in which Françoise sees her reflection in the mirror 
and states “I am not that woman,” (SCS 406, LI 416) and anticipates similar scenes in The Woman Destroyed. 
See page 246 of this study. 
517 Bo 227 -228, SA 214 – 216. 
518 In these moments, she learns that she is at one embodies the kind of conversion that Beauvoir further will 
describe in The Ethics of Ambiguity.  
  133 
returning to German occupied Paris on the train, Hélène gives up her seat in a car to a mother with her 
baby suddenly feeling “the weight of the child on her knees and the appeal of its reproachful eyes.”519 
Hélène’s growing awareness of her political and ethical responsibilities evidences her 
acknowledgement that individuals are always already amidst inter-subjective relationships. And this 
recognition is premised on her realization of the complexities of subjectivity. In acknowledging the 
complexities of her relation to others, she simultaneously acknowledges the complexities of herself. 
In the moments described above Hélène realizes that while she has a body, while she is grounded in 
time and space, she is also more than this. She is more than immanence, more than a particularity, 
more than just a body amidst other bodies. She thinks. She chooses for herself and for others. She 
acts. At one and the same time she is both immanence and transcendence, both subject and object, 
both facticity and freedom. Describing the transformation of Hélène, Beauvoir notes that   
In the generous atmosphere bred by comradeship and action she 
finally won through to that ‘recognition’, in the Hegelian sense of the 
word, which preserves men from mere immanence and contingency. 
She died as a result; but only after reaching a point where death itself 
could not prevail against her.520  
This involves the recognition of others as freedoms necessarily bound to us, a theme that entails the 
recognition of the self as both subject and object. 
4.6 On History 
“History burst over me and I dissolved into fragments.” 521 
 - Beauvoir  
 
In many ways Hélène’s story in The Blood of Others mirrors Beauvoir’s own wartime experiences. In 
her journals and autobiography, Beauvoir notes that reading Hegel lead her to the recognition of the 
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importance of History. As noted earlier, she describes how “history burst over me.”522  In the novel 
history takes hold of Hélène in a similar manner. Beauvoir recognizes that she could no longer adhere 
to the radical form of individualism or solipsism that had characterized her pre-war work. Nor could 
she hold onto the kind of ahistoricism on which it was premised. Reading Hegel had led her to 
conclude that, “To suppress one’s awareness of the Other’s existence is mere childishness.”523 She 
had lived through History and had come to understand that its legacy of meanings could not be 
overlooked nor could the call to re-create it be left unheeded. To study the problem of the other’s 
consciousness, was to study history for all present relations between self and other were framed by 
past situations, by situations which continued to exert their influence on attempts to transcend the 
present and move toward the future.  
Mahon argues that The Blood of Others “is perhaps best seen as a statement of an 
existentialist theory of human history.”524 But what does this theory entail? To begin this analysis it is 
perhaps best to look at the theories of history explicitly rejected by Beauvoir in this text. Blomart 
rejects the account of history offered by both Paul, his communist friend, and by his father. 
Communism, with its adherence to historical materialism, is a form of historical determinism guided 
by belief in revolution. The outcome of history was rule by the proletariat. Blomart rejects the belief 
that there is any kind of necessary outcome of history. He notes how in adhering to this idea the 
“Communists treat human beings like pawns on a chessboard, the game must be won at all costs; the 
pawns themselves are unimportant.”525 For Blomart the outcome of history cannot be anticipated. 
There are no guarantees that the proletariat will win the game, for the “pawns” are free and their 
actions have affects that cannot be predicted. Neither revolution nor salvation is assured. His criticism 
is not limited to communism: Blomart rejects all accounts of History that are grounded in a belief in 
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progress, regardless if that progress is the communist dream of a classless society or his father’s 
vision of a capitalist future. His father “did not think of stopping the blind progress of the world.”526 
But Blomart sees no progress. He sees atrocities that have no cause, no reason. And he must intervene 
or become implicated in those actions.  
In this regard, Beauvoir uses her character of Blomart to offer up her critique of Hegel’s 
notion of history. History is, for Beauvoir, the unfolding of human freedom. It is not determined as 
agents are, by definition, free. Individuals are free not limited by either their biology or the historical 
settings in which they were born and raised. Beauvoir, from her standpoint, did not see history as 
necessarily moving forward towards some better future. History was motion but there was no 
assurance that such movement would result in progress. As individuals are free, they do not know that 
they will choose what is better over what is worse. They do not know that they will choose what they 
wish they would. The future is open. To believe otherwise was to fall prey to what Beauvoir describes 
as the “tranquilizing effect” of Hegel’s philosophy, described earlier. That is, it is to develop a faith in 
future progress that gives way to withdrawal from recognition of present atrocities and from the 
acknowledgement of personal responsibilities. She recognizes that  
Reading the Hegelian system is so comforting. I remember having 
experienced a great feeling of calm on reading Hegel in the 
impersonal framework of the Bibliothèque Nationale in August 
1940. But once I got into the street again, into my life, out of the 
system, beneath a real sky, the system was no longer of any use to 
me: what it had offered me, under a show of the infinite, was the 
consolations of death; and again, I wanted to live in the midst of 
living men.527 
Aware of its pull, acknowledging the solace to be offered by losing oneself in the pull of something 
bigger and something grander than her self and in so doing, to absolve her self of accountability, she 
rejects his view of history. But what theory of history does this leave open for her?  
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For Beauvoir, history is neither the unfolding of universal principles nor is it a series of 
random events. History entails meaning, meaning that it acquires from those who enact it and those 
who tell of it. It is not a meaning ascribed to it by outward and predetermined forces. It is a human 
construct, and, hence, a sign of freedom. But it is not an easy freedom. As Mahon notes, in The Blood 
of Others Beauvoir makes clear that “humans make history that we humans are free, but this freedom 
is constantly imposed upon and often overwhelmed by such apocalyptic forces as war, fanaticism, 
and class struggle.”528 There is no easy meaning to be ascribed to history. It is not a series of events. 
But it also is not a litany of words. Rather, it is a series of meanings ascribed to events via action and 
word.  
More specifically, history is the account of the relationships between self and other placed 
into context. Each individual is born into a time and a place, into a situation that was already 
inhabited by meanings borne out by others. As such, history reveals that subjects are always already 
caught up in relations with others regardless of their intentions and despite their actions. It is never 
personal but always necessarily entails the meanings ascribed to it by others. It entails many 
meanings and, further, is ever open to re-writing. Beauvoir would further reflect on the meaning and 
influence of history in All Men are Mortal and in the essays she writes during this period, although it 
would not be until she re-reads Hegel’s Phenomenology in 1947 and begins writing The Second Sex 
that she begins to develop a more complete theory. For therein, taking up in yet an even more direct 
manner Hegel’s philosophy, she will have to consider if the self and the other can be reconciled.  
As Tidd notes, Beauvoir’s discovery of history and her turn away from solipsism necessitates 
a more complex understanding of self and other.529 In The Blood of Others, the problem of the other’s 
consciousness is complicated by the influence of history, the recognition of the interdependence of 
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freedoms, and the acknowledgement of the ambiguities that define human existence. Recognizing that 
the self is always already in a world where others exist, gives rise to her discussion of guilt and 
responsibility. Blomart can no more escape his sense that he has done wrong by his friends than he 
can change the events that lead to their death. Thus it is that history gives rise to ethics in Beauvoir’s 
writings. 
To consider the history of a relation between self and other is to simultaneously engage in 
ethical reflections, for while history tells of what has been, ethics reflects on what might have been. 
This focus leads Beauvoir to dramatically reconceive of this kind of reasoning. Ethics, for Beauvoir, 
is not a collection of rules: it is not, as she states in The Ethics of Ambiguity, “a collection of 
recipes,”530 a list of “do’s” and “don’ts.” Rejecting both deontological and teleological models of 
ethical reasoning, Beauvoir attempts to redefine the field grounding her ethics in the recognition of 
the ambiguity of human existence and in human freedom. None live in such a manner that they can 
know all the effects of their actions. How they act influences people in far off places and in distant 
times in ways that they cannot begin to imagine. Yet this should not, it cannot lead to paralysis. It 
cannot lead to inaction. For as seen in The Blood of Others, even inaction is action. Regardless of the 
limitations of their knowledge, regardless of their inability to control and anticipate consequences, 
individuals must nonetheless act. And, because they act, they are responsible for those actions. 
Framed by these conditions, there can be no “recipes” for living. Ethics, rather, becomes a method. 
Or, perhaps more specifically, it becomes what Vintges has described as “the art of living.”531 It 
entails reflections on the way the world could be grounded on an understanding of the way the world 
has been.  
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The final paragraph of The Blood of Others sets forth the philosophical agenda that Beauvoir 
takes up until 1947. In the conclusion of the novel, Hélène dies and Blomart considers his next action. 
He claims that, 
For you, only an innocent stone – you had chosen.  Those who will 
be shot tomorrow have not chosen; I am the rock that crushes them; I 
shall not escape the curse; forever I shall be to them another being, 
forever separated from them. But if only I dedicate myself to defend 
that supreme good, which makes innocent and vain all the stones and 
the rocks, that good saves each man from all the others, and from 
myself. Freedom – then my passion will not have been in vain. You 
have not given me peace, but why should I desire peace? You have 
given me the courage to accept forever the risk and the anguish, to 
bear my crimes, and my guilt, which will rend me eternally. There is 
no way.532 
This quotation pulls together the themes explored in the novel – the need to choose, the paradox of 
freedom, the intertwining of actions, the risks entailed in acting, the responsibility for others and the 
guilt that is inevitably shared, and the need for History to go forward. In the novels and essays that 
would follow the publication of The Blood of Others, Beauvoir would provide further reflections on 
these subjects and offer up a theoretical defense of the philosophy it entails, a philosophy that would 
take up many of the assumptions grounding Hegel’s Phenomenology. 
4.7 All Men are Mortal 
“After wars peace, after peace, another war. Every day men are born and others die.” 533 
 
  - Beauvoir 
 
Describing The Blood of Others and Pyrrhus and Cinéas, Beauvoir states that she, 
 
. . . attempted to define our true relationship with other people 
(autrui). I reached the conclusion that, whether we like it or not, we 
do impinge on other people’s destinies, and must face up to the 
responsibility which this implies. But such a conclusion also 
produced its opposite corollary: though keenly aware of my 
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responsibilities, I nevertheless felt myself wholly incapable of action. 
This impotence is one of the main themes I tackled in All Men are 
Mortal.534 
In All Men are Mortal Beauvoir continues the study of history and ethics she begins in The Blood of 
Others. Of particular importance to the development of her understanding of the problem of the 
other’s consciousness, is the further development of her critique of Hegelian and Communist 
accounts of history and the discussion of ethics and immortality offered therein. In this novel she 
challenges claims that all historical actions are movement toward a final, common end. Unlike her 
early novel, however, she goes on to offer in its place an account of history as a series of 
discontinuous events. Moreover, herein she challenges those theories of ethics grounded outside of 
history. Rejecting the connection drawn between immortality and ethics in the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, she argues that meaning and value are possible only because humans exist within time and 
space. In offering these reflections on history and ethics, Beauvoir does not present her readers with 
an alternative philosophy of history.535 Indeed, many of the claims made about history and mortality 
in this novel seem irreconcilable. The importance of this work is not, however, premised on her 
demonstrating such a theory herein. Rather, the significance of this works lies in the reading of 
Hegel’s philosophy it encompasses and the account of otherness that it entails. She offers in this work 
no systemic account of history but rather sets the stage for the development of such a theory in her 
later works, in particular, in The Second Sex.  
All Men are Mortal, like The Blood of Others, is one man’s narrative. And, as in the earlier 
novel, it entails recognition that to tell the story of one man’s life, it is necessary tell the stories of the 
lives of others. But the narrative offered up by Fosca, the main character in this novel, is different. He 
not only tells the stories of the lives of others, he tells the stories of his own lives. Fosca is immortal. 
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As ruler of the Kingdom of Carmona in the 14th century he drinks elixir that grants him immortality. 
He steps outside of history not understanding that contrary to his beliefs, he is not as a result exalted 
but rather is condemned.536 He does not understand his wife Catrina’s warning that, “when Christ 
wanted to punish the Jew who laughed in his face, he condemned him to live forever,” but he will.537  
The book traces Fosca’s various incarnations across time. He must constantly re-make 
himself for no one can accept him as he really is. Across time, he takes on the role of an advisor to 
King Charles V, an explorer in the New World, a scientist in Paris during the era of salons and the 
rise of the scientific revolution, a rebel during the French Revolution, an insane man in Paris in the 
20s or 30s.  
Fallaize has described All Men as Mortal as a study of the problem of the individual’s 
relation to history.538 This seems an apt description for in this text Beauvoir explores the necessity of 
history that is the impossibility of denying history’s influence on the individual. As noted earlier, this 
was a theme developing already in The Blood of Others. What Beauvoir adds to this earlier account of 
history is a definition of the term. That is, in this text, Beauvoir explores various philosophical 
accounts of history with the goal of trying to fill in the blank from her earlier works. She knew that 
history shaped meaning, shaped human existence. Now she needed to understand how and why it did 
so. 
Her investigation of history in this regard takes the form of a critique of the theories of 
history being advanced at the time she wrote and published this novel, that is, between the years 1943 
and 1946. The atrocities of the war had made appealing the philosophy of history found in Hegel and, 
in one form or another, developed in Communism. Hegel’s dialectical account of History as the 
movement of Reason across time as it approaches Absolute Knowledge, gave consolation to those 
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who could not comprehend the horrors of the Holocaust, of massacre and deprivation. If Hegel was 
right, the events WWII could be explained in terms of some end goal to which they contributed. 
These events could be justified. They would be given meaning and eventually would be forgotten, 
would be dissolved in a better future. The horrors of today would provide the building blocks for a 
better tomorrow. For Hegel, that tomorrow would be one in which Absolute Spirit was realized. The 
Communists envisioned class struggle leading to a classless society. The appeal of such accounts of 
history is clear. However, for Beauvoir, this appeal was illusory.  
Fosca, in first incarnations, embodies Hegel’s philosophy of History, a philosophy that sees 
the movement of time offering the possibility for union amongst individuals, amongst people under 
one rule, under one will – namely his own. It is important to note that this desire is not entirely 
egoistic. Fosca may have initially drank the elixir with the desire to simply escape his own death, but 
across time he comes to believe that his immortality can serve a greater good, namely, the union of 
humanity. He attempts to live Hegel’s philosophy of History. But it fails. Events take on their own 
meaning. No one listens to him. There is no way to explain the various event of history in term of the 
manifestation of reason. 
This view of History that sees across time and space the enacting of a single will, a single 
goal, is dispelled by Fosca’s lived experience. Beauvoir describes All Men Mortal in such terms. “The 
Communists,” she claims, 
. . . following Hegel, speak of Humanity and its future as of some 
monolithic individuality. I was attacking this illusion by embodying 
this myth of unity in Fosca; the meanderings, the backslidings, the 
miseries of History, and its crimes, are too hard to encompass for one 
consciousness to recall them down through the length of centuries 
without yielding to despair; fortunately, from father to son, life 
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begins afresh indefinitely. But this perpetual renovation implies also 
the pain of separation.539  
In this important quote, Beauvoir identifies one of her primary points of departure with Hegel. Hegel 
desired to see history as a continuous story, as a meta-narrative, uniting events across time and space. 
Beauvoir, while in her diaries she initially finds this theory appealing, cannot reconcile this view with 
her lived experience -- her experience, particularly during the war, of hatred, of division and of events 
that could not be rendered continuous except by an act of fabrication too fantastic to be accepted. 
Fosca wished for unity. He wanted “to gather the universe” in his hands, that is, to have it 
“governed by a single will,” his own.540 This is why he could not accept Luther’s call for each to 
decide on his own. If each individual followed his own consciousness “then the world would be even 
more divided than it had been.”541 Adopting this stance, “Nothing can be done for man, his good 
depends only upon himself.”542 The world kept slipping out from under Fosca’s control, out of his 
hands. He wanted to see progress in the world, the development of ideas, that advancement of 
humanity, but instead he only saw repetition. Part of Fosca’s lesson is that history cannot fall under 
the will of one – one consciousness or one ideal. Rather, as noted by Fallaize, “History … becomes a 
discontinuous succession of freedoms with endless departures towards individual projects but for 
which there can be no overall goal.”543 Fosca’s discovery of history is Beauvoir’s discovery. The two 
find that, “The universe is elsewhere, always elsewhere, and it is nowhere; there are only men, men 
forever divided.”544 History cannot be superseded; it cannot be overcome. Rather, each moment must 
be lived in all its ambiguity.  
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For Fosca, history thus loses all meaning. Standing outside of time, divided from others, there 
is no value in the world. All events are equal and he is overcome by indifferences. That this is the 
case, however, is not true for those he encounters. Marianne, Beatrice, and Armand engage in the 
world, they find value in it and it is from that context that their actions gain meaning. Meaning and 
value does not come from sources outside of history. They do not lie beyond or outside of time.  
Neither the future nor the past, gives meaning and value to the present. Rather, history is created by 
our actions as they take place in time and space. As Armand notes, “A limited future, a limited life: 
that’s man’s lot, that’s enough”545 It is that limitation; it is the ability to die for a cause, to risk life, to 
suffer the consequences of his actions, that gives life meaning. Fosca cannot enter into the battle to 
the death that according to Hegel gives meaning to actions and content to the idea of the self.  He is 
without limitations. He can risk nor gain anything and as such he is denied the happy ending of a 
death.546 Thus, he lives without meaning and without value as no one.547 
Beauvoir challenges traditional ethics on a number of fronts in this novel. Judeo-Christian 
ethics is grounded on the belief that the opportunity for immortal life necessitated that humans act in a 
moral manner. Within this context, values which transcended time and place are to be upheld in order 
to ensure salvation and eternal life. Fosca unveils the illusion of such reasoning. He demonstrates that 
immortality rather than necessitating ethical action, takes away the conditions for the possibility of 
value being attributed to his actions. It is his ability to risk all, to risk life itself that gives value to the 
world. Fosca acts neither morally nor immorally for he stands outside of all time. For him there is 
only indifference.548 Fosca’s immortality makes evident that it is through living and acting in their 
own time, that individuals create value. From the perspective of eternity, all principles are useless. It 
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is the temporal and contingent nature of human action that allow for the exercise of freedom and the 
creation of value. Fosca’s immortality thus condemns him to not only a life without meaning but also 
a life alone. 
Fosca’s immortality not only separates him from others but it also separates him from 
himself. It is this that he tries to explain to Regina in recounting to her his many lives. He is the other 
and will always remain so. He cannot engage with others. He cannot participate in their projects. 
Fosca, according to Beauvoir, “steals the world, without reciprocity, he casts them into the agonizing 
indifference of eternity.”549  He can only live through others: he cannot live with them or for them, as 
he watches Armand and Marianne do. As such, he “never reaches the true meaning of friendship or 
love because the whole basis of our brotherhood is that we all must die.”550 As Savage Brosman 
notes,  
Others can be affected by what he does, but he is separated from 
them because he does not share in the defining relationship between 
these actions and time. Cut off from the most telling fact of human 
situation and from the consequences of his own deed, he is a type of 
imposter, the quintessential alienated man.551 
Images of Fosca as an imposter, as an alienated man, are apt. In a manner clearly echoing Hegel’s 
account of self-consciousness in the Phenomenology, he finds himself alienated from others and 
alienated from himself. 
In the early part of the book, Antonio describes his father as “a foreigner in your own city.”552 
This claim proves prophetic. While Fosca recognizes the truth of Antonio’s accusation, he does not 
yet understand the consequences of living as such. Fosca is a foreigner not only in his own city: he is 
a stranger to himself – to his own body, to his own mind. He has lived many lives, lives that are not 
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continuous, lives of which that he can never acknowledge the implications. Moreover, he must 
continually recreate himself. He talks of taking up new roles and new costumes.553 He must in other 
words, always be other than himself, other unto himself.  
Fosca’s is a morality tale. The pull of history cannot be escaped nor can it be conveniently 
conceived of as continuous progress. Fosca’s lesson is that History is what individuals make of it. It is 
the collection of meanings attributed to it based on actions undertaken in time and space. At the end 
of the novel, Fosca describes himself as  
A man from nowhere, without a past, without a future, without a 
present. I wanted nothing; I was no one. I advanced step-by-step 
towards the horizon which receded with every step; drops of water 
sprang forth and fell to earth again, each instant destroying the last. 
My hands were forever empty: an outsider, a dead man. They were 
men; they were alive. I was not one of them. I had nothing to hope 
for.554  
To be a subject is not to try to escape the pull of time but rather it is to embrace it and to risk a life.  
4.8 Transition Points 
“Each book thenceforth impelled me towards its successor, for the more I saw of the world, the 
more I realized that it was brimming over with all I could ever hope to experience, understand and 
put into words.” 555 
 - Beauvoir 
 
The completion of All Men Are Mortal in 1946 marks the end of Beauvoir’s “moral” period. Spurred 
by her reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology, there is in the writings dating from this time a growing 
awareness of the role that history plays in situating freedoms. This recognition in turn required her to 
revisit and revise the account of subjectivity and of the problem of the other’s consciousness that 
informed her earliest works. In particular, it gave rise to a consideration of the interdependence of 
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subjectivities, that is, of the possibility of relations between consciousnesses not defined by hostility 
or conflict.  
Yet in these works already she begins to problematize these ideas. While she advances a 
theory of interlinking freedoms, she still is yet to adequately account for the manner in which projects 
do more than overlap. That is, she has still yet to escape the pull of individualism. As well, her 
understanding of situated freedom would require further requirement. While she acknowledges that 
history frames individual freedom, she is still yet to consider how to discern degrees of responsibility 
as a result. Finally, while she ventures to write of love, fraternity, friendship and generosity, each 
attempt ends in failure. Fosca will be unable to love neither Marianne nor Regina. Blomart will 
disappoint his friends. Generosity will not flourish. The conditions for the possibility of recognition 
will not be met.  
And yet she does not give up on her project. Indeed, as will be seen, her explorations of these 
ideas from this period provide the foundation for her mature writings – writings that she herself will 
characterize as offering her best resolution to this problem.  
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Chapter 5 
Reciprocity 
5.1 The Mature Works 
“Through the body we can ‘frequent’ the world, understand it; we can ‘have a world.’ The space in 
which we situate objects is not an abstract form imposing itself upon us from outside; our 
perception of space expresses the manner in which we stretch out toward the future through our 
body and through things. It expresses the entire life of the subject. The experience of spatiality is 
the experience of our situation in the world.” 556 
 - Beauvoir 
 
After completing All Men are Mortal, or perhaps more accurately, amidst her writing of this work, a 
shift takes place in Beauvoir’s thinking – a shift that, though subtle, would have a great effect on her 
understanding and resolution to the problem of the other’s consciousness. As Kruks recognizes, 
Beauvoir, in her writings from the mid-forties, in what might be considered her transition period, 
. . . puts into question her earlier characterization of the self as 
always free to make its own choices within its situation. Instead, she 
develops an account in which selves make their choices not only as 
free affirmations of a future but also as expressions of their specific 
present situations – situations that are freighted by their past. Thus 
accompanying Beauvoir’s greater focus on the weight of situations, 
in both The Second Sex and The Mandarins, there is a greater 
attention given to the particularities of lived experience and in both 
works Beauvoir turns more fully to the use of a phenomenological 
method.557   
Addressing the questions she herself raised about the excessive individualism and 
abstraction evidenced in The Blood of Others, All Men are Mortal and Pyrrhus and Cinéas, 
Beauvoir seeks to ground her works more clearly in the life-world. The problem of the 
other’s consciousness was not a theoretical problem but a lived dilemma that could only be 
understood and ultimately resolved when situated clearly in history, in a place and in the 
particularities of an individual life.  
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This shift is first evident in an often overlooked but important review that Beauvoir writes in 
1945 of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s The Phenomenology of Perception.  In this essay Beauvoir points 
her readers towards her growing awareness of the ways in which time, space and the body frame the 
problem of the other’s consciousness and delimit its possible resolution. That is, it evidences, as 
Kruks notes, Beauvoir’s growing recognition of “The Force of Circumstances”558 and lays the 
foundation for a new approach to her problem in The Second Sex and The Mandarins.  
In adopting this approach, Beauvoir does not take a wholly new direction in her study. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, there is already in her writings from her moral period a growing 
awareness of the role that time plays in structuring and framing relationships between self and other. 
As the war came to an end this awareness intensifies and becomes more pressing as questions are 
raised as to whether an individual can be held responsible for what occurred in the past, whether there 
can be restitution, whether retribution and revenge are justified. Underlying and informing answers to 
these questions, questions that Beauvoir will explore in The Mandarins, is a conception of time – both 
a phenomenological account of how time is lived and also an ethics of time. It is such an account of 
time, an account that did not just theorize the past but that also conceptualized the future, that she 
finds the beginnings for in Merleau-Ponty’s work. 
For Beauvoir, the past, as Keltner aptly describes it,  is “a signification that is revealed as a 
solicitation.”559 The past is always already caught up in the future. This has an evident effect on her 
account of the problem of the other’s consciousness. As Kruks notes, she comes to develop an 
understanding of this problem in “which selves make their choices not only as affirmations of a future 
but also as instantiations of a present that is heavily freighted by the past.”560  Considering how the 
past along with the present and the future configures the self and hence the other, leads Beauvoir to 
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recognize along with Merleau-Ponty the ways in which the situation more generally shapes and 
frames the problem of the other’s consciousness.   
Developing this more nuanced and sophisticated theory of temporality based on her reading 
of Merleau-Ponty’s work, Beauvoir is drawn to consider as well the concept of space. Deutscher 
rightly notes that for Beauvoir there is a necessary link between time and the “imaginative and 
transformative relationship one has to one’s environment.”561 It is not just history but also all the 
particularities of the places and spaces that the self finds itself in that shape its understanding of itself 
and of the other.  It is his situation that defines for him these relationships in the same moment as he 
defines them. Considered in the abstract, outside of a particular place and outside of a particular body, 
this was not so much a problem as a logic game or perhaps a thought experiment. What the 
Phenomenology of Perception makes clear to Beauvoir is the need for her to ground her work in 
concreteness of lived experience. 
Her growing awareness of the importance of the situation in defining the parameters of the 
problem of the other’s consciousness leads Beauvoir via her reading of The Phenomenology of 
Perception to recognize the importance of the body. In his study Merleau-Ponty “defines the body as 
our manner of being in the world, our ‘anchorage’ in this world, or even the collection of ‘holds’ we 
have on things.”562  That is, the body is the means by which and through which the individual gains a 
world. But how is this the case? Elaborating on this definition, Beauvoir recognizes herein that  
. . . through the body we can ‘frequent’ the world, understand it; we 
can ‘have a world.’ The space in which we situate objects is not an 
abstract form imposing itself upon us from outside; our perception of 
space expresses the manner in which we stretch out toward the future 
through our body and through things. It expresses the entire life of 
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the subject. The experience of spatiality is the experience of our 
situation in the world.563 
As Beauvoir will write in The Second Sex, “A life is a relation with the world; the individual defines 
himself by choosing himself through the world.”564 These choices will be made and this link between 
self and the world will be constructed in and through the body. It will be the means by which the self 
constructs its world. And it thus will provide the vantage point from which to determine what is of the 
self and what is other. Summarizing Merleau-Ponty on this point, Beauvoir notes that   
In order to perceive, I must be situated, and the same movement by 
which I accede to the world by rooting myself here and now, pushes 
away the world to the always inaccessible horizon of my experience. 
Indeed, I am not an impersonal and timeless consciousness. If I exist 
as subject, it’s because I make time.565  
For Beauvoir, taking up her project, her problem, once more the body hereafter will prove to be a 
point of departure for considering the manner in which the problem of the other’s consciousness is 
lived and the manner in which it may be resolved. 
It is important to recognize that the body to which Beauvoir refers and which Merleau-Ponty 
describes is not pure corporeality. The body is composed of the physical object along with all of the 
meanings ascribed to it based on its location in time and in space.566 Situated and situating, the body 
both defines and is defined by what is other. And this body is not closed in an instant but implies an 
entire history and even a pre-history.567  
The world gives meaning to the body and hence to the self. But the body simultaneously 
gives the world to the self. As Beauvoir notes, the body, as described by Merleau-Ponty, is   
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“a certain way of being in the world that is proposed to us from a 
point in space, and that our body takes back and assumes.  . .And in 
order for the sensible to be sensed, it must be subtended by my gaze 
or by the movement of my hand. To perceive the blue sky is not a 
matter of positing myself in front of it. I must abandon myself to it, 
so that it ‘thinks itself within me.’”568  
The body is a meeting-point, an intersection between immanence and transcendence, between the 
individual and the world, between self and other.  
Situating the self in a time, in a place, and in a body radically transforms understandings of 
the other. Indeed, what Merleau-Ponty is suggesting and what Beauvoir is acknowledging is that it is 
only so situated in the confines of lived experience that the other can be encountered. Extracted from 
the situation, from the life world, there is no other -- there is only an idea. As Butler notes, “The skin 
and flesh expose us to the gaze of others . . .to touch and to violence.”569 It is through the flesh that we 
come to know the other and, as this quote makes evident, that the self comes to know itself. For it is 
only through the other that the self’s own otherness is acknowledged. The body makes evident the 
thingness of the self that cannot be escaped through theory or through denial. It makes evident the 
vulnerability of the self to the other, its fragility as the other approaches with tenderness or hostility.   
Merleau-Ponty’s study of perception thus provides Beauvoir with the foundation for 
developing a more sophisticated account of the relationship between self and other. He makes evident 
that “the object is always given to a subject, and the subject is always directed toward an object. The 
two are interdependent but can be separated by analysis,” as noted by Heinämaa.570 Beauvoir’s 
tendency towards individualism and her addressing of the problem of the other’s consciousness in the 
abstract made it difficult for her to theorize such interconnectedness. In situating self-consciousness, 
Merleau-Ponty succeeded in giving 
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. . . back to man the right to an authentic existence, by eliminating 
the opposition of the subject and the object. It is impossible to define 
an object in cutting it off from the subject through which and for 
which it is object; and the subject reveals itself only through the 
objects in which it is engaged.571  
In The Second Sex and The Mandarins Beauvoir will put this theory into practice, giving life to these 
ideas, creating a catalogue of the various ways in which self and other, subject and object become so 
intertwined – a catalogue that will include relations of hostility and conflict but will not preclude 
other possible forms of recognition.  
The review Beauvoir writes of The Phenomenology of Perception marks the beginning of a 
new period in her work. As Kruks describes it, “This period is marked by an increasingly profound 
acknowledgement of the weight of situations, of what she will call la force des choses. In this new 
period she stopped attempting to ‘exorcise’ those elements of life that are beyond the control of the 
self.”572 It is not so much this change of focus itself, but the effect of this change that is key to this 
study. She leaves aside questions of ontology for matters of history.573 She tries to leave aside 
abstractions following Merleau-Ponty’s lead and centering her work on lived experience574. In so 
doing, in situating the subject within a time, a place and a body that had always already been ascribed 
a meaning, a shift occurs in Beauvoir’s understanding of the dimensions of the problem of the other’s 
consciousness and consequently of possible resolutions. These effects become evident as, adopting 
this new approach, she turns her attention to the “problem of woman.” 
5.2 The Hegel Renaissance 
“Our epoch is a birth-time, and a period of transition. The spirit of man has broken with the old 
order of things hitherto prevailing, and with the old ways of thinking, and is in the mind to let them 
all sink into the depths of the past and to set about its own transformation.” 575  
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 - Hegel 
 
In 1947 as she began the process of writing The Second Sex, Beauvoir turns once again to Hegel. In a 
letter to Nelson Algren dated September 28th, 1947 she writes of how she and Sartre "sat at a terrace 
of a café, on the Boulevard Montparnasse, and we spoke about Hegel whom we are studying together 
and who is a very difficult philosopher."576 Little is known as to why Beauvoir picked up Hegel's 
Phenomenology in 1947. It may be that her own questions concerning Hegel's Phenomenology raised 
during her moral period led her to return to this work. Or perhaps it was that Hegel was becoming 
fashionable in France in the late 1940s. Or yet another reason may have been Sartre's desire to read 
Hegel as he turned his attention towards writing an existential ethics, an ethics which he would never 
publish but which he outlines in his Notebooks Towards an Ethics.  
Whatever the reason, Beauvoir returns in 1947 to Hegel's work. The year of this endeavor is 
significant for it was in 1947 two of what remain to be the pivotal commentaries on Hegel's 
Phenomenology were published in France. Both Kojève’s Introduction to Hegel's Phenomenology 
and Hyppolite's Genesis, Structure, and Phenomenology in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit appear 
in this year and set the agenda for Hegelian studies for the next 25 years.577  
Few details are known about Beauvoir’s specific reading and critique of these texts. The sole 
reference to Kojève’s Introduction in her own works is found in The Prime of Life. Therein she makes 
reference to a conversation she has with Queneau on Kojève though she provides no details of the 
nature or content of that discussion nor does she comment on her more general stance on his 
controversial text.578 Indeed, Beauvoir remains vague with regard to her views on this work. In an 
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interview with Lundgren-Gothlin,579 Beauvoir claims to have read Kojève’s work on Hegel, however 
once again she does not offer up a detailed critique. And yet, perhaps she does. That it was this year, 
of all years, that she turns to writing The Second Sex, that she turns to addressing the problem of 
woman employing Hegel’s model in the Phenomenology perhaps is meant to signal to her readers that 
this work be read as contributing to the tradition of these writers, read as her contribution to French 
Hegelianism. Thus it is necessary to look in greater detail at the role of Beauvoir in the French 
Hegelian tradition, positioning her study of women in relation to those studies from 1947 in order to 
better understand the novelty and import of her contribution to what is regarded in France as the 
“Hegel Renaissance."580 
No single scholar had more influence on creating this Renaissance than Jean Hyppolite. 
While the Phenomenology of Spirit was first published in 1807, it would be more than 100 years 
before this work would gain prominence in France. Although some studies of Hegel were undertaken 
in France as early as 1831,581 work on his philosophy in the early part of the century was scant and 
marginalized. It would be in the early 1920s that the first lectures on the Phenomenology would be 
delivered by Myerson and Andler, and Alain would offer the first course taught on Hegel in France at 
the Sorbonne. In the late 20’s and early 30s a shift takes place in the reception of Hegel's work in 
philosophical circles in France. It is with the publication of Leon Brunschvicg’s Le Progrès de La 
Conscience dans La Philosophie Accidentale and Jean Wahl’s Le Malheur de La Conscience dans La 
Philosophie de Hegel,582 along with the delivery of a series the lectures by Alexandre Koyré, that 
attention begins to be given to Hegel’s work, attention that would reach a pinnacle in the 1940s with 
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the completion of the translation of the text by Hyppolite But it was not only his translation that 
influenced generations of Hegelian scholars.  
In Genesis, Structure, and Phenomenology in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, as noted 
earlier published in 1947 along with his translation, Hyppolite offers up his reading of Hegel’s text. 
Therein, Hyppolite aims to reconcile the differing approaches to Hegel’s Phenomenology. In this 
regard Hyppolite approaches Hegel's text not as an outline for social change, nor as an examination of 
the development of Absolute Spirit. Negotiating a middle ground between views that read this work 
as a revolutionary treatise and those that aimed to keep the text in the realm of abstract reflection, 
Hyppolite offers a reading of the text that mediates the two approaches. For him, the text, while 
relying on abstractions and holding open the possibility of being employed to re-shape history, is 
firstly an account of a personal journey of discovery, of self-discovery, which incidentally proves to 
be a discovery of an age. Employing this framework, in a manner similar to that adopted by Wahl, 
Hyppolite focuses on the discussion of the unhappy consciousness. As such, the importance of 
Hegel's work does not lie in his call to challenge exploitation, but rather it resides in the move to 
transcend hostile subject/object or self/other relations. And this project is not undertaken in the 
abstract realm but rather as Gutting notes Hyppolite “negotiates the middle ground between 
existential phenomenology and Hegelian Absolute Knowledge” he centering Hegel’s text in lived 
experience.583 
While it is Hyppolite who kick-starts the Hegel Renaissance, his contribution to this 
movement is often overlooked as attention is drawn to the more radical work of Alexander Kojève. In 
his lectures, the notes from which comprise Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Kojève emphasizes 
the transformative nature of Hegel's philosophy. Sidestepping the ontological and metaphysical 
underpinnings of the text, Kojève focuses his attention on the master and slave dialectic. In Hegel's 
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account of the movement of reason across history, he describes a moment when individuals, 
confronted with the realization that others are capable of reducing them to the level of objects, that is, 
that they were capable of denying them their subjectivity, willingly enter into a battle to the death in 
order to acquire and sustain a sense of self. However, such a battle soon comes to be recognized as 
eliminating rather than providing the conditions for the possibility of selfhood. The self needs the 
other to grant him his subjectivity. The self cannot grant this status to him or herself. If others cannot, 
as such, be eliminated, the alternative is to place them in submission. The world can thus be divided 
up into masters and slaves – masters being willing to risk life in order to maintain a sense of self, 
while servants being unwilling to sacrifice all for this cause. For Kojève, the critical moment of this 
text lies in the recognition that it is the slave, via the experience of labour, not the master who is 
capable of achieving subjectivity. What results is a reading of the Phenomenology as a revolutionary 
social theory, a social theory that held great appeal in Postwar France.584 
Sartre’s reading of Hegel parallels that of Kojève in many regards. In particular, Sartre joins 
Kojève focusing on the conflict between consciousnesses. However, he would explore the dimensions 
of the conflict not in the realm of politics but rather in relation to the inner life of the individual, not 
turning away from the ontological issues at hand but rather centering his discussion of Hegel on this 
front. Considering his elaboration of the premises underlying and informing Kojève’s interpretation 
helps to situate Beauvoir’s reading of Hegel in regards to the French tradition and as well makes 
evident the ways in which her reading of the Phenomenology is distinct from that of Sartre.  
Sartre summarizes his account of the relation between consciousnesses, his account of the 
problem of the other's consciousness, in his discussion of the Look.585 In Being and Nothingness he 
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explains that the minute that one gazes at another, he turns her into an object, an object in time and 
space. He cannot see another as anything other than an object. He cannot see her in her subjectivity. 
He sees instead " a "woman", a "flirt.” But as he sees others so too is he seen. He is a “man,” a 
“seducer,” a “threat.” What hence results when two self-consciousnesses encounter each other is a 
battle of the Look, the battle for the first look. To be subject, he must first see the other, transforming 
her into an object and securing his own subjectivity. As he notes, "between the Other-as-object and 
Me-as-subject there is no common measure… I can not know myself in the other if the Other is first 
an object for me; neither can I apprehend the Other in his true being – that is, in his subjectivity."586 
One cannot see the self in the other or the other in the self. As such, there is for Sartre a necessary and 
inescapable ontological separation between consciousnesses.587 It is, for him, “In the Look that 
individuals engage in a social war of mutual objectification," as Murphy argues.588 
Between consciousnesses, consequently, there can be no reciprocity, no mutual recognition. 
Such relations are  ruled out by Sartre's ontology. In his Cahiers he notes that  
Recognition must be without reciprocity; an absolute witness, 
himself the definition of good and evil, must justify me in 
recognizing me. When this witness is no more, we try to replace him 
with the interplay of give and take of mutual recognition. But it is 
just the quickness of this "reflection-reflecting" interplay that 
prevents our seeing its illusory character. It is also the fact that 
concrete humanity (or its fibrous structure owing to its great number) 
is grasped as an unlimited series of men. The unlimited series of men 
(if some recognize me today I take this recognition as the symbol of 
a recognition by the whole human past since the present is their heir 
of the past and for the sign of recognition to come for every present 
act is given as making some mortgage on the future) is equivalent in 
my comprehension to a man (a universal, absolute, etc. concept). I 
am recognized therefore by man. But this man is me. Circle.589  
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The logic of the Look precludes this possibility. As such, he concludes that consciousness 
knows itself before it knows the other. The other does not give the self to the self. According to 
Sartre, Hegel fails to appreciate that the other is perceived only in its objectivity. "The Other is not a 
for-itself as he appears to me; I do not appear to myself as I am for the other."590 He concludes that 
the subject’s relation with others is always defined by an irreducible separation and hostility towards 
them as he attempts to assert his subjectivity and remain a self. Friendship, love, gratitude-- all these 
are mere facades for what ultimately are battles for the Look, for subjectivity and hence, supremacy. 
Reciprocity and mutual recognition were not possibilities, for Sartre.  
5.3 The Second Sex 
“To emancipate woman is to refuse to confine her to the relations she bears to man, not to deny 
them to her; let her have her own independent existence and she will continue nonetheless to exist 
for him also; mutually recognizing each other as subject, each will yet remain for the other an 
other.” 591 
 - Beauvoir  
 
These interpretations of the Phenomenology offered by Hyppolite, Kojève and Sartre help to frame 
Beauvoir’s project in The Second Sex. For while she would share their enthusiasm for Hegel’s work, 
she would in light of her earlier studies of his work and given her new taking up of his text, want to 
distinguish her reading from all three. First, while along with Hyppolite Beauvoir reads beyond the 
discussion of the master-slave dialectic to consider the impact and importance of Hegel’s discussion 
of the unhappy consciousness, particularly in relation to the development of an account of reciprocity, 
in keeping with her critique of Hegel from her moral period, she cannot maintain with him that the 
dialectic is driven by and leading towards some Absolute.592 Nor is she willing to read the text as 
solely an account of the inner journey of consciousness, as he reads the work. Hyppolite in regarding 
the Phenomenology as a journey of discovery for the self, as the development of self-awareness, 
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592 For a discussion of Hyppolite on the Absolute, see Gutting, 2011, 22 -23.  
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overlooks that the history of the individual and the history of the age are intertwined. The individual 
cannot be subtracted from history any more than history can be extracted from the individual. In line 
with Kojève, she rejects both these aspects of Hyppolite’s account opting for a reading of the 
Phenomenology that does not succumb to abstraction and that gives to his dialectic social force. 
While Kojève rejects Hegel’s reliance on the Absolute to inform his account of the dialectic, 
he nonetheless continues to maintain that there is an end to history, a view that Beauvoir cannot 
adopt. The dialectic, she maintains must remain open. Further, while Kojève abstracts from the whole 
of Hegel’s dialectic, the discussion of lordship and bondage, Beauvoir sees this as but one moment in 
the movement of history.593 Indeed, in advancing this interpretive stance, Kojève seems to reduce the 
whole of the Phenomenology to the discussion of “Lordship and Bondage.” In so doing he misses the 
plot and the structure of the Phenomenology as a whole.  It is for this reason that she, unlike Kojève 
will not cast all relations between self and other in hostility but will hold open the possibility for 
recognition.594 That is, as Williams notes, he “collapses recognition into master-slave and suppresses 
the fact that the concept of recognition supports alternative possibilities of realization and outcomes. 
Finally, it distorts the range and continuum of the concept of recognition in the Phenomenology and 
other writings.”595Finally, while Kojève speaks of the revolutionary value of Hegel’s work, Beauvoir 
enacts it. She puts Hegel’s ideas into context, into history, unlike her contemporary and she 
demonstrates the force that institutions, values and beliefs play in shaping and structuring the 
relationship between individuals at both the interpersonal and the social level. 
                                                      
593As Lundgren-Gothlin points out, for Beauvoir, the master/slave dialectic is not an endless battle but rather is 
a stage of development, a stage of development that would be overcome by choosing to act in the world. 
Lundgren-Gothlin, 1996, 79. 
594 Note herein I take issue with Gothlin’s reading of The Second Sex. In her work, Sex and Existence (1995) she 
argues that Beauvoir advances Kojève’s interpretation of The Second Sex. For a more detailed account of the 
problems with this reading of Beauvoir’s work, see O’Brien, 1999.  
595 Williams, 1992, 170. 
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It is on many of these same grounds that Beauvoir also rejects Sartre’s interpretation of 
Hegel. The logic of the Look precludes the possibility of seeing the self in the other and the other in 
the self.  One cannot see into one’s self nor can one see beyond the objectified body of the other. As 
Murphy notes, "Sartre had argued the gaze of others objectified and limited our possibilities. For 
Beauvoir, the gaze afforded moral possibilities and gave moral content."596 It opened up the 
“possibility of synthesis between male and female, consciousness and body.”597 Further, Beauvoir 
rejects Sartre’s focus on Hegel’s ontology. As Evans notes, Beauvoir does not view Hegel’s 
description of consciousness in abstract theoretical terms but as embodying a truth of lived 
experience.598 Hence her grounding of her study in time and in history, within a body, in a manner not 
found in Sartre’s writings. In keeping with her reading of Merleau-Ponty’s The Phenomenology of 
Perception, and in a manner that clearly exhibits the shift in her understanding of the problem of the 
other’s consciousness, a shift conditioning a new emphasis on lived experience, her application of 
Hegel’s ideas is historical and embodied.599 Beauvoir thus is led to “quietly subvert" Sartre's account 
of freedom and his impermeable "walled city subject"600 Freedom, she makes clear, is always situated 
and the self, as noted earlier, is always already caught up with others.601  
In these regards, Beauvoir offers up what is in many ways a more radical interpretation of 
Hegel --- a more radical appropriation of Hegel --- than that offered up by these other commentators. 
It is clear that her goal in taking up The Second Sex, of writing it alongside the Phenomenology, is to 
use his theoretical account of the problem of the other’s consciousness to elucidate the lived 
                                                      
596 Murphy, 1989, 103. 
597 Moser, 1994. 25. 
598 Evans, 2009, 106. 
599 Indeed, this shift in focus is evident in the very language that Beauvoir employs in The Second Sex. In a 
manner that starkly contrasts with Sartre’s consideration of Hegel’s ideas both in Being and Nothingness and in 
his Notebooks for an Ethics, Beauvoir’s work relies on little if any philosophical “jargon,” opting instead for a 
more descriptive and accessible vocabulary and literary style. 
600 Kruks, 1992, 98. 
601 For further discussion of Beauvoir on the notion of situated freedom, see Kruks, 1995, Arp 2001, and 
Andrew, 2003. 
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experience of those deemed “the other,” not merely to theorize the problem. In Hegel's Recollection 
Verene notes how in the Phenomenology 
Hegel invites the reader to participate in his work, not just to think 
about what it says but to think with it, to extend it and bring it to life. 
If we cannot place ourselves in the work, we become mere 
technicians of its interpretation. We must be able to think thoughts 
freely with Hegel and risk something of our own philosophical 
ability on behalf of our understanding. Without life philosophy goes 
nowhere."602  
It is this view of Hegel that Beauvoir adopts. She would not undertake a theoretical exploration of the 
ontological and metaphysical elements of Hegel’s text. She would leave that to Hyppolite, Kojève 
and Sartre. Rather she would think with Hegel. She would pick up his project, his dialectic, and she 
would give it life. Or perhaps, more accurately give it over to life – place it in the context of 
lifeworld. In so contextualizing or situating the problem of the other’s consciousness – in taking it out 
of the realm of abstract thought and centering it in the lived experience of ordinary people, Beauvoir 
emphasizes the role that history plays in framing the relationship between self and other. In so doing, 
in placing Hegel’s discussion in time and in space as such, her focus is no longer on abstract 
individuals but rather on the concrete living subject. 
It is this re-orientation of Hegel’s project that leads Beauvoir in her mature and late works 
dating from 1949 onward,  to explore the lived experience of racism, ageism, and sexism in works 
including America Day by Day, Old Age, A Very Easy Death and The Second Sex as well as to 
consider the less obvious, more subtle ways that the media, family, and lovers structure the 
relationship between self and other in her novels Les Belles Images and A Woman Destroyed and her 
four part autobiography. More specifically, it would focus on how these institutions, structures and 
values transform and maintain woman as the other.  Butler claims that Kojève and Hyppolite placed 
desire in time. It seems to me that what Beauvoir does is place desire in space or place, giving it both 
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a body (from which and toward which it can aim) from which it arises and towards which it aims and 
also a context – a place in time – a location – perhaps this is what is best achieved in the early essays -
-- this grounding (literally and figuratively) of desire. 
That Beauvoir intended for The Second Sex to be situated, amidst these works, that she meant 
for it to read as her contribution to the Hegel Renaissance is clear from both the form and the content 
of this work.  The very structure of the work beckons for comparisons to be drawn between this study 
and Hegel’s Phenomenology. Both works trace a journey across history and across a lifetime from a 
state of immanence (consciousness) through to its realization in the other. However, Beauvoir, 
recognizing in this, the first of her mature works, the importance of grounding her studies in the lived 
experience of subjects situated in both time and space, does not undertake an abstract investigation of 
the movement of spirit towards Absolute Knowledge such as Hegel undertakes. Rather she grounds 
her investigation in time and space, and embodies her subject, addressing not the problem of the 
other’s consciousness in this work but rather the problem of women in her account of the dialectic. 
What results is her phenomenological investigation of woman’s journey from being Absolute Other 
through to a free subject, that is, through to a subject that finds its self in the other and the other in 
itself. She traces the movement of women from the stage of recognition through to that of mutual 
recognition. The parallels at hand are too clearly established for this to be mere coincidence. Clearly 
she employs Hegel’s model in structuring this study and thus directs her readers to examine these two 
texts in tandem, to read her work as both a commentary and an application of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology. 
It is not, however, only the structure of the text that calls for such parallels to be drawn. 
Further evidence that Beauvoir intended The Second Sex to be read in this fashion, read in this 
context, can be derived from content of her introduction. She states that her problem that she takes up 
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therein is to determine "what is a woman?"603 After rejecting conceptualist (essentialist) and 
nominalist (humanist) answers to this question, she makes clear that she will approach this problem 
from within the framework of Hegel’s discussion of the relationship between self and other, 
answering her own question stating that, man “is the subject: he is the Absolute. She is the other.”604 
She is clear that she will take up Hegel’s account of the hostility between these two self-
consciousnesses, the hostility that marks the master-slave dialectic, as the starting point for her 
analysis. But while she cues her readers to consider her study as an application of Hegel’s account of 
the dialectic in the Phenomenology, she is from the start not simply adopting his account but already 
critiquing and extending the ideas outlined therein in light of lived experience.  
In what follows she applies Hegel’s account of the relationship between subject and object, 
self and other, to the relationship between men and women. The language Beauvoir employs herein is 
the language of Hegel’s Phenomenology. Moreover, she directly invokes Hegel in noting that “the 
subject posits itself only in opposition; it asserts itself as the essential and set up the other as 
inessential as the object.”605 Indeed, she makes this increasingly clear importing into the discussion 
the language of master and slave.  The other defined by society and sustained by her complicity (as in 
earlier works Beauvoir regards the self in this manner as both "constituted and constituting."606 Yet, 
despite clearly signalling her intent that The Second Sex be regarded as a study of the 
Phenomenology, this text has not been placed alongside the works of Kojève and Hyppolite and read 
as part of the French Hegelian tradition.607   
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606 Kruks, 1990. 
607 That this remains the case is evident from Beauvoir’s exclusion from seminal and recent texts exploring 
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Perhaps this has to do with her approach. As noted earlier, starting from her review of 
Merleau-Ponty’s The Phenomenology of Perception, there is in Beauvoir's works a new awareness of 
the need to situate discussions of the problem of the other's consciousness in both time and space. 
This is not a problem of logic or a metaphysical paradox to be debated.  Indeed, she herself had 
discovered, addressed in the realm of the abstract, that the problem fosters resolutions viable only for 
abstract, disembodied subjects. Beauvoir increasingly understands that this is a problem of lived 
experience, that, as such it can only be understood and only be resolved in context. Hence when she 
turns to considering the situation of woman, and later of the elderly as the other, she does not resort to 
discussions of ontology or metaphysics but rather undertakes an investigation of the history of their 
oppression and a study of the physical and psychological development that has embedded and 
encouraged their complicity in perpetuating this view. Thus she does not describe what it is to be the 
other, to be the self, but rather she traces, bears witness to the process of othering. This is significant 
for only by seeing the means used to render woman the other -- only by identifying those institutions, 
myths and values that instill and maintain the objectification of individuals and groups, only by 
considering, for example, how "Legislators, priests, philosophers, writers, and scientists have striven 
to show that the subordinate position of woman is willed in heaven and advantageous on earth,"608 
can the conditions for the possibility of their return or, perhaps more accurately, their discovery of 
themselves as selves be fulfilled. Only once explored from this perspective, only once placed in time 
and space, and explored from within history and in relation to the body, only once the problem of the 
other’s consciousness is explored not as an abstract, hypothetical but as a lived experience,609 can the 
truly revolutionary nature of Hegel’s project be realized. Perhaps it is this approach, her application of 
Hegel’s ideas, her undertaking of a study rather than her writing of a piece of scholarship on his 
understanding of the problem of the other’s consciousness, that led to her exclusion from the ranks of 
                                                      
608 TSS1 xxxiv, DS1 22. 
609 See in particular Heinämaa 2003, Bergoffen, 1997, and Scarth 2004. 
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Hegel scholars such as Kojève and Hyppolite. Or perhaps this omission has something to do with her 
subject matter.  
 
With the completion of The Ethics of Ambiguity, and while contemplating her next project, 
Beauvoir recounts in how she shared with Sartre her desire to write about her own life. The Second 
Sex, she maintains, took shape when Sartre asked her how her life had been structured, how it was 
different, given that she was a woman.610 In fact, Beauvoir’s interest in “the question of women”611 
dates farther back. Writing in her journal in November of 1939, she notes how  
. . . this psychological inner life is new to me. In the past I had 
primarily a moral attitude; I tried to believe I was what I wanted to 
be. This year, however, the presence of the contingent, the passionate 
due to Bost has been glaringly obvious. Now I enjoy it like a new 
field. I wouldn’t enjoy writing about it, for it’s too frivolous and 
mundane, but it’s always interesting to discover and find out about 
myself. It’s a step toward knowing myself which is beginning to 
interest me. In this respect I feel my age . . . . I’m going to be 32 
years old; I feel I’m a mature woman, though I would like to know 
what kind. Last night I spoke with Sartre for a long time about a 
point that specifically interest me about myself: my ‘femininity’ and 
how I’m of my sex and in what way I’m not. This remains to be 
defined, as well as, in general, what I expect from my life, my 
thought and how I situate myself in the world. If I have the time I 
shall address these matters in this notebook.612  
Indeed. Bair notes that the idea for this study dates back yet further to 1937, to a series of 
conversations Beauvoir had with Colette Audry while teaching in Rouen about the possibility of 
writing a work on the contemporary condition of women.613 Clearly, the question of woman was on 
Beauvoir’s mind well before 1945 when she finishes her essay and begins to look for a new project.  
The radical nature of Beauvoir’s project is easily overlooked. Consider that it was only in 
1948, one year before the publication of Beauvoir’s study, that women in France were first allowed to 
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vote. While she writes of contraception in this text, women would not have access to legal birth 
control for another eighteen years. And while, perhaps even more radically for 1949, Beauvoir dares 
to speak of abortion, legal first-trimester terminations of pregnancies would not be permitted for 
another twenty-six years. While 1950 was declared by Life Magazine to be “The Year of the 
Woman,” in the United States of America, it was not the expansion of her political, economic and 
reproductive rights that they celebrated. Indeed, in an attempt to encourage women to return to home 
after their experiences of work in the war years, this edition celebrates the remarkable advancements 
made in the lives of women by the vacuum cleaner and the electronic washing machine. 614 The 
controversy this work gave rise to might contribute as well to the failure to appreciate Beauvoir’s 
contribution to the French Hegelian movement.615 
Perhaps the failure to read Beauvoir in the context she so clearly intends her work to be read, 
can be so explained. Or perhaps this failure has something to do with the historic importance of the 
work. The Second Sex gave rise to the second wave of feminism and continues to inspire social 
change more than 60 years later as the agenda Beauvoir sets out therein inspires new generation of 
women, particular new generations of women in developing nations. No doubt it had something to do 
with the inadequacy of the standard translation of the text, a translation that omitted large portions of 
the text and confounded the philosophical terms that Beauvoir employed in order to cue readers as to 
how to approach her text.616Whatever the reason there has been a failure as such to read Beauvoir as 
she signals to her readers that she wishes to be read.  
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No other of Beauvoir's works have been investigated as thoroughly as a meditation on the 
relation between self and other as The Second Sex and no work has elicited more consideration of the 
influence of Hegel's work on the development of Beauvoir’s thought. However, reading the ideas 
found in The Second Sex back into her early works and/or seeing only the continuation of the views 
found in this, what is considered to be her seminal text, in her subsequent writings, has skewed 
understandings of Beauvoir's ongoing engagement with Hegel's Phenomenology. As such, it is 
necessary to consider this work anew, that is, to consider it in relation to Beauvoir's growing 
awareness of the manner in which the particularities of lived experience and the force of 
circumstances shape the problem of the other's consciousness. Explored from this perspective, this 
work is revealed to bear witness to the dialectics of gender. It traces the process of othering to which 
women have been subjected to across history and across their life times. And, it brings to light the 
various resolutions to the problem of the other’s consciousness that Beauvoir envisioned by helping 
to identify the various stages of recognition through which they traverse and towards which they aim.   
Taking seriously Beauvoir’s suggestion that her study of women be read in tandem with 
Hegel’s Phenomenology, a novel reading of her account of the problem of the other's consciousness 
arises from considering the ways in which she parallels her discussion of women’s struggle for 
recognition with his account of the dialect. As Hegel maps out the journey of spirit from Absolute 
Consciousness, through to reciprocal recognition (or reciprocity), towards mutual recognition (or 
universal)617 so Beauvoir in this study traces the journey of an embodied subject, of a woman, across 
history and across her life-time from the experience of Absolute Otherness through the struggle for 
reciprocity and towards the possibility of mutual recognition. While she is clear that these various 
forms or phases of recognition should not be equated, and while she warns of a mistake that “comes 
                                                      
617 As noted earlier, my characterization of these phases of recognition is based on Williams account of these 
distinctions. See page 20 of this study for a further discussion of this characterization of Hegel’s project. 
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from confusing the forms of mutually exclusive alterity,”618 many commentators heretofore have been 
too quick to do just that, leading them to find problems and inconsistencies in her work that, when 
read in this context, simply do not appear. The debate arising between Gothlin and Bauer concerning 
Beauvoir’s reliance on the master-slave debate, for example, is revealed to be no debate at all. 
Deutscher summarizes these competing interpretations of Beauvoir on reciprocity stating that   
. . . where Lundgren-Gothlin argues that the master-slave dialectic 
cannot, on Beauvoir’s view, take place because of man’s demand for 
recognition is not met by an equivalent demand from women (a 
struggle between them in which one of the parties might be willing 
to risk death even taking place), Bauer responds that Beauvoir is 
more thoroughly transforming Hegel with an ideal according to 
which reciprocal recognition would involve a mutually equivalent 
position in which two subjects are willing to take up positions as 
both subjects and objects.619 
However, upon reflection perhaps there is not so much a difference of interpretation at hand between 
these two Beauvoir scholars so much as a difference in standpoint.  
Read as mirroring Hegel’s Phenomenology, Beauvoir recounts in The Second Sex, not the 
experience of recognition but the process by and through which one comes to see the self in the other 
and the other in the self. In retracing Hegel’s map of the dialectic in the context of her consideration 
of the experience of women, Beauvoir does not describe the experience of being the other but rather 
recounts the various manifestation of the relationship between self and other that develops across 
time. Considered in this context, the views on recognition advanced by Gothlin and Bauer can be 
reconciled for what they are in fact describing are two different stages in the dialectic of recognition. 
That is, they are trying to reduce and equate what Beauvoir aims to distinguish.   
                                                      
618 TSS2 80, DS1 120. Beauvoir reiterates this point later in the text when she warns that “assimilating the 
woman to the slave is a mistake.” TSS2 160, DS1 233 In making this claim she likewise points towards the 
need to distinguish between the various phases or forms of recognition. 
619 Deutscher, 2008, 42 n. 85. 
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Understood within this framework Deutscher’s own concern that the eight different ways she 
identifies Beauvoir describing recognition are not commensurable or even compatible, similarly can 
be answered.620 She worries “How best to read the case made by Beauvoir that a number of notions of 
reciprocity are called for? . . . Perhaps the best question we can direct at this material is: what is 
accomplished by this multiplicity?”621 Deutscher sees here a problem for she has worded her question 
wrongly. These are not different accounts of “reciprocity” but rather they are accounts of various 
forms of “recognition” of which reciprocity is but one possibility.  Beauvoir is providing, in and 
through these various definitions, a catalogue of possible ways the struggle between self and other 
may be resolved. Hence, these descriptions are not commensurable for they do not describe 
recognition per se but rather describe three different stages, three different experiences of the 
relationship between self and other.  Reading this text in the manner Beauvoir cues her readers to 
adopt, clarifies what appear to be inconsistencies in the text and makes evident a more nuanced and 
more sophisticated account of both the problem of the other’s consciousness and its possible 
resolutions heretofore recognized in this work. 
Throughout most of history, women, Beauvoir argues, have been regarded as the Absolute 
Other,622 that is, as “pure alterity,”623 or “an absolute” alterity.624 Lacking the potential to become a 
self, standing outside of dialectic as such, she is incapable of either giving or receiving recognition. It 
is for this reason that while men have created her as such, she can only frustrate him: “She is 
everything he craves and everything he does not attain.”625 She can never give to him the kind of 
assurance of his mastery, the kind of recognition that he desires.  
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Beauvoir makes clear the consequence of her failure. Destined to be the other to man, never 
having her subjectivity recognized, woman is other to herself. Alienated as such, she is a mystery to 
herself, an “absolute mystery.”626 Hence, she is  “all that which is inessential: she is wholly the other. 
And as other she is also other than herself, other than what is expected of her. Being all she is never 
exactly this that she should be.”627 
 
Gothlin is clear as to the problem that hence arises. She notes that 
. . . while Beauvoir uses the Hegelian master-slave dialectic to 
explain the origins of oppression, she does not locate man as master 
and woman as slave in this dialectic. Instead, woman is seen as not 
participating in the process of recognition, a fact that explains the 
unique nature of her oppression. Although the man is the master, the 
essential consciousness in relation to woman, the woman is not a 
slave in relation to him. This makes their relationship more absolute, 
and non-dialectical, and it explains why woman is the Absolute 
Other.628  
However, given this characterization of women, given she is the Absolute Other, how can she ever 
escape this profound experience of otherness, of othering and enter into the next stage in the dialectic 
– enter into the battle for the death and thus acquire reciprocal recognition? Can she enter into the 
master-slave dialectic or is she destined to stand outside of it – destined to forever be a stranger to the 
other and “a stranger to herself?”629 Before venturing an answer to this question, it is necessary to 
explore the second stage of recognition, reciprocity.  
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Reciprocal recognition as described by Hegel is achieved in and through the master-slave 
dialectic. Recall that at this stage in his account of the journey of spirit Hegel argues that self-
consciousness when encountering another must either take up the role of the other or be relegated to 
the status of object. Self-consciousness does not see itself in the other but rather sees all that it is not 
and all that it hopes not be, so in order to win the status of self and to relegate the other to the status of 
object, it enters into the battle to the death for subjectivity. He who is willing to risk everything in 
combat, willing to risk his own life, becomes master while she who backs down, unwilling to forfeit 
life in this battle becomes slave. But recall that the relationship between the two parties is 
symmetrical – both freely enter into this dialectic, both know what it is to risk and lastly, both fear 
death. There is, as such, equality established between the two. Such it is that her role as mediator 
between the master and nature, between the master and the objects in his world, allows the slave to 
learn her mastery. In and through her labour, she discovers her freedom. The relationship between 
lord and bondsman, between self and other, thus is inverted. Not yet able to see, to find the self in the 
other or the other in the self, there is nonetheless not the stasis between individuals seen when women 
is Absolute Other and men are Absolute Subjects. There is a kind of dynamism that underlies this 
kind of recognition. The roles of subject and of object, of self and of other oscillate.  
This experience of reciprocity is premised on the recognition of equality between master and 
slave. This marks the difference between women’s experience as Absolute Other and her participation 
in the master-slave dialectic. As Kruks argues, there are "two significantly different kinds of relations 
of otherness: those between social equals and those that involve social inequality,"630 that mark the 
difference between these two experiences of recognition. Where there is equality between the parties 
there is the possibility of reciprocal recognition, that is, it is possible to enter into the master-slave 
dialectic. However, in instances in which there is no such equality, it is impossible to enter into such 
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relations. At the stage of Absolute Otherness, "It is not only that woman is the Other; she is the 
unequal Other,"631 that makes the only relations possible between men and women those of 
oppression and subjection.  
 As to whether Beauvoir in 1949 believes that women have acquired such equality, leaving 
behind the stage of Absolute Other entering into this new stage of recognition, it is unclear.632 From 
both her language and her accounts of the lived experience of women in her time, Beauvoir waivers 
on this matter.633 At points in her discussion she herself seems to confuse or conflate the distinction 
between these kinds of recognition that she is trying to elucidate. She seems at these moments in her 
text uncertain as to what stage of recognition, what kind of otherness, women in her time are 
experiencing.  
This uncertainty is evident in her account of the lives of her contemporaries. She notes the 
increasing independence of women within both the public and private realm. And she acknowledges 
increasingly women agree declaring their transcendence.634 But she questions whether these calls 
fulfill the necessary condition for women to enter into the dialectic and leave their role as Absolute 
Other behind. Transcendence is not something than can be ascribed but rather must be recognized. 
For women to experience their freedom, men must see women as freedoms in themselves. That there 
are advantages in men offering up such recognition is clear. Men want women to be their possessions 
-- their slaves – but they also seek in them their companions. This is necessitates that they grant 
women their subjectivity. Rather than risk that possibility he settles and acknowledges that “He loves 
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her because she is his, he fears her because she remains other.”635 Without his recognition, women 
remain the other. Women cannot be assured of their transcendence by the mere speaking of the word. 
Women had begun to speak such words in Beauvoir’s time, but that was not enough. Their words 
needed to be heard. That is, their freedom had to be recognized. Moreover, it had to be earned.  
It is not through word but through action that transcendence is acquired. For women to enter 
into the dialectic, they must do more than announce their transcendence. They must earn it. The slave, 
in Hegel’s dialectic, achieves his freedom via work. Relegated to the domestic sphere, raised to 
accept and find fulfillment in and through marriage, children and social life, women do not labour in 
the Hegelian sense. They do not develop projects or do they engage in activities. Giving birth and 
caring for children, in cooking and in cleaning, these are “natural functions” that repeat life and do 
not create it. They are functions that do not “involve a problem”636 and so cannot construct meaning. 
To acquire transcendence women must labour.637  But this requires them to abandon certain comforts 
that have heretofore been given them.638 
Women have never been a class, never formed a community, and hence have never revolted, 
Beauvoir notes, for they have always already found themselves in relation to men, in Mitsein.639 
There are advantages associated with maintaining this alliance, particularly for women from the 
bourgeoisie. Playing the role of the other ascribed to her means there are risks she need never take. 
Her role as the Absolute Other affords her financial, metaphysical and ontological advantages. Rather 
than risk such comforts women have “accepted the order of things at hand.”640 They have been 
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complicit in their subjugation641 -- accomplices in their own oppression.642 For women to win their 
transcendence they must eschew such recompenses. In this analysis Beauvoir harkens back to Hegel’s 
recognition 
Those who remain bondsmen suffer no absolute injustice; for he who 
has not the courage to risk his life to win freedom, deserves to be a 
slave; and if by contrast a people does not merely imagine that it 
wants to be free but actually has the vigorous will to freedom, then 
no human power will be able to hold it back in the bondage of 
merely being governed passively.643 
To gain their freedom women must enter into combat, willing to risk enmity and not settle too readily 
for amity and thus gain reciprocity. In so doing, they risk the possibility of losing themselves. It is a 
battle to the death that the slave enters into. Recognition will come but at a cost. But, for those who 
dare it, there is the chance that they might find themselves.644 
Despite the limited success of women to achieve reciprocity, Beauvoir nonetheless 
anticipates, she imagines, a time when women will be capable of mutual recognition. In his 
discussion of “The Phenomenology of Mind,” from Hegel’s Logic, an account that Beauvoir would 
have read in 1940, Hegel distinguishes between these two stages of recognition.645 Mutual recognition 
or what he alternatively calls “universal self-consciousness,” is  
. . . the affirmative awareness of oneself in the other self. Each self as 
free individuality has absolute independence, but in virtue of the 
negation of its immediacy or desire it does not distinguish itself from 
the other; it is universal and objective; and it has real universality in 
the form of reciprocity, in that it is aware of its recognition in the 
free other, and is aware of this in so far as it recognizes the other and 
is aware that it is free.646  
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This kind of recognition is distinct from reciprocity where there is necessarily “an unfree but an 
equally independent self-consciousness.” Hegel elaborates on this distinction making clear that, 
. . . at this standpoint ‘the mutually related self-conscious subjects, 
by sublation for their unequal particular individually, have risen to 
consciousness of their real universality, of their freedom befitting all, 
and hence to the intuition of their determinate identity with each 
other. The master confronting the bondsman was not yet genuinely 
free for he was still fall from intuiting that his own self in the other. 
Consequently, it is only by the liberation of the bondsman that the 
master too becomes completely free. In this condition of universal 
freedom, in being reflected into myself, I am immediately reflected 
into the other, and conversely, in relating myself to the other I 
immediately relate to my own self. Here, therefore, we have the 
tremendous diremption of mind into different selves which are, both 
in and of themselves and for one another, completely free, 
independent, absolutely obdurate resistant and yet at the same time 
identical with one another, hence not self-subsistent, not 
impenetrable, but, as it were, merged together’ . . . This unity is 
obviously present at the standpoint in question. It forms the 
substance of ethical life, especially of the family, of sexual love 
(there the unity has the form of particularity, of patriotism, this 
wiling of the universal aims and interests of the state, of love towards 
God, of bravery too, when this is staking one’s life on a universal 
cause, and lastly, also of honour, provided that this has for its content 
not the indifferent singularity of the individual but something 
substantial, genuinely universal.647 
Beauvoir echoes this distinction in her description of the different forms of otherness women 
experience via love, friendship and generosity. 
It is in Beauvoir’s account of love in The Second Sex, that her vision of the possibility of 
mutual recognition is best glimpsed. Authentic love arises when “Two separate beings, in different 
circumstances,” as she imagines it, come “face to face in freedom and seeking justification of their 
existence through one another."648She holds open the possibility for authentic love, a love  
. . . founded on reciprocal recognition of two freedoms; each lover 
would then experience himself as himself and as the other; neither 
would abdicate his transcendence, they would not mutilate 
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themselves; together they would both reveal values and ends in the 
world. For each of them, love would be the revelation of self through 
the gift of self and the enrichment of the universe.649  
It is the moment in which independence and love are reconciled.650 It is an experience that woman 
grasp sight of in their erotic encounters for therein they know what it is to find the self in the other 
and the other in the self, to know oneself as both self and other. In such encounters 
. . . recognition of the other requires the understanding that we are 
ourselves other for the other, that otherness is reciprocal. It means 
ceasing to project the abject parts of the self, onto the other; taking 
this ‘otherness’ or ‘strangeness’ within the self.651  
 
For Beauvoir, as for Hegel before her,652 love requires, indeed, it necessitates that the other be seen as 
other and not be reduced to (a reflection of) the self, to the self-same. Love is not narcissism by 
another means – it is not some veiled act of conceit or of arrogance. It demands more than that. The 
other must be loved in his or her otherness.653 It is this experience of mutual recognition Beauvoir 
also catches glimpses of in friendship, particularly in female friendships, and acts of generosity.654 In 
these experiences and Beauvoir notes how woman have the possibility of finding “a home in 
oneself”655 or, to quote Hegel to whom this reference clearly beckons for comparison, “to find oneself 
at home in the self through the other.”656  
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There is, as Scarth notes, a new kind of risk at hand in the struggle for this kind of 
recognition. No longer is it merely one’s freedom that is on the line, the risk of  “self-assertion . . . 
But there is also risk involved in accepting the ambiguity of our embodied condition, in risking self-
abandon in generous bodily communication with the other.”657  Such experiences last at best for a 
moment.658 As Atak makes clear  
The subject/object dynamic is precisely that, a dynamic which is in 
constant flux, demands constant reaffirmation both collectively and 
individually, has to be continually reinvented because it can 
ultimately never satisfy, never be established once and for all (which 
is why the process of identification and belief are so important).659  
Love660 can readily be transformed into a will to dominate -- into violence and sadism, or, 
alternatively, into passivity, subordination and masochism, as Beauvoir acknowledges.661 Mutual 
recognition is not won once and for all but must be won time and again.  
Friendship and generosity, along with love  
. . . alone permit in actuality this recognition of free beings, are not 
facile virtues; they are assuredly man's highest achievement, and 
through that achievement he is to be found in his true nature. But this 
true nature is that of a struggle unceasingly begun, unceasingly 
abolished; it requires man to outdo himself at every moment. We 
might put it in other words and say that man attains an authentically 
moral attitude when he renounces mere being to assume his position 
as an existent; through this transformation also he renounces all 
possession, for possession is one way of seeking mere being; but the 
transformation through which he attains true wisdom is never done, 
it is necessary to make it without ceasing, it demands a constant 
tension. And so, quite unable to fulfill himself in solitude, man is 
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incessantly in danger in his relations with his fellows: his life is a 
difficult enterprise with success never assured.662 
Yet she dreams. She dreams of “the day when it will be possible for the woman to love in her strength 
and not in her weakness not to escape herself but to find herself, not out of resignation but to affirm 
herself, love will become for her as for man the source of life and not a mortal danger.”663  
But can such love be realized? Can such relations between self and other, between men and 
women materialize? Beauvoir is clear that “Women’s success in living their condition completely 
does not come easily.”664 She struggles to reconcile her subjectivity with her feminine destiny. She 
struggles to acknowledge both her transcendence and her immanence, to reconcile the two.665 She is 
torn.666  She dares to speculate that “Perhaps the myth of woman will be phased out one day: the more 
women assert themselves as human beings, the more the marvelous quality of other dies in them. But 
today it still exists in the hearts of all men.”667 
A life, Beauvoir notes in this work, “is a relation with the world; the individual defines 
himself by choosing himself through the world.” In outlining how women have been constructed as 
the Absolute Other, in showing how they have been complicit in this process, and in bearing witness 
to the other forms of recognition open to her, identifying the means through which they may be won, 
exploring the conditions for the possibility of their achievement, she offers up The Second Sex as an 
appeal. Women have been defined and have defined themselves by accepting a particular relation 
with the world. Could they dare to redefine this relationship and in so doing find themselves for the 
first time in their freedom and their facticity? 
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In writing The Second Sex, in taking up this study of the problem of the other’s 
consciousness, Beauvoir shadows Hegel’s Phenomenology. What she maps out in her work is the 
journey, not the journey of spirit towards Absolute Knowledge, but the journey of an embodied 
subject, of a woman, across history and across her lifetime from the experience of Absolute Otherness 
towards the possibility of mutual recognition. It is a journey undertaken at both the interpersonal and 
the social level, travelled by individuals and collectives alike.668 It is a journey Beauvoir recognizes is 
full of both risk and promise.669  
This reading of Beauvoir’s work challenges those translations and interpretations of 
Beauvoir’s work that readily equate these three experiences.670 What she recounts herein is closely in 
line with Hegel’s Phenomenology.  It is not recognition but different stages or phases of recognition 
that women experience across history and across their lifetimes. Mirroring his account of these 
gradations of recognition, she thus develops a more refined understanding of the nature and possible 
solutions to the problem of the other’s consciousness than has heretofore been acknowledged.  
The Second Sex has been criticized on many counts. Many question her choice of Hegel as a 
model for her study of the problem of woman given his clear misogyny.671 Some consider her too 
ready and willing to accept Hegel’s ideas on his own terms.672 Others regard her study as failed for it 
subtly and insidiously endorses a masculinist account of subjectivity,673 for grounding not only her 
ontology but also her account of the body on a masculine, and for the most part, Cartesian model,674 
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as most clearly evidenced in her account of female sexuality and maternity.675 Yet at the same time, 
others praise her work on these very same grounds noting how she advances, in anticipation of post-
structural and post-modern accounts of subjectivity, by turning Hegel against himself676and offering 
up a “non-dualistic conception of selfhood as embodied subjectivity. The ambiguity of transcendence 
and immanence at one.“677 Does she accept and reproduce the masculine model of subjectivity 
endorsed in Cartesian thought, or does she dare to transform it?  
Beauvoir herself wondered if her reliance on what seemed to be upon reflection a priori 
categories of male-female and subject-object was too idealist. And, in hindsight she notes how she 
should have relied more heavily on materialist arguments to account for the subjugation of women – 
discussing in greater detail how need and scarcity framed their experience. 678What these criticisms 
seem to point towards is a deeper underlying problem best articulated by Gauthier. He questions 
whether Beauvoir employed Hegel’s account of the dialectic to full advantage in this text. Had she 
backed down from the implications of her own analysis failing to see the consequences of adopting 
Hegel’s notion of recognition in her analysis of women’s situation? Consideration of this problem 
seemed to already be on Beauvoir’s mind as she turned once more to considerations of the relation 
between self and other as she took up the writing of The Mandarins. 
5.4 The Mandarins 
“Existence – 
others have said it and I have already repeated it more than once myself --- cannot be reduced to 
ideas, it cannot be stated in words: it can only be evoked through the medium of an imaginary 
object; to achieve this, one must recapture the surge or backwash and the contradiction of life 
itself.” 679 
- Beauvoir 
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While none of Beauvoir’s works garners as much attention as The Second Sex, and while none of her 
other works draws more attention to her interest in Hegel’s Phenomenology, it is not this study, but 
rather her subsequent work, her novel, The Mandarins, which Simons notes, Beauvoir believes offers 
her most satisfactory resolution to the problem of the other's consciousness.680 This is an intriguing 
comment on which Beauvoir does not elaborate. She leaves it for her readers to speculate as to how in 
this story and through its telling, she succeeds in resolving the problem of the other’s consciousness. 
Far from an oversight on her part, this failure to provide her readers with this answer seems to serve 
as her response.  
The Mandarins recounts the relationships that develop and that dissolve amongst a group of 
intellectuals in post-war Paris. Faced with the challenges of how to respond to the political and 
personal failures experienced during the war, struggling with what Beauvoir describes as “the death 
of hope,”681 that marked that time but which is not often recalled, the book explores the political 
decisions that this generation faced regarding collaborators, the failed Leftist movement, and the start 
of the Cold War while simultaneously, asking how one lives with one’s self and with others in the 
wake of so much horror.682 
Lacing together autobiography, political history and literary theory, this story is told by two 
narrators. Henri, whose account is written in third person and composes the larger part of the text, is a 
well-regarded journalist and resistance hero. Anne, whose story is told in first person, is a middle-
aged psychiatrist treating post-war trauma. The two serve throughout the novel as counterpoints, 
“each reinforcing, diversifying and destroying the other,” as Beauvoir explains.683 She thinks; he 
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writes. She is pessimistic; he is optimistic. She seeks solitude; he is social. What links these narratives 
is the relationship each has with the writer and political activist, Robert Dubreuilh. Henri’s mentor 
and Anne’s husband, Dubreuilh, unites these two narratives. Bridging the political and the personal, 
the objective and the subjective, Beauvoir in this work draws together her reflections on the problem 
of the other’s consciousness from across her career, putting them in context, and enacting them in her 
very construction of this story.  
“Surviving one’s own life,” as Anne tells the reader, is more difficult than expected.684 
Questions about the inevitability of hostility in framing encounters with others – questions raised by 
Beauvoir in student journals and in She Came To Stay -- are explored once more in this novel as all 
the characters struggle to understand what it is to live in peace time. “This is a struggle experienced 
particularly by Vincent. In his search for collaborators and his need to exact on them his own 
punishment, he makes evident the difficulty in leaving conflict behind, in envisioning anything but a 
battle to the death arising between self-consciousnesses.”685 Despite the horrors, despite the 
consequences, Vincent like Nadine is seeking to extend the hostilities of the war, “taking refuge in the 
past and in the name of the past,” as Henri describes it, assuming “a superior attitude to everything 
that happens to you.”686 
To a great extend Vincent’s struggle and the struggle of all the characters in this novel, is a 
struggle with history. Where does the past finish and the present begin? When will the war finally 
end? While the battles have ended and peace been declared, it seems that the past persists. The 
deportees start returning to Paris. Anne treats Holocaust survivors. She describes them as returning 
ghosts.687 And there are the memories of those who died – of Rosa and Diego that haunt these 
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characters’ lives. 688 They struggle with regret.689 In all these manners, the past lingers in the present, 
never fully taking form and never really letting go. It leaves them all with “shapeless futures.”690 They 
are spectators, specters in their own lives, taking refuge in a past that they cannot leave behind .691 
Described by Beauvoir as being trapped between past and present, between the present and the future, 
it is the manner in which Beauvoir captures something of the opacity of life in her this work that 
marks its success.  
 “A novel is about bringing existence to light in its ambiguities, in its contradictions.”692 This 
is Beauvoir’s goal in writing her novels, a goal not easily achieved. The temptation for the novelist is 
to resolve ambiguities in the text for fear of being read as indecisive, unclear or of having lost their 
narrative. The temptation is to write a roman à thèse – for the words to embody a theory, make a 
statement and thus to turn the novel into a morality lesson, or a means for salvation.693 Beauvoir 
herself worries that too often in her early writings, particularly in The Blood of Others, she had 
succumbed to this temptation.694 But this is not the case in The Mandarins. Herein she claims to have 
“showed some people, at grips with doubts and hopes, groping in the dark to find their way; I cannot 
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think I proved anything.”695 Like Henri in his novel, Beauvoir in The Mandarins “neither 
demonstrates nor exhorts but bears witness.”696  
She bears witness to the conflicting pulls that define life. Like Vincent in his search for 
justice via violence, all of the characters in this story are divided within and against each other. Henri 
constantly feels the pull in opposite directions as he tries to negotiate between opposing political 
interest groups hoping to have sway with his weekly magazine, L’Espoir. Lambert tries to reconcile 
himself to the love he feels for his father and the hatred towards him for collaborating with the Nazis. 
Anne, as Beauvoir describes her, is struggling, in her relation with Dubreuilh, with Nadine, with 
Lewis to find some “possible reconciliation between facticity and freedom.”697 Capturing these 
contradictions, in this novel Beauvoir makes 
. . . manifest the equivocal, separate, contradictory truths that no one 
moment represents in their totality, either inside or outside myself, 
grouping them all together by inscribing them within the unity of an 
imaginary object. Only a novel could reveal the multiple and 
intricately spun meanings of . . . a changing world.698 
That is, she fulfills “the essential purpose of literature.”699 
Her success at weaving together these elements of her study of the possibility of mutual 
recognition, in great part derives from grounding her investigation in a specific time and in a specific 
place. This point deserves pause for the novelty of her approach as well her facility in accomplishing 
it.  In this work, as Kruks makes clear,  
Beauvoir does not invite her readers to sit in judgment of Henri but 
rather invites us to enter Henri’s world and to discover that – from 
the perspective of lived experience, judgment, action, responsibility, 
bad faith have become much more relative matter. . . (Rather) they 
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admit of gradations and must be qualified by the fact that we so often 
act in between-zone, a place of neither liberty nor of determination 
tout court.700   
Set “in a definite place and definite time,” this work “meant something.”701Not a response 
to an abstract question but a study of lived experience, not an attempt to eschew ambiguity 
but an effort to embrace it, The Mandarin portrays the lived experience of complex 
characters – characters for whom the boundary between self and other is never clear and 
never settled. 
Or perhaps more accurately, for these characters the boundaries between self and other are 
never clear and never settled. What becomes evident in this novel is that the problem that Beauvoir is 
occupied with across her lifetime is not the problem of the other’s consciousness but the problem of 
the others’ consciousnesses. For what Beauvoir describes is the multitudinous and varied ways that 
relationships between self and other are simultaneously negotiated. Each decision to end or to begin a 
relationship in this novel is influenced by and influences relationships with others. Henri tells 
Dubreuilh that he has lied about his actions in the Resistance and in so doing put in question the 
testimony of two Holocaust survivors in order to save Josette, his lover, from being denounced as a 
collaborators. His options are shaped by others and his choices affect those he does not know. The 
ripple effects of this decision, effects that move both backward and forward in time, lead Dubreuilh to 
conclude that there “can be no personal morality.”702 That is, there can be no making of decisions for 
the self that have not already been shaped by others. And whatever decisions are made will likewise 
affect others in ways unanticipated and unintended. Dubreuilh determines fate as Lewis decides 
Anne’s future. Nadine determines Sézenac holds Henri’s future in his hand but Nadine, Henri’s wife, 
determines Sézenac’s fate. The self is always already caught up and implicated in the lives of others. 
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In this regard, Beauvoir returns in The Mandarins to a theme she explored in The Blood of Others. 
Individuals are caught up in the lives of others, they make decisions for the other and there is no 
escape.703  
McWeeny argues that it is in the manner in which she casts these intertwining relationships 
that Beauvoir offers up an alternative to the logic of hostility and opposition that seemed to prevail in 
her attempts to resolve the problem of consciousness.704 In developing amongst and amidst the 
characters not dyads but rather triads, McWeeny sees Beauvoir providing the conditions for the 
possibility of creating relationships between self and other that are not dualistic and grounded as such 
in conflict.705 What Beauvoir offers instead is “a new theory of relationality” that does not have 
opposition at its center but rather is based on and in the logic of the gift, of withdrawal and of 
solitude.706 This argument seems to extract this novel from the philosophic development of Beauvoir's 
views. Conflict, as is she maintains throughout her career, is a necessary moment in the dialectic, in 
process of recognition. Moreover, it is unclear how triadic relationships would necessarily undermine 
the development of opposition. Indeed, it is not evident why these triangles would not compound 
rather than dissipate the hostilities that develop between subjects.  
What McWeeny’s argument does identify, however, are the pairs of relations that mirror each 
other in this novel. That is, it draws attention to the contrasting couples whose stories fuel this 
dialogue. It illuminates how Beauvoir structures this work in order to contrast the various forms of 
recognition presented therein.  In this regard, McWeeny points towards the reason why Beauvoir 
might regard this novel as her best account of the problem of the other’s consciousness.  
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The success of The Mandarins, in terms of its addressing questions concerning the possible 
relations between self and other, lies in her elucidation of the variety of ways that individuals live and 
reconcile themselves to the divisions they find in the world and within themselves. In this novel, she 
catalogues the various relationships that develop between self and other. And she notes the strengths 
and weaknesses that each garner. Consider in this regard her portrayal of the triangle that develops 
between Henri, Paule and Nadine. Paule, Henri’s long time lover whom he has recently left, is cast in 
the role of the Absolute Other in relation to Henri. She models the account of the woman as complicit 
in her total subjugation. Her history -- her relationship with Henri, her failed career, trace how she 
becomes inessential, how, more specifically, she becomes what Beauvoir describes in The Second Sex 
as “an amoureuse.”707 The price she pays for adopting and adapting to this role is made evident in her 
breakdown, in her both psychological and also physical loss of herself.  The consequences of her 
choices are brought further to light when her relationship with Henri is contrasted with that he enters 
into with Nadine.  
Nadine is far from willing to be “the inessential other” in relation to Henri. She maintains that 
she will not append her life to that of Henri.  Indeed, her relationships with Henri, with Lambert, with 
her mother, Anne, all are defined by hostility. She will not become the slave to any other. She will not 
risk that possibility so she is in constant battle, constant combat. Yet despite her militancy and her 
persistence, it is unclear that she is master over those who populate her life, whether she is master 
over her self. She is alone and lonely. She tricks Henri into getting her pregnant - a strange act for one 
who considers herself subject in and of her own life.708 Similarly Anne’s relationship with Lewis and 
with Dubreuilh likewise reveals this contrast. It is not the trinity formed amongst the characters but 
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the set of contrasting pairs that contextualize and contrast Beauvoir’s account of the stages of 
recognition discussed in The Second Sex.  
The success of The Mandarins lies not only in the portraits Beauvoir draws of the various 
kinds of relationship that develop between self and other, but also in the form or style she employs in 
addressing the problem of the other’s consciousness therein. As noted before, Beauvoir is clear that 
this is not a roman à clef, nor is this a roman à thèse.709 Her ending as such offers up no final 
conclusion, no statement, and no judgment of these characters. Rather, this novel is an “evocation,” as 
Beauvoir describes it.710 It offers no answers but rather serves as a means for elucidating and holding 
in place the complexities and ambiguities that mark a life, that structure relationships between self 
and other. It offers no prescriptions but rather catalogues her description of the various ways, stages 
or phases of recognition. It serves as such as an evocation or perhaps more accurately an invitation for 
the reader to decide, to write for him or herself the fate of these characters, to determine their 
successes or their failures. A novel, Beauvoir recognizes, is “a collective object. Readers contribute as 
much as the author to its creation.”711 Hence in this work she provides no solutions to the problems 
the characters face. Rather, she writes in such a way that demands of her readers that they approach 
the work  “Full of curiosity and questions . . . like one of the mandarins who must come to terms with 
what it means to be a thinker and an actor, a citizen and a critic, an individual and a member of the 
collective.”712 Thus she stages a demonstration of her resolution to the problem of the other’s 
consciousness.  
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5.5 A Matter of Practice 
“If the desire to write a novel became imperative for me, it was because I felt situated at a point in 
space and time at which each of the sounds that I could draw from myself had a chance to awaken 
echoes in a great many other hearts.” 713 
 - Beauvoir 
 
Through her construction of her characters and in the style and structure she employs in telling their 
stories, Beauvoir in The Mandarins intimates what she would further explore in later writings – a 
resolution to the problem of the other’s consciousness. In writing, in transposing his life onto the page, 
Henri tells the reader that he finally succeeds in discovering himself.714 Consider this admission in 
relation to Dubreuilh recognition that we, “all have our own little personal stories which don’t interest 
anyone . . . that’s why we’re always discovering ourselves in our neighbour’s. And if we know how to 
tell them well, in the end we wind up interesting everyone.”715 In the act of writing and of reading, 
Beauvoir demonstrates how the self finds itself in the other and the other finds within the self.716 While 
love may fail and friendships falter and generosity may be hard to find on the pages of this novel, there 
is exhibited in its very reading, an act of mutual recognition. However, before Beauvoir would develop 
this model further, she would turn back one final time to reading Hegel’s Phenomenology. And she 
would find therein an aspect of the dialectic that would help her to develop this theory of literature in 
her late works. The Mandarins, as such, would prove not to be the conclusion to her study of the 
problem of the other’s consciousness but rather a new beginning. 
  
                                                      
713 FC 276, FCH 283. 
714 M 152, LM 112. See as well M 156, LM 120;  M 172, LM 132 – 133; M 179, LM 137; and, M 707, LM 556 
on the relationship between life and literature.  
715 M 292, LM 280. 
716 M 152, LM 112.  
  190 
Chapter 6 
Recognition 
6.1 The Later Works 
“Art, literature, philosophy are attempts to found the world anew on a human liberty: that of the 
individual creator; to enter such a pretension, one must first unequivocally assume the status of a 
being who has liberty.” 717 
 - Beauvoir 
 
While Beauvoir considered The Second Sex and The Mandarins to be her most successful works, 
while Simons notes that Beauvoir considered the latter to offer up her best solution to the problem of 
the other’s consciousness, to render such a verdict is to fail to appreciate how she resolves this 
problem in the her late writings. It is to overlook how, in her autobiographies, her studies of aging and 
her final works of fiction, she “evokes”718 the problem through their content and their style.  And it is 
to overlook how Beauvoir makes the reader complicit in solving her problem. For in these works, 
Beauvoir realizes that in the very act of writing she has always already been solving her problem. Her 
readers assure her that there is not just the possibility of moving beyond reciprocity to experience 
mutual recognition, but that it is a reality enacted in the simple act of picking up her books and 
allowing her words to transport them into her life and into her world. However, before she could fully 
develop this model, she would return a final time to Hegel and to his Phenomenology. 
6.2 A Final Return 
“the life of the Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by 
devastations, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itself in it. It wins its truth only when 
in utter dismemberment, it finds itself. It is this power, not as something positive, which closse its 
eyes to the negative, as when we say of something that is nothing or is false, and then, having done 
with it, turn away and pass on to something else; on the contrary, Spirit is this power only by 
looking the negative in the face, and tarrying with it.” 719 - Hegel  
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In or around 1954, Beauvoir would return once more turn to reading Hegel’s Phenomenology as she 
continued her study of the problem of the other’s consciousness. Or so it can be reasonably supposed. 
While there is no direct evidence of her once more picking up her study of this work, this speculation 
seems well founded. In 1955 Sartre would deliver his paper “The Singular Universal,” at the 
centenary of Kierkegaard’s death.720 Therein he considers the relationship between the particular and 
the universal drawing heavily on Hegel’s ideas from the Phenomenology. As well, it was in this year 
that he began work on A Search for a Method, another of his essays highly indebted to Hegel’s ideas. 
It can be reasonably assumed given their daily meetings that Beauvoir in the context of their 
discussions would have returned to this text. Moreover, it was in this year that Beauvoir began work 
on what, upon completion, would be her four-volume autobiography. As she theorized its form and 
reflected on her career, as she in many ways retraces the ways in which the problem of the other’s 
consciousness had propelled her thinking, there are references and allusions to Hegelian concepts and 
reliance on his structuring of the Phenomenology. In particular three concepts reappear in and across 
the pages of later works: his concept of becoming, his discussion of the relationship between the 
particular and the universal, and his exploration of the manner in which the concept of mutual 
recognition necessitates recognition not only of the self that lies in the other but of the other comes to 
reside in the self.  
Hegel's philosophy can be characterized as the philosophy of becoming. That he intended his 
work and particularly the Phenomenology to be read in this manner is evident from the many 
references to the concept in his outline of his project in the “Preface.”721 The Phenomenology bears 
witness to this process insofar as it traces the movement of spirit towards Absolute Knowledge. As he 
elaborates in The Philosophy of Mind, "Mind is not an inert being but, on the contrary, absolutely 
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restless being, pure activity, the negating or ideality of every fixed category of the abstractive 
intellect.”722 Thus, self-consciousness is always in the process of becoming. For, as Hegel notes ”’to 
become' is the true expression for the resultant of 'to be' and 'not to be."'723 That is, "Becoming is the 
unity of Being and Nothing."724 As such, for self-consciousnesses  
Their truth is therefore this movement, this immediate disappearance 
of the one into the other, in a word, becoming; a movement wherein 
both are distinct, but in virtue of a distinction which has immediately 
dissolved itself.725  
 Becoming thus is the process of self-creation, whereby contingency and universality, hostility and 
unity, are reconciled with the identification of the self in the other, and the other in the self.  
 Importantly, for this study, there is in becoming as well the reconciliation of the particular 
and the universal. Hegel claims that in the process of becoming there is “precisely this identity of 
subjectivity and objectivity that constitutes the universality now attained by self-consciousness, a 
universality that overarches these two sides or particularities and into which they dissolve.”726 Indeed 
his own recounting of the movement of the dialectic bears witness to this union. For, as he makes 
evident in both the content and the structure of his work, each moment of the dialectic, while distinct, 
nonetheless remains part of the development of Absolute Spirit. As such each moment reflects within 
it the totality.727  
  Hegel describes this relationship in the preface to his Phenomenology. He asks his readers to 
consider how 
The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and we might 
say that the former is refuted by the latter; in the same way when the 
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fruit comes, the blossom may be explained to be a false form of the 
plant’s existence, for the fruit appears as its true nature in place of 
the blossom. The ceaseless activity of their own inherent nature 
makes these stages moments of an organic unity, where they not 
merely do not contradict one another, but where one is as necessary 
as the other; and constitutes thereby the life of the whole.728 
Already in the bud there is evidence for the flower.  Indeed, at each particular moment in the growth 
cycle there is the actualization of that potentiality. Royce probably best captures this idea when he 
notes, 
The true universal, namely, or as Hegel calls it, the Begriff, whose 
highest expression is to be the absolute Idee, is the organic union of 
the universal truth and the individual facts, an union determined by 
the principle that every truth is a truth constructed by the thought of 
the world-self, and that as such it will exemplify just that multiplicity 
of individual facts in the all-embracing and so universal unity of self-
consciousness.729   
Royce’s interpretation is particularly useful for it not only elucidates the manner in which the 
particular and universal are reconciled by Hegel but it as well points toward the ways in which this 
provides the foundation for the reconciliation of the self and the other.  
In Hegel’s Phenomenology Beauvoir had found a model for her own understanding of the 
problem of the other’s consciousness. She had found therein an account of the importance of history, 
of the various forms or phases of recognition between self and other may be envisioned. But it was 
not until she turns to Hegel’s text one final time, that she would find the foundation for a resolution to 
the problem of the other’s consciousness in his discussion of language and of literature.  
There is a growing body of research exploring both the literary structure and the use of 
literature in Hegel’s writing. The structure of the Phenomenology, upon reflection, clearly resembles 
that of the quest or the coming of age novel, which in the end, is perhaps a variation on the former. 
The journey of Spirit towards Absolute Knowledge across the various stages and strands of the 
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dialectic seems mirrored in both historic works such as Don Quixote, which Hegel himself discusses, 
and in more contemporary writings such as Cloud Atlas by David Mitchell.730 As Butler aptly 
recognizes, there is something to the very structure of Hegel’s narrative that “is designed to seduce 
the reader, it exploits his need to find himself in the text he is reading. The Phenomenology requires 
and effects the imaginative identification of the reader with the traveling subject so that reading 
becomes a philosophically instructive form of travel.”731 That is, he not only mirrors his 
Phenomenology on art but in art he finds the working of spirit mirrored. Thus, it is not only the 
literary structure of the Phenomenology that warrants consideration of Hegel’s relationship to 
literature, it is also his inclusion of references to novels in this text that warrants consideration in light 
of his exploration of the possibility of mutual recognition. 
In part three of the Phenomenology, having completed telling the story of the development of 
self-consciousness through to the rise of the unhappy consciousness, Hegel turns his attention to 
tracing both a new and always already present aspect of the journey of Spirit focusing on the 
development of Reason. While mirroring the previous two “strands” of the dialectic, differences arise 
in the presentation of the ideas herein. A new form of thinking and thus a new form of agency arises 
and with it Hegel takes what Speight describes as his “literary turn.” There appear thereafter 
references in the Phenomenology to literary works including Sophocles’ Antigone, Goethe’s Faust, 
Cervantes’ Don Quixote and Diderot’s Rameau’s Nephew.  
Speight’s argument reinforces an often-overlooked aspect of the Phenomenology taken up 
during the Hegelian Renaissance in France. It is a return, as such, to an idea that was identified but 
seemingly forgotten in the recounting of the history of French Hegelianism. Hyppolite recognizes in 
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the process of translating the Phenomenology that Hegel saw literature, saw language as facilitating 
intersubjectivity. He notes that "Language says things, but it also says the ‘I’ who speaks and it 
establishes communication among the diverse ‘is’. It is the universal instrument of mutual 
recognition."732  
This view seems to reflect Hegel’s claim that  
. . . thinking means that, the other, one meets with one's self. It 
means a liberation, which is not the flight of abstraction, but consists 
in that which is actual having itself not as something else, but as its 
own being and creation, in the other actuality with which it is bound 
up by the force of necessity.733  
In thought, and in its presentation in language and in text, there is the meeting of the self and the 
other. As such, the dialectic is being both described by Hegel in the Phenomenology and it is being 
enacted therein. As others read the words he has written, as they try to understand them, as they 
discuss and debate them, and, hence, are transformed by them, the boundaries between self and other 
blur. Theorized by Hyppolite, it is a view that Beauvoir, adhering to her project of contextualizing 
and historicizing the problem of the other’s consciousness, in her later works would transform into a 
practice.  
6.3 Writing and Recognition 
“Writing has remained the great concern of my life."734 
          - Beauvoir 
In the final volume to her autobiography, All Said And Done, Beauvoir recognizes that "Writing has 
remained the great concern of my life."735 Her works are filled with writers. François in She Came to 
Stay is a playwright, Henri, Dubreuilh, and Lambert in The Mandarins are journalists, and Laurence 
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in Les Belles Images is a copywriter for an advertising agency. Then there are the many diarists and 
letter writers who write their stories and narrate their live throughout her works.736 This includes the 
unnamed narrator, Monique and Murielle in The Woman Destroyed, Blomart in The Blood of Others 
and Fosca in All Men Are Mortal. Her stories are stories of stories. Moreover, she uses literary 
examples in her studies to illustrate her ideas. From Woolf to Chaucer, from Leduc to Stendhal, from 
Hemingway to Eliot, she refers to more than one hundred authors in The Second Sex. Old Age 
likewise draws on literary sources in describing the lived experience of the elderly. This later text 
along with in her essays including “Literature and Metaphysics," and "My Experience as a Writer," 
she more directly outlines her theory of literature. And finally, there are her own stories she tells in 
her autobiographies.   
The number of lectures, essays and introductions written during her later period that reflect 
on this subject matter attest to her growing interest in her process and its ties to her “problem” – the 
problem of the other’s consciousness. In her reflections on writing and on reading, Beauvoir picks up 
on themes and relationships explored in Hegel’s Phenomenology. Cuing her readers to consider these 
works in parallel, she echoes Hegel account of becoming noting how a novel “is a way of embodying 
in something this everything which one wants to express starting from a nothingness.”737 Literally 
taking up the task of self-creation, that is, of communicating “the lived sense of being-in-the-
world,”738 she explores how literature reconciles the particular and the universal and how ultimately it 
provides the point of intersection at which if the work is successful self and other mutually recognize 
each other.  
Beauvoir’s account of writing is perhaps best summarized in her lecture, "My Experience of a 
Writer Today." Therein she notes that  
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I read a novel . . .(and) Insofar as I am captivated, suddenly it is no 
longer I who says “I.” I am in another world. Of course I remain 
myself but I forget myself: I identify with the hero of the novel or 
with the author of the autobiography; his world with its values and 
its colours, becomes my own world. I still live in mind, but I leave it; 
there is a perpetual movement back and forth that results in the world 
of others becoming mine even while I am still in my world. And not 
only that, but insofar as there are other readers who read this book, 
who like this book, who make Proust’s world their own, for example, 
I communicate with them through Proust. I am thinking of Proust 
because it is he who said that the literary work, the literary world is 
the privileged space of intersubjectivity; that is to say that it is the 
place where consciousnesses communicate with one another, 
inasmuch as they are separated from one another. That is a very 
important thing because the ambiguity of our condition is that we are 
linked precisely by that which separates us. I mean that I am I for 
myself alone. But each of you is I for yourselves alone. It is our 
shared condition that we are radically separated from one another as 
subjects. So much so that Descartes can base on the intuition of the I 
the most universal philosophy there is. When he discovers by a 
completely singular intuition “I think, therefore I am” it is an 
absolutely singular existential truth which is universalized. Likewise, 
our life has a flavor which is only ours; but this is true for everyone; 
it is true for each one of us. We are alone to die our own death. No 
one will die for us. But this is true for everyone. There is therefore a 
generality in what is the most singular in us. I think that one of the 
writer’s task is to break down the separation at the point where they 
are the most separate, at the point where we are the most singular. 
This is one of my most comforting, most interesting experiences as a 
writer; it is in speaking of what is the most singular that I have 
arrived at what is the most general and that I have touched my 
readers most deeply.739 
As this passage makes clear, for Beauvoir, not only does literature allow for the union of particular 
and universal, it as well allows for the meeting of the self and other. Echoing Hegel and Proust after 
him, she claims that literature is “the privileged realm of intersubjectivity."740 In order to see how 
literature provides the solution to the problem of the other’s consciousness for Beauvoir, it is 
necessary to explore these aspects of her work in relation to her discussion of writing and of reading.  
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Consider, in light of the description of the process of writing offered above, how Beauvoir 
starts to write each day. Consider what it means for her to write. As Beauvoir sits down to recount the 
story of Françoise or Blomart or Anne, she must for a moment leave herself behind. She must for at 
least a few seconds, allows this character to enter into her. She must have a sense of what they feel 
and how they walk. She must know what it is they think and how they love. And as she turns to 
writing those words on the page, it is as if she has left herself behind and been inhabited by another. 
She thinks their thoughts and loves what they love, hates what they hate. She does this despite her 
own preferences. She does this in order to capture an experience that others will comprehend and that 
will allow them to understand the particularities of this character’s life.  
But why would the reader care about this character who is not real and who lives a life far 
removed from her own?  Her concern about what it is that ties together the writer and the reader, a 
concern that in the end raises questions about the purpose of writing, is found already in Beauvoir’s 
journal as she takes up her writing her first novel.741 It is a problem that continued to vex her. Her 
worry is perhaps best articulated in The Mandarins. In this novel, Henri, troubled that telling his own 
personal story will be of little value to others, is told by Dubreuilh that we “all have our own little 
personal stories which don’t interest anyone . . . that’s why we’re always discovering ourselves in our 
neighbour’s. And if we know how to tell them well, in the end we wind up interesting everyone.”742  
That the singular experience of an individual or character is picked up by readers and taken 
forward evidences, for Beauvoir, the success of the author in undertaking what she describes as 
“actual artistic work.’ The writer’s task is to take up  “a singular experience’ and “move on to a 
universal one. When I succeeded in finding a form which gave this universal dimension to my 
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experience, then the book was conceived.”743 To do so, the writer must recount the particularities of 
her character’s life, identifying what makes her laugh and what she wears to sleep and whom she 
loves and whom she does not. These “banalities’ of life are taken up by the author who transforms 
them into something more “either in giving a universal dimension to what you have lived singularly, 
or in finding a way to singularize a conceptually impoverished knowledge.”744 These banalities are 
essential for only by “Beginning with the singularity which is of necessity at the root of creation” is it 
possible “to find the universality of a situation.”745 In telling the story from a particular perspective, 
by placing it in context and thus revealing the ambiguities, the conflicts in emotions, interpretations 
and values that it entails, the story comes to bridge the writer and the reader after her with the world.  
And it does so in ways that resonate with other readers and with the other people who populate the 
world around her. While there is something unique to the character’s story or the tale told by the 
autobiographer, there is at the same time something familiar. The story, as such, “goes infinitely 
beyond my singularity.”746 As Beauvoir makes clear, in telling her story, her stories she at one and the 
same time reveals the details of her life and “bears witness” to the era and the lives of those with 
whom she shared it.747 In this regard in telling the story of her character’s life, she is always already 
telling the story of other characters and of the readers that will pick up this novel and read her story 
across Beauvoir’s lifetime and after it. That is, it is a story that is at once both singular and universal. 
Hence it is that “By means of language I transcend my particular case and enter into communication 
with the whole of mankind.”748 
This is no easy task as she makes evident when describing how  
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Every moment reflects my past, my body, my relations with others, 
the tasks I have undertaken, the society I live in, the whole of this 
earth; linked together, and independent, these realities sometimes 
reinforce each other and descant together, sometimes they interfere 
with, contradict, or neutralize each other. If their totality does not 
remain always present, I shall say nothing exact. Even if I surmount 
this difficulty, I stumble over others. A life is such a strange object, 
at one moment translucent, at another utterly opaque, an object I 
make with my own hands, an object imposed on me, an object for me 
again, pulverized by events, scattered, broken, scored yet retaining 
its unity; how heavy it is and how inconsistent: this contradiction 
breeds many misunderstandings.749 
Beauvoir echoes in this context Hegel's account of the particular and the universal that he both 
describes and enacts in the dialectic as described above.  However, the universal that she appeals to 
herein is not the Absolute in which he saw all the moments of the dialectic coalescing.  
Indeed, her use of the term “universal” is misleading given the many ways in which her choice 
of language and the structuring of her text, beckon to Hegelian interpretations. Beauvoir reinterprets 
the idea of the universal, detotalizing it, and hence she concludes that  
Every moment reflects my past, my body, my relations with others, 
the tasks I have undertaken, the society I live in, the whole of this 
earth; linked together, and independent, these realities sometimes 
reinforce each other and descant together, sometimes they interfere 
with, contradict, or neutralize each other.750  
To write the history of a fictional character or to tell the story of one’s life, is always to tell 
simultaneously the stories of her readers and of those who have never heard the author’s name nor will 
ever read the pages of her work. That is, "if any individual...reveals himself honestly, everyone, more 
or less, becomes involved. It is impossible for him to shed light on his own life without at some point 
illuminating the lives of others."751  In writing, the singular becomes the medium for expressing the 
universal and in the process self and other are reconciled. The manner in which this later goal is 
achieved through literature, that is, the way that literature for Beauvoir as for Proust and Hegel before 
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her becomes considered “the site of intersubjectivity,” is best evidenced by turning away from the 
investigation of the creation of the work of art to reflecting on its appreciation. That is, to step back 
from exploring writing to reflect on reading. 
6.4 On Reading 
“I bring into 
being a bookish world that overlies and overflows with the real world, lighting it up and enriching 
it; and in some cases this superimposed universe has greater depth and brilliance – Emma Bovary 
or Monsieur de Charlus exist more sharply for me than many people do that I have actually met. 
They also exist for other people, who see them from different angles but who communicate with me 
by means of them. It has been said, and very truly that literature is the field of intersubjectivity. 
Alone in my room with a book, I feel in contact not only with the writer of it, but also, through time 
and space, with its readers.” 752 
 
- Beauvoir 
 
The number of references to reading found in Beauvoir’s autobiographies, novels and essays it is 
remarkable. Characters pick up newspapers and novels. In her autobiographies, she recounts the 
works she herself read and loved, and those she read and hated. And Beauvoir provides a descriptions 
of what it is to read. In All Is Said and Done, she devotes a chapter to reading and writes therein her 
phenomenology of reading, one that reveals how in this often underappreciated and overlooked 
action, readers seek and discover the lines between self and other are blurred – that they have been 
recognized just as they are recognizing the other in their facticity and in their freedom.  
In the process of reading, Beauvoir notes that the barrier between self and other, a barrier 
created out of fear and hostility, must necessarily be lowered. Describing this process she notes that 
"for a text to have a meaning the reader must commit his freedom to it, silence his inner voice and 
install another's within his own mind."753 That is, while I read, "I live in another man's skin, and this 
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may deeply alter my vision of the human state, of the world, and of the place I occupy in it."754 To 
flush out Beauvoir’s account, consider what happens when one sits down to read.  
As the reader opens the book, from the very first sentence she reads, the lines between self and 
other begins to dissolve. From that very moment, the reader must grant the writer the freedom to 
inhabit her thoughts, allow him to lead her at will.  Reading her consciousness is drawn away from the 
room in which she sits, the cat at the door, and the list of endless tasks to be completed before the end 
of the day that keep running through her head. As the story draws her in these concerns fall away, she 
reads on. And, while she knows that she there in this chair in this house with these demands, with this 
life, yet she forgets all this as she is absorbed into another world and begins to inhabit another’s life. It 
might be a life far removed from her own – one distant from her in space and time. And yet, there is 
something familiar that she recognizes in the experience despite those differences.  While the story is 
unique, particular to the characters at hand, it nonetheless resonates. Particular yet universal, she is able 
“enter a world that is other” and “become part of a subject other than (her) self.”755  
The “miracle” of this experience warrants a pause for further reflection. Describing what it is 
to read, she notes how it is that  
Speaking of the most personal experiences that we can have like 
loneliness, anguish, the death of the people we love, our own death, 
is . . . a way of bringing us together, of helping each other and of 
making the world less somber. I believe that this is one of the 
absolutely irreplaceable and essential tasks of literature: helping us to 
communicate with each other through that which is the most solitary 
in ourselves and by which we are bound the most intimately to one 
another.756 
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In this moment self and other become so intertwined that it is difficult to know where one begins and 
the other ends. The self, the reader, is “transported” into another life. And she wants to be so 
transported.757 
The reader wants to know what it is to be the other -- to feel what the other feels, to know what 
it is like to see the world through their eyes. This is perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this 
experience. Not only is the reader transported into the life of the other, she wishes to find herself 
therein. That is, while she becomes the other for the author, she simultaneously takes up and acts on her 
freedom.  She must read the words, follow the story, and interpret the novel.  She must turn the page. 
So it is that Proust claims that it is in the act of reading that “ consciousnesses communicate one with 
the other, with all the ambiguity of our condition for we do so when we are actually all alone.“758 The 
reader has been subject to what Beauvoir describes as some “magical operation of bewitchment.”759 In 
the experience of reading, there is a necessary recognition of the other in the self and of the self in the 
other. 
And in those moments, the reader, the self, is not alone. This is what Beauvoir identifies what 
is the “function of literature.” Considering why it is that tragedies so often are the subject matter of 
novels, she recognizes that  
It is not out of morose delectation, nor out of exhibitionism, nor out 
of provocation that writers often tell of hideous or deeply saddening 
experiences: through the medium of words they render these 
experiences universal and allow their readers, deep in their private 
unhappiness, to know the consolation of brotherhood. In my opinion 
one of the essential functions of literature, a function which means 
that nothing else can take its place, is the overcoming of the isolation 
which is common to us all and which nevertheless makes us 
strangers to each other.760  
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Hence it is that "Alone in my room with a book, I feel in contact not only with the writer of it, but 
also, through time and space, with its readers."761 In the act of reading, the self is no longer alone. No 
longer a stranger to the other, she is to no longer to a stranger unto herself. In the act of reading, she 
has experienced mutual recognition. It is as she describes it, “the miracle of literature, which 
distinguishes it from information: that an other truth becomes mine without ceasing to be other. I 
renounce my own “I” in favour of the speaker: and yet I remain myself.”762 This ‘miracle’ is perhaps 
no place better evidenced in Beauvoir’s work than in her autobiographies.  
6.5 The Autobiographies 
“this is how I see my life: thousands of possibilities” 763 
 
- Beauvoir 
 
Taking to heart Hegel’s account of self-consciousness as self creation, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
Beauvoir in her study of the problem of the other’s consciousness would eventually turn to writing 
her autobiography. The four volumes and two studies that result place this philosophy in a time and in 
a place, in a body, amidst a life and offer up what Tidd describes as a “testimony” to both Beauvoir’s 
life and to an era.764  In Hegelian terms, these works bears witness to Beauvoir’s own becoming and 
to the becoming of her age. 
"Word, self and language, belong inseparably together and develop together."765 Perhaps no 
quote better captures Beauvoir’s project as she takes up the task of writing her life story. Underlying 
and guiding the four volumes that compose her life story, she asks a question echoed by many of 
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characters in her novels 766a question that she seems to address indirectly in many of her essays and 
studies.767 "Why am I myself?..My life it is both intimately known and remote; it is Yet she is the me 
and yet I stand outside it.  Just what, precisely, is this curious object,"768 she asks. And she dares to 
address this question in the four volumes of her autobiography that she produces.. W 
Autobiography, as Tidd notes,  
. . . is a privileged literary genre for ethical exchange of experience 
between self and other. The act of reading autobiography involves a 
readiness to be open to the experience of the other in the real – not 
merely open to experiences that are similar to mine but also those 
that are potentially unknown to me.769  
The act of writing autobiography thus requires the creation of the conditions for the possibility of 
such readiness. Hence it is to Beauvoir’s method of writing her life story, and not to the content of her 
answer that entails an account of her resolution to the problem of the other’s consciousness. It is not 
what she says about her life but how she recounts and reconstructs that life that is of interest in 
considering the development of her ideas on the relationship between self and other.770 For as she 
clearly recognizes in “My Experience As A Writer,” autobiography unlike fiction, deals with the 
contingencies and facticity of the singular experience, yet also involves recognition that takes place 
between self and other dealing with situations that concern not an other but many others.771 
Beauvoir noted that her goal in telling her story was to "unveil reality,"772 to "find the truth 
and speak it,"773"to dispel mystification."774 Yet in other accounts she offers of her autobiography she 
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notes,  "By writing a work based on my own experience, I would re-create myself and justify my 
existence."775 Francis and Gontier explain these contradictory claims concerning the writing of 
autobiography as revealing that "Beauvoir gave a certain order to the story of her life: she structured 
her narrative and restructured her life.”776 How to reconcile these views? It seems that in telling her 
readers that she would unveil reality she clearly veils another self, and in dispelling mystification she 
mystifies.  
She begins to write her own life story, she tells her readers in The Prime of Life, when she 
takes "that child and that adolescent girl, both so long given up for lost in the depths of the unrecalled 
past, and endowed them with my adult awareness. I gave them a new existence – in black and white, 
on sheets of paper."777 Looking back, she takes the person she once was and sees at her as if she was 
another. Or perhaps more accurately, she sees her as if she was the other. But as she so envisions her 
self as an object, she writes her story. She choses the scenes, the characters and the events to recount. 
She develops her project as she takes up herself as its object.  
She sits down to write. Now she must choose the scenes to recount. She must choose the 
words to use. There are paragraphs that she writes and writes again. She writes in such a way as to 
move her readers and to do this she must for a minute understand something of what makes them 
laugh and what gives them pause. And then, she offers up her story knowing that there is much that 
they will not understand. Her words will betray her just as she will betray her readers. "Self-
representation is always a form of self-fictionalization."778For neither can the words capture the whole 
of her life, nor can she retell it in its completeness to those who would read her works. 
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The volumes of the autobiography construct Beauvoir as a unified subject continuous over 
time, place and occupation. Yet she is in the very act of writing choosing her the events to include, 
filling in the gaps, throwing light on some events while letting others slip into the shadows. What in 
effect Beauvoir is doing in her autobiographies is pulling together the scattered pieces of what she 
knows of herself, trying to render them a continuous, polished and whole. As such Beauvoir joins 
Maclntyre and Arendt maintaining that "one's identity is that of a character in a narrative and the self-
understanding is accordingly a matter of the employment of one's experiences."779 
Indeed, in writing her autobiography, Beauvoir simultaneously has written her biography. 
The two projects are necessarily intertwined, for, as Blanchard notes, Beauvoir  
. . . sees herself as having made her life an interpersonal project . . 
.which others validate. This project, however, Beauvoir can describe 
as her own only because the truth-value of that description lies in 
others being made its guarantors. The fact that Beauvoir insists on 
making her readers equally responsible for what she now, towards 
the end of her life, sees as a project fulfilled, seals her covenant with 
her readers and thereby confirms, by reciprocity, that which she 
couldn’t have established by herself alone.780  
As she writes the story of her life, her story simultaneously is written by others. And what 
is more, the story she writes of herself is always the story of others.  
No where does Beauvoir make more evident the ways in which Hegel’s account of becoming 
frame her last works than in her autobiographies for therein she puts theory into practice using the life 
she knows most intimately, her own, to explore his account of consciousness as self-creation. She 
traces the movement of a restless being. She bears witness to the multi-various ways that self-
consciousness shows itself to be self-creation. She enacts this process, this transformation on the 
page. And in so doing she reconciles the self and other, particular and universal, the contingent and 
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the eternal. However, Beauvoir does not simply adopt Hegel’s model to her own life circumstances. 
She also problematizes his ideas.  
In All Said and Done, Beauvoir compares and contrasts her autobiography with other’s 
popular in her time. Anais Nin's Journals, she claims to be “inauthentic.” Reading them Beauvoir 
notes that she was, "embarrassed by her aestheticism, her narcissism, the narrowness of the world she 
artificially creates for herself, her immoderate indulgence in myth and her silly passion and 
astrology.”781Malraux’s autobiography is disappointing as well.782 She notes that he never questions 
himself in his work, that he never problematizes his life. His life-writing serves as a form of self-
justification rather than investigation.783 On the other hand, Beauvoir, admires Leiris, Fibrils. In his 
autobiography he dares to lay down the principles that he has tried to respect in his work as a writer  
Not to lie nor to indulge in fine words; to refuse verbal inflation; to 
banish all purples patches; not to talk without rhyme or reason and 
turn writing into a meddlesome busybody art; to write like a man 
who understands and appreciated the language and to make use of 
that language only with the utmost rigor and fidelity.784  
What distinguishes these examples of self-creation?  
In categorizing the autobiographies that she read, and ultimately in outlining the philosophy 
of autobiography to which she believes that she has adhered in her own volumes, Beauvoir elucidates 
an aspect of Hegel’s conception of becoming that can easily and quickly be overlooked. Self-
consciousness, he argues is self-creation. It is not consciousnesses that can engage in this process. 
Those who remain at this moment in the dialectic, those who do not develop an understanding of their 
own ambiguity and hence do not become “self-consciousnesses,” cannot engage in the process of 
becoming. Unwilling to see their own facticity and freedom – opting in Nin’s case to reduce herself to 
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the former and in Malraux’s case to limit himself to the latter – these writers cannot tell the story of 
their self-creation. They cannot successfully write their autobiographies. Their stories do not move 
Beauvoir, do not transcend their own singularity for as noted before it is only if an individual "reveals 
himself honestly” that “everyone, more or less, becomes involved. It is impossible for him to shed 
light on his own life without at some point illuminating the lives of others."785  
What Beauvoir points towards herein is that there are conditions for the possibility of self-
creation that Hegel seemed to either too quickly gloss over or to overlook altogether as a result of his 
theorizing rather than contextualizing his account of becoming. It is this criterion that Beauvoir points 
her readers to considering as she in her last work of fiction, The Woman Destroyed. 
6.6 Critical Perspectives: The Woman Destroyed  
“The novel is a problématique. One's life is a problématique.” 786 
 
- Beauvoir 
 
In the midst of completing her autobiography, Beauvoir turns to writing a series of short 
stories collected in the volume, The Woman Destroyed.  That she interrupted the completion of her 
memoirs to write these stories in particular is telling. For in each of these short works, Beauvoir’s 
main character offers up their own first person narrative recounting their life-story. That all three 
characters were women facing growing old, only further seems to suggest that Beauvoir meant for 
these works to be contrasted and read as a commentary on her autobiography and simultaneously as a 
critique of Hegel’s account of self-creation.  
Juxtaposing Beauvoir’s telling of her life story with the first person narrations offered up by 
the three main characters in these stories, offers up an opportunity to reflect on the ways in which she 
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problematizes and refines Hegel’s account of becoming in her late works. This critique centers on 
Hegel’s optimism concerning the dialectic. From Beauvoir’s earliest readings of the Phenomenology 
she is critical of Hegel’s view that all of Spirit was a movement towards Absolute Knowledge. She 
challenges the idea enacted in and through the text itself that the dialectic is always and necessarily 
progressing, moving towards Absolute Spirit. “Becoming” for Hegel, is synonymous with “becoming 
better.” Beauvoir was skeptical of this equation. True, becoming could lead towards the mutual 
recognition of the self and the other. Indeed, this is the goal she herself tries to achieve in writing her 
life-story. It is a goal, however, and not a necessary outcome. The process of self-creation could just 
as easily result in encourage division and conflict between consciousnesses.  
The Woman Destroyed calls for clear comparison with Memories of a Dutiful Daughter, The 
Prime of Life and The Force of Circumstances, for in these three stories like these three volumes of 
Beauvoir’s autobiography, the reader is asked to bear witness to the telling of a life story. Moreover, 
it is the narrator, in each case a woman facing the affects of aging in a society that brands both 
women and the elderly the other, offers up own story, her own justification, of her life choices. The 
parallels are too clear and too evident to not see Beauvoir commenting in these works on her own life 
writing. Beauvoir fictionalizes herein the very process she herself is engaged in. And it seems she 
does so with an express purpose.  
For, while these short stories share in common these features of the project that had 
preoccupied Beauvoir for over fifteen years, they also stand in stark contrast to her telling of her life-
story. Or so she hopes. As Bjorsnos recognizes, these stories illuminate the ways in which these 
women, similar to Beauvoir in so many regards, construct their lives. And how those lives 
deconstruct.787 Each narrative is offered as a means for holding onto what is being lost and as a kind 
of self – deceipt. These serve as autobiographical interventions—the stories the main characters tell of 
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their lives seem to be the means that they resort to in order to maintain a view of them and deny their 
own ambiguity. The unnamed narrator of the first story and Monique will use their stories to deny 
their facticity – to try to perpetuate a view that they have of themselves which sees them in control, as 
pure freedom. Murielle’s story, on the other hand, is the of one she hopes her readers will see as a 
“victim.” Denying her freedom, her transcendence, she offers up an account of herself as pure 
facticity, the story of an object. The irony found in this claim, well represents the strategy that she 
employs to try to deny her own complicity in her objectification. These stories thus reveal that just as 
literature can facilitate mutual recognition, it can and readily does fall back into previous moments of 
the dialectic and in so doing be used as a means for perpetuating hostility and a method for instilling 
Absolute Otherness. They serve as such as cautionary tales pointing towards the ways the story, that 
literature might facilitate mutual recognition and how it might undermine its possibility.  
The first of the series of stories composing The Woman Destroyed, "The Age of Discretion", 
takes up many of the issues surrounding aging that Beauvoir begins to consider in The Prime of Life 
and in A Very Easy Death, issues that she will go onto develop in greater detail in Old Age. It is the 
story of an older woman who has throughout her life seen herself as a confident scholar with a loving 
husband and devoted son. As the story unfolds, these three touchstones for her own construction of 
her identity are shown to have been illusions. She is not the person whose story she has told, not the 
image that she has tried to uphold in her own eyes, if in no one else’s.  Her most recent work is 
simply a repetition of previous studies, her husband suddenly seems old and ambivalent - devoid of 
any commitments or principles and lacking the desire to act, and her son, whom she has considered 
her personal success, abandons the academic life she has set out for him and becomes a hated 
bureaucrat,married to a woman who encompasses all the traits she most despises in women. She 
describes this recognition as being "Like having been hit on the head, when one's sight is disordered 
and one sees two different images of the world at different weights, without being able to make out 
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which is above and which is below."788 The myths that have sustained her interpretation of her life 
have been exploded and she sinks into a deep depression. She must take up the task of putting the 
pieces of her life back together, of recreating herself. This is a daunting task for it does not fit with 
her view of retirement - that myth too is revealed in this text. 
Yet, what is most troubling about this story is not the revelation that her life was not as she 
had thought it was, not how she had created it; rather, it is her willingness to repeat it in and through 
the new story which she constructs for herself. With the opportunity open to her for remaking herself, 
for self-realization and the creation of a more authentic self, she instead accepts the exact same life 
over again. She chooses once more to tell the story of her life in which she and Andre are one, a life 
where old age is unproblematic. To do so she must adjust her notion of time. She chooses to believe 
that "This present moment was a lie."789 The present Andre is not real. The past is what she considers 
real. She repeats the words of a poem: “’Little Star that I see, Drawn by the moon, the old words, just 
as they were first written were there on my lips. There was a link joining me with the past centuries, 
when the stars, shone exactly as they do today. And this rebirth and this permanence gave me a 
feeling of eternity."790 Rebirth and permanence not recreation and reinvention are at hand. This view 
is best demonstrated in her changing attitudes towards writing. 
Perhaps it is not surprising that Beauvoir leaves this character unnamed. She is without a 
present, living in a past that never was. She has no self only this character that she creates in and 
through the narrative she tells the readers and on the pages that she writes.  
Fallaize notes that this is a story in which the question of communication is paramount.791 
The narrator begins the story noting that when it comes to her husband there is "nothing we do not 
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know about one another."792 In keeping with this view, the narrator first rejects a book she is reading 
which argues that communication is impossible. But over the course of the story, she comes to 
question both assertions. She does not know her husband. She does not know of his loss of 
commitment, does not know of his struggle with aging. Further, she comes to question whether in the 
end we are "condemned to silence and loneliness.”793 She wonders whether communication is 
possible. She wonders as such, if mutual recognition is possible. But rather than following through 
with this question, instead of looking at the conditions for the possibility of communicating she 
returns again to the belief that communication is obviously a possibility. She talks with Andre and all 
their misunderstandings are eliminated. Or so she says. So she chooses to believe. 
It is significant to note that the questions she raises and the beliefs she espouses are framed 
both within and by her discussion of stories. The story opens with the narrator reflecting on the 
important role that writing and reading has played in her life. Books, she confesses, "saved me from 
despair."794 She confesses that she could not live without writing.795 She describes how "from time to 
time it is fun to concentrate for a long while upon a set of squares where the words are potentially 
there although they cannot be seen: I use my brain as a photographic developer to make them appear - 
I have the impression of drawing them up from their hiding-places in the depth of the paper.”796 
Unlike pictures, that "lose their shape; their colours fade . . .words you carry away with you."797 This 
is for her the great advantage of writing. It makes literature “a privileged activity."798  
Evoking Proust’s famous quote in the very wording of this line, having used this quote in 
several of her writings and in her essays, Beauvoir seems to ask her reader to consider what this 
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privileged activity might be. Are the stories that this character reads and those she writes to be taken 
as the sites of true intersubjectivity or, alternatively, are they to be considered the sites at which the 
conflict between consciousnesses is enacted? Is it the means employed to communicate or to 
dominate? The second in the series of stories composing The Woman Destroyed, further 
problematizes language and the project of writing the story of one's life. 
Murielle's prayer, which forms the second of the stories in this collection, “Monologue,” is 
her attempt to write and hence to right the story of her life. And it is at one and the same time, as its 
epigraph makes clear, "Monologue is her form of revenge.”799 While in her prayer Murielle is 
supposedly asking God for the opportunity to reconcile with her husband, a plea for mercy as such, in 
fact, what she offers up  is an account of the wrongs he undertakes.  Her prayer appears to be a 
rehearsal, a rehearsal of her argument to get her second husband, Tristan, to take her back and allow 
her to see her son. She practices her arguments before God, trying to build up her fortitude. However, 
very quickly the reader perceives her desperation.  
This monologue is her way of justifying her actions, not only to her husbands, to her mother 
and son, but primarily to herself. And she has much to explain - her failed first marriage, her mother's 
rejection of her, her daughter's suicide, her failed second marriage, and her separation from her son. 
She must explain all these things first and foremost to herself. She is justifying her actions to herself. 
And in doing so, rather than clarifying who she was and what she had done, she builds continually 
more elaborate myths. She construes all events, all the actions of others, and all the words of others in 
light of her interpretation of her own life. As for others, she is uninterested in the story of their lives. 
Indeed, she must be. For if she were to listen she might hear a story that would challenge her own. 
She has written the story of her life following clear themes. She is Murielle the good mother, the 
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concerned mother. She is Murielle the good wife. And lastly, she is Murielle the victim. She tells her 
story to a God who cannot reply and with no interest in hearing the stories of others.  
Throughout her monologue, Murielle makes reference to the fact that she tears masks off and 
reveals people for what they are rather than for how they appear.800 In describing the book she wishes 
to write of her life, her written monologue, she claims to have lived a life "without lies without 
sham.”801 As the story progresses, the duplicity of her claim becomes evident. Far from living without 
lies, her life is a lie. And while she might think she takes away the masks others use to hide 
themselves, in fact, she creates for them ever more intricate masks on the others around her, masks 
which she needs in order to sustain her view of herself. She cannot demystify others for if she did, she 
would risk the possibility of demystifying herself. So she imposes on the others in her life, her 
version of events, an image of herself. And her means for doing so is telling the story of her life, a 
monologue.  
For via the monologue she can fulfill her goal encompassed in her claim that "I want to live I 
want to come to life again."802 To come to life again she must look over her past roles and reinvent 
another. She must take up a new mask, the mask of a woman misunderstood, the mask of the victim. 
But wearing this mask Murielle ultimately is unrecognizable to herself. 
Perhaps in none of her works does Beauvoir more clearly articulate the dangers of writing the 
story of one’s life. Autobiography quickly turns self-investigation into self-justification. Writing 
alone does not guarantee that there is the recognition of the self in the other and the other in the self. 
Indeed, Murielle’s story identifies the means by which it can be used to transform loved ones into the 
Absolute Other. A story cannot be conceived as a means for seeking revenge, as advancing a thesis, if 
not about the world, about the self, if it is to serve as the site for intersubjectivity. A story is not a 
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monologue even though a single author alone often writes it in a room and indeed, it often takes the 
form of a first person narrative. As Beauvoir made clear, a work of literature is a dialogue with the 
author and the others who read the work. As Beauvoir makes clear the story, “the book is a collective 
object. Readers contribute as much as the author to its creation”803 Without providing them with an 
entranceway into the narrative, without leaving them the opportunity to pick up the story and write 
their own ending, the story is transformed into dogma or diatribe. The potential for literature to serve 
as a site for recognition is undermined.  The diary like the monologue will provide Beauvoir, in the 
last story in this collection to refine further the ways in which stories can facilitate intersubjectivity 
and the ways in which they can hinder it.   
The final story in this volume, "A Woman Destroyed," is the diary that the main character, 
Monique, begins to keep after she discovers that her husband, Maurice, has taken a mistress. The 
diary, as noted by Fallaize, "inevitably brings to the fore the subject of the activity of writing, since 
the diarist is perceived by the reader - and perceives herself - as writer, as the source of the narrative 
as well as the subject."804 In this regard, the act of writing allows one to be self and other at one in the 
same moment. One writes the story of one's life. One is the writer and the object being written on. 
This is a possible but not a necessary outcome of writing the story of one's life. But for Monique, the 
diary provides no such self-realization.  
Like the main character of the first of this series of stories, Monique has devoted herself to 
her family, but she has no job, no profession to fall back upon. She has seen herself through his eyes. 
It is in Maurice’s perception of her that she has "recognized herself." Now with Maurice gone, she 
cannot recognize herself in the woman who stays indoors, who does not go out or see friends. She 
writes. And in her words she tries to regain that reflection of herself that she saw in Maurice's eyes. 
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She tries to regain an image of herself as one devoted to others, an authentic woman. But now, who is 
she? "I thought I knew what kind of person I was: what kind of person he was. And all at once I no 
longer recognize us, neither him nor me."805 
How does she respond? Rather than looking at her own reflection, she seeks to know how 
others see her.806 She wants to know what she looks like from the outside. She looks for others to 
reflect for her that image.807 She looks for herself in the eyes of her friends, of her daughters, but she 
cannot trust what she sees, what they say. She has lost her own image and desperately seeks to find a 
new one, one that is not hideous.808 She concludes, "I do not know what kind of person I am but also I 
do not know what kind of a person I ought to be."809 
In and through her words and the images she creates therein, she tries to capture her own 
image. Writing thus becomes for her a mirror. She notes that she began to write in her diary when she 
finds herself alone. Her daughters have both left home and now she has time to "live for myself a 
little."810 But faced with such time, she finds she has little to do and begins to write. Soon her diary 
becomes necessary as she tries to explain to herself, for herself the circumstances of Maurice's affair 
with Noeille. She writes to fill up time. She writes to escape. Not to escape the events in her life. She 
writes instead to escape herself. For on paper she can be the good wife, the victim, the good mother. 
On paper she can be anything, any one she so desires. She can sit back and re-read what she has 
written. She can rehearse her part. 
She quickly learns the limitations of the medium. The story that she tells of herself, to herself 
and for herself proves to be inadequate. Words on the page prove to be inadequate reflections. There 
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is no distance to allow for refraction. The reflection as such is distorted. Moreover, the do not capture 
her life at all. As she comes to realize, in a diary "the things you omit are more important than those 
you put in.”811 What does she fail to write in her diary? She recounts events, the traumas, the 
conversations associated with her finding herself more alone than she ever had imagined. It is not the 
events in her life that she fails to write. What is missing from her diary is her own self. 
She realizes that there are parallels between her and a man in the story that once she heard: 
There was once a man who lost his shadow. I forget what happened 
to him, but it was dreadful. As for me, I've lost my own image. I did 
not look at it often; but it was there, in the background, just as 
Maurice had drawn it for me. A straightforward, genuine, "authentic" 
woman, with out mean-mindedness, uncompromising, but at the 
same time understanding, indulgent, sensitive, deeply feeling, 
intensely aware of things and of people, passionately devoted to 
those she loved and creating happiness for them. A fine life, serene, 
full, "harmonious." It is dark: I cannot see myself anymore. And 
what do the others see? Maybe something hideous.812 
Her diary is a mixture of insight and illusion. At times she recognizes that she has destroyed 
herself813, that she has lived not only for others but through them,814 but upon reading what she has 
written she comes to the conclusion that  
. . . these pages lie so - they get things so wrong . . . There is not a 
single line in this diary that does not call for a correction or a 
denial...Yes, throughout these pages I meant what I was writing and I 
meant the opposite; reading them again I feel completely lost. . . I 
have always wanted the truth; and the reason why I have had it is 
that I desired it. Is it possible to be mistaken about one's life as all 
that? I was lying to myself. How I lied to myself…I have taken to 
my pen again not to go back over the same ground but because the 
emptiness within me, around me, is as vast that this movement of my 
hand is necessary to tell myself that I am still alive.815 
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As with the unnamed character in “The Age of Discretion” and with Murielle in “Monologue,” 
Monique writes nota s means for introspection but as a means to escape all such reflection. 
At any time, she can pick up her pen and write again. Indeed, the story concludes with her 
attempting to do so. Her therapist suggests she write again. She recognizes the tactic. By writing she 
will regain interest in herself she will "reconstruct" her identity for herself. She does not reject the 
idea out of hand, for at the end of the story she is still writing. Fallaize has characterized this as the 
more positive side of the story. The story ends with Monique recognizing that she is afraid -- a true 
sentiment. But in order for her to write herself, she must rethink her views of language. She must 
learn to trust words again - a difficult task given that even her own words have failed her in the past.  
As in the other two stories that form this collection, questions are raised about the role of 
writing and about its potential to serves as means for reconciling self and other. Monique’s diary, 
perhaps more directly than the other two offerings, brings this issue to light. Monique seeks to tell the 
truth about her own life but writing on and for herself she ends up engaged in what the reader quickly 
recognizes is self-deception. In this instant, it is not as with Murielle that her narrative allows no other 
to exist and hence undermines any hope for mutual recognition. In this story, Monique has no self and 
so likewise cannot enter into the dialectic. The words cannot reconcile the distance between 
immanence and transcendence, cannot mediate the difference between self and other.  
In The Woman Destroyed, exploring the relationship between literature, agency and 
intersubjectivity, Beauvoir puts under erasure her claim that narrative could serve as to reconcile self 
and other in a moment of mutual recognition. Exploring the manner in which the fictional devices 
employed in these stories – the confession, the prayer, and the diary -- could be employed to instill 
and entrench the differences between self and other and, indeed, to foster hostility between the two, 
she offers the reader the opportunity to consider the conditions for the possibility of literature serving 
as the site for intersubjectivity. She demonstrates in this regard the manner in which literature must be 
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constructed as a joint venture. Trying to control of their own story the narrators in these stories,  
provide no opportunity for the other to enter in, as Bjosnos emphasizes in her reading of this work. 
How the other must be given the opportunity to write with the author the story, and how it is 
necessary, as Monique discovers echoing a lesson learned by Henri in The Mandarins, that one must 
write both to create oneself but to find oneself. The self was not solely the product of his own 
narration.  
6.7 Old Age 
“All truth is 'that which has become.' The truth of the human state is accomplished only at the end 
of our own becoming.” 816 
- Hegel 
 
Old Age, like The Second Sex, is a study of how it is one becomes the other. It examines how the aged 
are rendered the other by society and become other unto themselves. "Thinking of myself as an old 
person when I am twenty or forty," Beauvoir tells us, "means thinking of myself as someone else as 
another than myself."817 This inconceivable transformation that Beauvoir notes at one and the same 
time is a biological, an existential and a social phenomenon that remains hidden. In part because of 
bourgeois values and beliefs, and in part to ensure there is no risk of seeing the self reflected in their 
eyes, fearing a fate similar to their, the elderly are hidden away from society.818 And yet it is a fate 
that cannot be escaped. Even if one has seen his way through all the temptations and traps of 
otherness set for him across his life time based on his class, his race, his religion, and his gender, in 
the end, when he becomes old, as he must, he is subjected to a phenomenon - biological, 
psychological and social – that almost without exception will erode his sense of self and subjectivity 
he has worked towards acquiring and maintaining over a lifetime of activity and projects. It is this 
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transformation of the self into the other that marks not only this work but many of her writings from 
her late period. 
Her interest in writing on old age centered on  
. .  the idea of demystification, doing away with cant and humbug . . . 
But the reason why I made up my mind to embark upon this book 
was that I needed to understand a state that is my own, and to 
understand it in its implication for mankind as a whole, I am a 
woman, and I wished to throw light upon the woman's lot; I was on 
the threshold of old age, and I wished to know the bounds and the 
nature of the aged state.819  
The lives of the elderly remain a mystery to many, a mystery structured and maintained by bourgeois 
conventions and values. The old person is seen as "someone who is different, as another being."820 
What resulted was a series of studies on aging beginning with A Very Easy Death, and including The 
Woman Destroyed, Old Age, and Adieux: A Farwell to Sartre.  
It is in Old Age however, that she undertakes her most comprehensive and extensive study of 
the lived experience of the elderly. Using the interdisciplinary approach forged in The Second Sex, 
that is incorporating insights from history, biology, sociology and literature, Beauvoir employs the 
method she employed in her earlier study combining it with a more rigorous Marxist analysis than she 
heretofore had employed. Reflecting on her study of women, she notes that while she considered it to 
be successful, had she had the chance she would have re-written the work including a discussion of 
the economic basis for women being considered the Absolute Other looking at the role of "scarcity" 
in this process.821 Turning her attention to the problem of the other’s consciousness as it was lived in 
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and through the experience of aging, she undertakes in Old Age, as Deutscher notes, an exploration of 
recognition and distribution. 822 
In a manner resonate of Bergson’s notion of the two selves discussed earlier she traces this 
process from both an external and internal perspective.823 The first half of the text examines old age 
from an external perspective that is, from the standpoint of society at large, while the second half of 
the book looks at the lived experience of the elderly within society. More specifically, Beauvoir 
identifies how forces external to the individual - biology, history, culture, family, work, and 
government - render the old person the other. It is as such, a study of old age from an objective 
stance. She looks at the old person as "an object, an object from the scientific, historic and social 
point of view."824  
Emphasizing the systemic manner in which the elderly are relegated to the role of the other, 
she looks at how, as a result of biological changes and the interpretation given to those changes by the 
society in which one lives, the old person loses standing within the family, is alienated from the world 
of work, is forced to live on limited resources, and is often institutionalized. Throughout this section 
Beauvoir's emphasis is on how "the meaning and the value attached to old age vary in different 
societies."825 Old age is not just or even primarily a biological phenomenon; it is moreover a social 
phenomenon. 
There are two marked differences between this work on aging and Beauvoir's earlier 
phenomenological study of woman, two differences resulting from Beauvoir's new appreciation of 
Marx's theory of labour. In commenting on The Second Sex Beauvoir noted that her major criticism of 
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the work was that it had not taken enough consideration of economics. More specifically, she stated 
that she wished that she had relied on the notion of scarcity developed by Sartre in The Critique of 
Dialectical Reason and focused more specifically on the role that economics and resources play in 
instituting and maintaining oppression. In the first section of Old Age Beauvoir is careful to articulate 
how the loss of resources, the loss of economic power, leads to and maintains the oppression of the 
elderly. She lists statistics on the loss of income for the elderly. She provides descriptions of lived 
experience of those who lack resources. This leads, to the second shift evidenced between this text 
and The Second Sex. There is a new emphasis on the role of labour in the lives of individuals 
As she undertakes an ethnographic study of the elderly she emphasizes again and again that it 
is not the process of aging itself which leads to the devaluation of the elderly, but rather it is as a 
result of the interpretation of these changes associated with aging instilled in social structures and 
condoned in conventional beliefs that the elderly are deemed by society the other. That this is the case 
is revealed in her focus on the importance that the loss of work plays in contemporary society in the 
creation of the old man. 
As women have traditionally not worked and have been used to living through others, 
Beauvoir notes that their lives change little as they age. The same, however, is not true for men. The 
loss of status within the family, the loss of the ability to compete within economic circles, and the 
lack of projects that typically define the life of the old person, lead him or her to be conceived as the 
other. She explains how this is the case:  
Apart from some exceptions, the old man no longer does anything. 
He is defined by an exis, not by a praxis; a being, not a doing. That is 
why he looks to active members of the community like one of a 
'different species', one in whom they do not recognize themselves.826   
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Beauvoir concurs with Burgess who notes that "the role of the retired person . . . is no longer to 
possess one. It therefore means losing one's place in society, one's dignity and almost one's reality."827 
Through this account she emphasizes that "the human working stock is of interest only in so far as it 
is profitable. When it is no longer profitable it is tossed aside."828 This recognition has implications 
for how Beauvoir understands her project in Old Age 
Beauvoir is clear that what she offers her readers in the first part of this work is not a history 
of aging. Given the analysis above, the reason why such a history would be impossible to write 
becomes evident. History, she argues,  
. . . implies a certain circularity. The cause, which produces a given 
effect, is in its turn influenced by this same effect. The unity 
throughout time which thus evolves has some kind of meaning. The 
aged considered as social categories, have never influenced the 
progress of the world. When he loses his powers he takes on the 
appearance of another; he then becomes, and to a far more radical 
extent than a woman, a mere object. She is necessary to society 
whereas he is of no worth at all . . . It has been said that the Negro 
problem is a white problem; and that of women, a masculine 
problem: yet women are struggling for equality and the blacks are 
fighting against oppression; the aged have no weapons whatsoever, 
and their problem belongs strictly to the active adults.829 
There can be no history, in other words, of those deemed the Absolute Other. Along with women the 
elderly thus cannot enter into the master-slave dialectic for they are unable to work, to labour.  
While Beauvoir recounts how social forces, particularly material forces, construct the elderly 
as the other in society, to have explored the phenomenon of old age solely from an external 
perspective would be to provide an incomplete description of this lived experience. For it is not only 
that the elderly are seen as other by society. Like the women Beauvoir describes in The Second Sex, 
the elderly have become complicit in their own subjugation. They have become other unto 
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themselves. While in the first section of this study Beauvoir looks at how society transforms the aged 
into the other, in the second section of the book she turns her attention to exploring the interior, lived 
experience of being elderly. 
Part Two of Old Age describes the phenomenon of aging from a subjective perspective. It 
begins with a discussion of the discovery of old age. Inevitably and usually without warning, one 
morning one arises and finds that they are old.  And most often, they are the last to recognize this fact. 
There is nothing that is more expected and nothing that individuals are more surprised to discover 
about themselves. Beauvoir, in this the last of her major works, seeks to illuminate the lived 
experience of being old.830 Employing biographical resources she recounts how individuals come to 
acknowledge their own age, their experience of their own bodily decline, changes in the perception of 
time and history, and views towards death and dying. She describes herein the process of becoming 
other. Not of becoming other in the world, but of becoming other unto oneself.  
The uniqueness of the experience of growing old should be sufficient to temper the affects of 
time on the body. Few escape growing old and dying. It is the only fate of which individuals can be 
assured. And yet there is this kind of a surprise at its occurrence and a revolt against the fragility and 
vulnerability it reveals. The response is perhaps surprising. Deutscher perhaps best captures this 
experience when she recounts how, a “young person should be able to recognize him/herself in an 
older person because old age will happen to us all, because we share the necessity of aging, and we 
encompass our ongoing metamorphosis, what is often to be taken to be other.”831 The elderly 
embodying their future, the young should treat old people well, recognizing themselves in the other 
and the other in them. But in a manner all too often recorded in this study, faced with the other, who 
already resides within, the self transforms into the Absolute Other – refusing to recognize itself as 
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anything more than an object amongst objects. The elderly are elderly – they lose their distinctness, 
their projects, their value as they no longer “contribute” to society, that as, as they come to no longer 
work. They are hidden away in “institutions,” treated like children when recognized, if recognized as 
all.  
Perhaps it is no surprise, as such that while old age "is the general fate, and when it seizes 
upon our own personal life we are dumbfounded."832 Others are old. But the self, the self clings to the 
belief that it has remained the same.833 It cannot see the passing of time.834 Beauvoir recounts in this 
regard a woman who sees her friends become old and then one day is astounded that she is a granny 
too. Beauvoir notes in this context that "It is significant that at this moment of awareness she spoke to 
herself as tu: it was the Other within her she was addressing, the Other that existed for the rest but of 
whom she herself had no immediate knowledge."835 She recognizes "in the old person that we must 
become, we refuse to recognize ourselves."836 But while they might not see the other that they have 
become, the rest of society is always already judging them as such.  
Beauvoir notes that the revelation of our age comes to us from the outside.837 “I am treated as 
old. The outsider sees me as such . . .I try to picture myself in his eyes.”838 A split occurs. It is a 
unique experience for in that moment the self is no longer for others what it is for itself.839 The elderly 
are no longer themselves. There is a kind of desperation in their aspiration to cling to this image of 
who they once were. No doubt this resistance comes from recognizing the social, political and 
economic challenges they will face if they are old. So, "In order to recapture a picture of themselves 
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they are forced to use another's eyes - how does he see me? I ask this question of my looking-glass. 
The reply is vague,"840 but it says you are old. "An alien eye has transformed her into another 
being."841  
In the end, Beauvoir makes clear, 
Whether we like it or not in the end we submit to the outsider's point 
of view. . . We must assume a reality that is certainly ourselves 
although it reaches us from the outside and although we cannot grasp 
it. There is an insoluble contradiction between the obvious clarity of 
the inward feeling that guarantees our unchanging quality and the 
objective certainty of our transformation. All we can do is to waver 
from the one to the other.842 
Inevitably, there is acquiescence. Despite not feeling old, despite not wanting to be old, and despite 
all attempts to resist being seen and seeing him or her self as old,  
The elderly person conforms to the conventional ideal that is offered 
for his acceptance. He is afraid of scandal or quite simply of ridicule. 
He becomes the slave of what people might say. He inwardly accepts 
the watchwords of propriety and continence imposed by the 
community.843  
And in that moment, the elderly person realizes that "I am myself and yet it is not me any longer." 844 
They become divided within and against themselves. The other has come to reside in the self but 
there is no hope of reciprocity given the old person has been deemed the Absolute Other and lacks the 
freedom or the resources to counter this portrayal. Denied their subjectivity they are seen and see 
themselves as an object, as and through their body. But, indeed, it was their own body that betrayed 
them.  
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They are not even able to recover themselves in their memories. Beauvoir notes that "There 
are streets in Uzerche, Marseilles and Rouen where I can walk about, recognizing the houses, the 
stones; but I shall never find my plans again, my hopes and fears - I shall not find myself."845 In 
making this assertion she undermines the belief that the elderly can find comfort in their past. The 
past, she recognizes "is not a peaceful landscape lying there behind me, a country in which I can stroll 
wherever I please, and which will gradually show me all its secret hills and dales. As I was moving 
forward so it was crumbling."846 The past does not allow the elderly to revive the self that they once 
were. That self, indeed, the self is lost. There is no sidestepping this reality by escaping into a time 
that once was. Faced with a limited future and a frozen past, ultimately, there is the acceptance, the 
recognition that "Within me it is the Other. . .who is old: and that Other is myself."847 
In what would be her final work, Adieux: A Farwell to Sartre, Beauvoir describes Sartre’s 
final years providing her readers with a case study, a biographical sketch of how one, one who has 
asserted and held onto his subjectivity above all else, becomes, is transformed into the other. As noted 
by Idt, 
Sartre's singular case also serves as experimental verification of the 
hypotheses of the essay on old age. It verifies the constants 
determined in the second and most phenomenological part, on 
"being-in-the-world": the confusion between old age and illness, 
indifference, resignation, old people's lack of curiosity, their taking 
refuge in habit, their moroseness, their incapability of invention, 
their harrowing feeling of physical, financial and emotional 
insecurity.848 
Along with her study of her mother’s dying and death in A Very Easy Death, this account 
of Sartre as the elderly serves as did so many of her studies and her novels, as a means for 
grounding her theories and ideas. Herein she brings to light how the time and the place, 
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shapes and informs both how the body is lived and the significance and meaning which it 
is ascribes. It makes evident once more that the problem of the other’s consciousness is 
not a philosophical question but a challenge of lived experience. It grounds Hegel’s 
Phenomenology once more in the lifeworld showing the dialectic at work in the ordinary 
experiences of day-to-day life. And it showed the potential for the problem to be resolved.  
Even having identified and catalogued the multi-various institutions and social forces that 
contribute to the elderly being constructed by society and by themselves as the Absolute Other, 
Beauvoir is unwilling to consider their fate sealed. Recall that for Hegel self-consciousness is always 
“Becoming:”849the possibility for self-creation persists even as hair grows thin and grey and legs 
move at a slower pace. That the elderly find themselves without projects, that they find themselves 
strangers to others and strangers to themselves, is not a necessary truth of their existence but rather 
only a historical moment in the history of aging and the life of the old woman or the old man. The 
possibility of transforming the present persists. As she notes  
Hegelian philosophy puts forward a rational justification for this 
idea, according to which every past instant is enfolded in the present 
instant, which necessarily prepares a still more perfected future, even 
failures being put right in the end: old age, the final stage of a 
continual advance, is life's highest pitch of perfection. But in fact this 
is not how life progresses at all. It is line of advance is perpetually 
broken by the falling back of our projects into practico-inert reality. 
At every given moment it provides its own sum, but this summation 
is never completed: Human action amounts both to the whole and to 
the destruction of the whole. That is why our motion is not a firm 
advance, but rather that reeling staggering movement that Montaigne 
speaks of.850  
Change remains open to the individual and to the collective. But Beauvoir, is not naïve. She knows 
that the transformations in social institutions to facilitate change will be hard won.  
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The series of works that Beauvoir completes on aging and the elderly is a 
remarkable study not of becoming the self but of becoming the other. Tidd aptly 
summarizes this agenda noting how  
. . . in these body-oriented auto/biographical texts, written in the 
latter stages of her literary career, Beauvoir addresses the abject 
otherness of intersubjective relations. Through the representation of 
the other’s decline and death, she is able both to confront certain 
aspects of her own subjectivity which remained opaque in the 
memoirs and explore possibilities of reciprocity at a time when the 
other is potentially most distinct from the self—at the end of his/her 
life.851 
This “abject otherness,” For Beauvoir, "Old age exposes the failure of our entire civilization. It is the 
whole man that must be re-made, it is the whole relationship between man and man that must be 
recast if we wish the old person's state to be acceptable."852What this study makes evident is that for 
the elderly to shed the veneer of “abject otherness” which they have been ascribed, for them to be 
perceived as subjects "everything has to be reconsidered, recast from the very beginning."853With her 
new awareness of the manner in which material conditions shape and condition experiences of 
otherness, Beauvoir is clear that the economic situation of the elderly along with their health care 
must be reformed if society is to abandon the ideal of the elderly as the Absolute Other. But for this 
goal to be achieved there must be a radical transformation in the way the elderly see themselves. This 
is a difficult task for if the elderly are to be recognized they would always have to have been treated 
as “men” and not have been looked upon solely “as so much material."854 His freedom must be 
recognized by society and by himself. And freedom, as Hegel made clear, is something never given 
but always won.  
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Beauvoir remains optimistic.  Indeed, in her conclusion to this study she returns to discuss 
experiences of mutual recognition described in other of her works. She seems to hold open the 
possibility that the elderly and the woman and the lesbian and the person of colour remain able to 
escape their oppression. They need not forever be relegated to the role of the Absolute Other in 
society or in their own lives. She holds open the possibility not only for reciprocity to develop – for 
these disenfranchised groups to enter into a battle to win their freedom and the right to be seen in turn 
over time as now self and then other. No. In her choice of examples she makes clear that she holds 
out the possibility for her problem to be resolved and for there to be mutual recognition. Mutual 
recognition not just in theory, not as an ideal but in the lived experiences of even those most 
marginalized in society.  
In her conclusion to Old Age Beauvoir returns to her account of genuine love and eroticism in 
The Second Sex and dares to describe the love lives of the elderly. She does much herein to dispel the 
myth that the elderly are asexual. And in so doing, she returns to her discussion of reciprocal 
recognition, for  
In the turmoil and desire of sexual activity the consciousness and the 
body become as one in order to reach the other as a body and in such 
a way as to enthrall and possess him; there is a twofold reciprocal 
embodiment, a transformation of the world, now a world of desire. 
The attempt at possession necessarily fails, since the other remains a 
subject; but before it reaches its end, the drama of reciprocity is 
experienced in the act of love in one of its most extreme and 
revealing forms. If it takes on the character of a struggle then it 
begets hostility; more often it implies a 'togetherness' that encourages 
tender affection. In a couple whose love does away with the distance 
between "I" and the other even failure is overcome.855 
Beauvoir echoes herein Hegel who in The Philosophy of Mind notes that in sexual relations "each sex 
feels in the other not an alien externality but its own self, or the genus common to both."856In genuine 
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love and in its expression through eroticism, the distinction between self and other disappears or 
rather it is manifold. The self sees the other as both subject and object and at one and the same time is 
recognizes as being similarly constituted. As Bergoffen notes, "It is from the erotic intoxicated 
experience of ourselves as simultaneously subject and object that we are able to experience the other 
as simultaneously subject and object with us."857 Individuals even in their old age have the potential 
to become, to find anew themselves in the other and to find the other resides within them.  
The same kinds of relations are possible through writing. Beauvoir concludes her study of 
aging and in many ways concludes her literary career, with perhaps one of her most eloquent 
descriptions of writing. She begins by noting that  
Philosophy considers man qua notion: it seeks to know his total 
relationship to the world. The writer too aims at the universal, but 
from the standpoint of his uniqueness. He does not claim to provide 
knowledge, but to communicate that which cannot be known - the 
inwardly experienced meaning of his being in the world. He conveys 
it by means of a unique universal, his work. The universal is not 
made unique nor has the work any literary dimension, unless the 
author's presence is revealed by a style, a tone, and an artistic power 
that bear his mark. Otherwise we are dealing with a document, 
something that conveys reality in its impersonal objectivity on the 
plane of exterior knowledge, and not as the inward experience of a 
subject. But how can my inward experience become that of another? 
In one way only, by means of the imagination. The reader of a 
document gathers information about one of the parts of his world 
without leaving that world: he remains in his place there - he does 
not move from the given spot of the given moment in his life. The 
reader of a literary work enters a world that is Other: he becomes 
part of a subject other than himself. This implies that he denies 
reality in order to plunge into the imaginary. This is possible to him 
only if the work he reads offers him an imaginary world. The 
communication of inward experience, of experience that has been 
lived through, does not consist of setting down words on paper 
directly designed to express it. That which has been lived does not 
assume a given form: for the writer it is a question of extracting clear 
and intelligible statements from the opaque confusion of the unsaid. 
He thus creates an object that interprets no reality and that exists in 
                                                      
857 Bergoffen, 1995, 187-188. 
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the imaginary mode; and for his own part he provides himself with a 
fictitious composition.858 
At first glance perhaps it seems strange to find here at the end of her last major work, a study of the 
elderly, her to be discussing writing.859 Or, perhaps not.   
In writing, as in genuine love, the self becomes the other at the same time as the other 
becomes the self.  Harkening back once more to the problem that this study has shown frames her 
thinking across her life time, the problem of the other’s consciousness, harkening back once more to 
her on-going conversation with Hegel on the possibility of recognition, Beauvoir seems here to be 
reminding her readers of the theme that pervades her late works – this idea of becoming – of self-
consciousness as self-creation. The elderly are not destined but can be transformed. They can be 
transformed despite being deemed the Absolute Other. Taking into consideration their lifeworld, that 
is in light of the historical time period, the place, the bodies and the material circumstances, that 
frame their lived experience, they can see themselves anew and in so doing necessitate that others see 
them differently. They can take up new projects and write for themselves new stories. Here at the end 
of their lives still remain open the possibility for the development of mutual recognition.  
6.8 Conclusion 
“this problem of the other’s consciousness.” 860 
- Beauvoir 
 
And coming to the conclusion of this study of Beauvoir’s oeuvre, it seems that we simultaneously 
find ourselves at the end of Hegel’s Phenomenology. For not only has his dialectic framed her work 
with each reading of it she undertakes, but moreover, it seems to have framed her study across her 
lifetime. For, in the early works she writes of the self that cannot see anything that is other, of the 
                                                      
858 OA 444 -445, V 422. 
859 Following the publication of Old Age, Beauvoir would write only one other book, Adieux: A Farewell to 
Sartre, which as argued earlier, is in many ways a case study of the ideas she develops and explores herein.  
860 Simons, 1999, 10. 
  234 
kind of mastery assumed at the level of Absolute Consciousness. In her student diaries and She Came 
To Stay, she tells the story of those who see the other only in terms of themselves – of those who 
ultimately have no self, for without the other Françoise knows not who she is.  
As she begins to see the limitations of this excessive individualism and of the consequences 
of such hostility as the war begins to change her life, and history falls upon her, her views are 
transformed. She does not abandon the idea that there is always the possibility for the individual to 
subsume the other in itself – to find itself the sole subject in a world of objects. However, she begins 
to recognize that there are other subjects in the world, or at least that there are those who have the 
potential for being subjects. She realizes that there are such risks at hand. It is a battle to the death that 
subjects find themselves amidst – a battle in which there will be a master and there will be a slave -- 
but just who is who will never be entirely clear. Acknowledging the necessary intertwining of self and 
other in The Blood of Others and in Pyrrhus and Cinéas, she comes to realize that self and other are 
responsible for each other. There remains the possibility for hostility and conflict to flourish when 
self-consciousnesses encounter each other. But there also arises the possibility for something more. In 
her mature works she considers how some form of recognition might develop between self and other.  
Beyond Absolute Otherness, she explores the conditions for the possibility of reciprocity and 
imagines mutual recognition as she explores the problem of women in The Second Sex.  She pulls 
together these elements of the dialectic in The Mandarins and in the very act of writing it begins to 
draw faith in the possibility that mutual recognition could be something more than an ideal. She 
realizes through her characters and in their creation, that is, in writing and reading, that there is a 
moment when author and reader meet, a moment when the self is in the other and the other is in the 
self. True, such moments are hard to achieve, but in her later works she will explore, through the 
writing of her own life and in telling the story of the stories of the women in The Woman Destroyed 
how this might be achieved.  
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She will refine her theory and identify the many ways that are held open for one to write to 
see the self within the self or the other within the other.  But in the end, in her last works on old age, 
she will still hold out hope. She will write of the institutions that work to transform one into the other, 
and she will write of how the self capitulates. But she will hold out hope that things can be otherwise. 
She retells a story once told to her, and as she comes towards it close, tells those who have followed 
her words, followed his words, that  “This time I will not write a conclusion to my book. I leave the 
reader to draw any he may wish to choose.”861 
 
 
                                                      
861 ASD 500, TCF 513. 
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